Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Lawrence Gray
Maurice Cranston
Paul Noack
Lewis S. Feuer

JULY-AUGUST 1978



EUROCOMMUNISM 1978

France • Frank L. Wilson

Spain • Eusebio Mujal-Leon

Moscow's View • Richard Lowenthal

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Problems of Communism

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Cover: Georges Marchais, Secretary-General of the French Communist Party (PCF), at a rally on September 28, 1977, when he told 30,000 party faithful that the PCF would not change its program demands to accommodate the Socialist Party—a partner in the Common Program. Photo by Daniel Simon-Gamma/Liaison.

EDITOR
Paul A. Smith, Jr.

SENIOR EDITOR (TEXT) David E. Albright
SENIOR EDITOR (MANAGEMENT) Wayne Hall
ASSOCIATE EDITOR Paul A. Shapiro
DESIGNER Gary Soderstrom

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Eurocommunism 1978

EDITORS' NOTE—The 1970's have seen the growth in a number of Communist parties of trends loosely termed "Eurocommunist." While the meaning and merits of the term itself remain subjects of controversy, the phenomenon is there, and its basic features are clear. These include a preference for parliamentary over violent means of achieving power, an avowed respect for political and civil rights, a tempering of the more extreme forms of collectivism in economic and social affairs, and a tendency to reject Soviet hegemony in interparty relations. The articles presented here explore a number of issues related to the phenomenon. Looking at France, Mr. Wilson appraises the alliance policy of the French Communist Party (PCF) in the March 1978 elections and the effects of both the policy and the elections on the internal affairs and political prospects of the PCF. Turning to Spain, Mr. Mujal reviews the failure of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) to shape Spain's political transition to the post-Franco era and the impact of that failure on the party's fortunes. Examining the Soviet perspective on "Eurocommunism," Mr. Lowenthal notes the friction between Moscow and the "Eurocommunist" parties but points to reasons why that friction has not led to schism.

The French CP's Dilemma

By Frank L. Wilson

In 1975, a respected observer of French Communism remarked that the one thing that could be said with certainty about the evolving French Communist Party (PCF) was that it wanted to be in power.[1] The party had chosen a peaceful path to power based on coalition with the Socialist Party (PS) and had demonstrated its commitment to this path by signing the Common Program of the Left in 1972 and cooperating with the Socialists in the 1973 legislative and 1974 presidential election campaigns.[2] However, during preparations for the spring 1978 legislative elections, it seemed that

Mr. Wilson is Associate Professor of Political Science, Purdue University (Lafayette, IN), and Resident Director of the Indiana-Purdue Foreign Study Program in Strasbourg, France. He has written The French Democratic Left, 1963-1968: Toward a Modern Party System, *1971, and several articles on contemporary French politics.*

1. Georges Lavau, "The PCF, the State, and the Revolution: An Analysis of Party Policies, Communications, and Popular Culture," in Donald L. M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Eds., *Communism in Italy and France,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 129.

2. For discussion of the development of the PCF-PS alliance, see François G. Dreyfus, *Histoire des gauches en France 1940-1974* (History of the Lefts in France, 1940-1974), Paris, Grasset, 1975; Howard Machin and Vincent Wright, "The French Left Under the Fifth Republic: The Search for Identity and Unity," *Comparative Politics* (New York, NY), October 1977, pp. 35-67; Jean Poperen, *L'Unité de la Gauche 1965-1973* (The Unity of the Left, 1965-1973), Paris, Fayard, 1975; Robert Verdier, *Histoire des rapports du parti socialiste et du parti communiste du congrès de Tours en 1920 à aujourd'hui* (History of Relations between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party from the Tours Congress of 1920 to Today), Paris, Seghers, 1976; and Frank L. Wilson, "The Left in French Politics: Prospects for Union," *Contemporary French Civilization* (Bozeman, MT), Winter 1978, pp. 205-29.

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Georges Marchais, Secretary-General of the French Communist Party, discusses the Communists' posture in the ongoing electoral campaign at a national conference of the PCF in Paris on January 7, 1978. The signs on the lectern and in the background indicate the PCF's effort to present itself as the sole true spokesman of the French Left. They read: "There Is Only One Way to Really Win and Bring About Change in 1978: Vote Communist!"

—Pierre Vauthey/SYGMA.

the PCF had lost interest—at least temporarily—in assuming governmental responsibilities. The Communists clearly did not want to come to power with the Socialists under existing circumstances.

The principal cause of the shift which had taken place in the PCF's attitude was the intensified competition that had developed between the PCF and the PS during the period prior to the elections. Formerly, each party had possessed a distinctive appeal that defined its electorate and attracted certain types of individuals into its ranks. But as the PS radicalized its outlook after 1971 and the PCF moderated some of its doctrinal positions, the distinctiveness of the two parties in the public eye diminished to such an extent that the PCF and the PS found themselves appealing to approximately the same categories of voters and hoping to attract very similar types for roles as party activists. Both sides have admitted the competitive nature of their alliance. On the one hand, the Socialists have made clear their desire to win over a substantial portion of the PCF's voters and to establish party sections in the workplace to compete with PCF factory cells.[3] On the other, the Communists are determined to retain their claim to be the leading force of the Left,[4] a claim which they base on the tenets of Marxist-Leninist doctrine as well as on the PCF's hold on more than one fifth of the French electorate.

During earlier periods of joint action with the Socialists—e.g., during the Popular Front experiment of the 1930's and the wartime resistance—Communist strength had increased greatly as the PCF extended its influence and control over major new

3. A few days after signing the Common Program of the Left in 1972, Socialist Party leader François Mitterrand declared to the 14th Congress of the Socialist International (Vienna) that his fundamental objective was "to rebuild the large Socialist Party on the terrain occupied by the Communist Party itself in order to demonstrate that out of five million Communist voters, three million can vote Socialist." *Le Monde* (Paris), June 30, 1972.

4. In 1975, PCF leader Georges Marchais warned: "It is absolutely essential that the PC progress for the Union of the Left to be consolidated. We will come to power with the Socialists only if two conditions are met: a profound unitary current and a very strong Communist Party." *L'Express* (Paris), Nov. 17, 1975.

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portions of the French electorate and labor movement. In comparison, the recent era of left-wing unity has been significantly less rewarding. Indeed, since the signing of the Common Program of the Left in 1972, the Socialists have been the major beneficiary of PS-PCF cooperation. In a series of by-elections for the National Assembly between 1974 and 1977, the PS increased its electoral strength in the districts involved from 18.9 percent of the vote in 1973 to 26.5 percent, while the strength of the PCF declined slightly from 18.2 percent in 1973 to 17.0 percent.[5] Similar Socialist Party electoral growth and Communist stagnation was reflected in the results of the 1976 cantonal and 1977 municipal elections.[6] In addition, the *Confédération Général du Travail,* the Communist-run labor union, also seemed to be losing its predominant hold over the national trade union movement.[7]

As a result of these developments, the PCF's claim to be the leading force of the Left became increasingly subject to question. After 1974, the news media and the public came to regard Socialist leader François Mitterrand as the de facto leader of the Left, i.e., as the Left's privileged interlocutor with the government and the spokesman of the Left on national issues. Resentful of the public attention thus directed toward the Socialist Party and its head, the PCF went so far as to accuse Mitterrand of being too sure of himself and too domineering, the exact same criticism that the party had once leveled against Charles de Gaulle.[8] The depth of PCF resentment became clear in the spring of 1977 when, two days before Mitterrand faced Prime Minister Raymond Barre in a nationally televised

5. See Wilson, "The Left in French Politics" loc. cit., pp. 214-15.

6. Alain Lancelot, "The Red and the Green: The Elections of March 13 and 20, 1977," *Projet* (Paris), No. 116, June 1977, pp. 703-18.

7. The results of professional union elections demonstrated the CGT's decline in support among workers voting from 50.8 percent in 1966 to 42.0 percent in 1974. *Le Monde,* Feb. 4, 1978.

8. Ibid., Feb. 11, 1975.

François Mitterrand, right, First Secretary of the Socialist Party, debates with French Premier Raymond Barre, left, on French television on May 12, 1977. At the center left is host Henri Marque, and at center right is questioner Julien Besançon.

—AFP/Pictorial Parade.

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debate, the party leadership publicized its estimate that the Common Program would cost some US$100 billion to implement.[9] This estimate embarrassed the Socialists, and they denied its accuracy. Nevertheless, Mitterrand found himself on the defensive in an important precampaign debate.

From this point on, relations between the two major allies of the Left deteriorated rapidly. National Assembly elections had to be held by the end of March 1978, when the five-year mandate of the existing Assembly expired, and as the election deadline approached, the PCF became increasingly concerned over the likely electoral impact of growing PS strength in the Left alliance and nationally. How the PCF responded to the increasing pressure under which it was operating, how the party fared in the national elections finally scheduled for mid-March, how it reacted to the results of the election, and what the party's post-election options are for the future are all questions which must be addressed within the context of the present essay.

The PCF and the 1978 Elections

As the 1978 elections grew imminent, public opinion polls of voting intentions indicated that the Socialists might win as much as 30 percent of the national vote (in contrast to 18.9 percent in 1973) and replace the Gaullists as the strongest party in France, while the Communists would likely garner about the same 21 percent of the vote that they had been receiving in national elections ever since 1958.[10] The PCF feared that this shift in electoral strength within the alliance would affect the number of PCF candidates eligible for second ballot runoffs.[11] Because the parties of the Left had been committed since 1967 to reciprocal withdrawals in the runoffs in favor of the best-placed leftist candidates in the first ballot, Socialist electoral growth coupled with Communist inertia might result in fewer PCF candidates in the runoffs and fewer opportunities for the party to win parliamentary seats. The Communists also feared that over the long run their supporters might conclude that since they would be voting for Socialists on the second ballot anyway, they might as well do so on the first. With a victory for the Left a distinct possibility in the elections, the PCF did not want to see this happen.

On the programmatic side, the PCF wanted assurances that, in case of victory, the PS would honor its commitment to socialist policies. The details of the Common Program worked out in 1972—i.e., before the onset of the international energy crisis and the recession and problems of inflation that the crisis engendered—clearly needed revision before the 1978 elections. But as the Communists and Socialists settled down to reviewing the joint platform, the full extent of their disagreements and of the tension between them was revealed. The PCF, pressing for new concessions by the Socialists, demanded a thorough rewriting of the 1972 agreement, while the PS envisaged only some minor updating. Moreover, the two partners were not even able to agree on the meaning of the original 1972 program. The PCF asserted that the 1972 document provided for the nationalization of all subsidiary firms in which the state acquired a majority interest by nationalizing the parent corporations. This interpretation expanded the number of projected nationalizations from the nine industrial conglomerates listed in the 1972 program to over a thousand firms. In addition, the PCF wanted to add six more industrial giants, including all of the steel industry, to the Left's list of proposed nationalizations. The PS rejected the PCF interpretation of the 1972 agreement regarding subsidiaries and consented to nationalize only companies fully owned by the parent firm. It also opposed extending the number of firms to be nationalized during the life of the next legislature, although it did indicate a willingness to consider nationalizing the steel industry at a future time. Beyond these issues, the two parties disagreed on the question of compensation for owners of nationalized firms and on the forms of management to be instituted in the public sector.[12] Differences of similar scope emerged regarding a broad range of economic, social, and defense issues.

The PS had a much stronger bargaining position in 1977 than it had held when the Common Program was originally drafted in 1972 and resisted commitment to any radical new proposals. Like the Communists, the Socialists felt that victory was at hand, and they wanted to avoid committing themselves to measures that might provoke social or economic instability when a government of the Left took power.

9. *L'Humanité* (Paris), May 10, 1977.

10. For summaries of preelection polls, see Jean Charlot, "French Voting Intentions," *Projet*, No. 122, February 1978, pp. 186-90; and Jérome Jaffré and Jacques Ozouf, "From the Municipals to the Legislatives," ibid., No. 116, June 1977, pp. 719-27.

11. The French electoral system provides for runoff elections one week after the initial balloting in all districts where no candidate wins an absolute majority of votes cast on the first ballot.

12. For a discussion of the two parties' conceptions of the purpose and nature of nationalization, see Pierre-Yves Cosse, "The Nationalizers," *Projet*, No. 123, March 1978, pp. 347-53.

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The convening on September 14, 1977, of the summit meeting of the signers of the 1972 Common Program of the Left. These talks revealed considerable rifts among the three leftist parties. Seen third from the left is Robert Fabre, head of the Left Radicals; at the center rear, François Mitterrand, head of the Socialists; and second from the right, Georges Marchais, head of the Communists.

—Rush/Katherine Young.

With neither the PS nor the PCF willing to compromise, negotiations between them ended in failure on September 23, 1977. Disagreement over the question of nationalizations was the immediate cause of the breakdown, but the two parties had also failed to reach agreement on a much broader range of social and economic issues. As might be expected, each side blamed the other for the failure of the negotiations, the PS arguing that the PCF was engaging in demagogic attempts to "outbid" its partners, and the PCF claiming that the PS had taken a turn to the right.[13]

From this point on, the PCF attacked its partner of the Left more frequently than it did the Giscardist/Gaullist parliamentary majority. Its major objective in the upcoming elections became to limit the Socialist Party's advances. To achieve this goal, the PCF sought first to consolidate control over its own supporters and then to woo to its side voters wavering between Communist and Socialist candidates, by arguing that the Socialists had forgotten their commitment to a genuine socialist transformation of society. PCF Secretary-General Georges Marchais charged that the PS intended to "manage the social crisis in the interests of big capital and to continue to impose austerity upon the workers."[14] Allegedly, the PS had given in to its social democratic inclinations and was even being tempted by appeals of French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing that the PS join the majority. In support of such allegations, the Communists cited the refusal of the Socialists to accept the revisions of the Common Program proposed by the PCF, the removal of left-wing elements from the PS leadership,[15] and some statements made at the PS party congress held during

13. On the dispute between the two parties, see Kathleen Evin and Roland Cayrol, "How to Control the Union? PC-PS Relations since 1971," *Projet*, No. 121, January 1978, pp. 63-74.

14. See the report of George Marchais to the Central Committee of the PCF, in *L'Humanité*, Nov. 11, 1977.

15. The left-wing faction CERES was maneuvered out of national party leadership positions in 1975. Its influence in the party was further diminished in the 1977 municipal elections when many CERES-led local party units made what other PS elements considered to be excessive concessions to the PCF.

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the summer of 1977 that suggested plans to delay or modify some policies proposed in the Common Program.[16] Before the Left could come to power and carry out a genuine socialist program, argued the Communists, it was essential that the PCF grow stronger. To emphasize its commitment to this idea, the PCF threatened not to accede to reciprocal withdrawals of leftist candidates in second-ballot runoffs if the PCF did not receive more than the 21 percent of the first-ballot vote that the polls indicated it would get.[17]

As the electoral campaign entered its critical last weeks, however, the leadership of the PCF became worried that its attacks on the PS might, in the end, permit the Socialists to attract Center-Left voters unhappy with the conservativism of the current majority but fearful of any Communist participation in the government. The deterioration of the PCF/PS partnership created a possibility for these voters to support the PS. To rekindle the fears of such voters, the PCF stated flatly that if the Left won a parliamentary majority in March, the PCF would be represented in the new government. Furthermore, the PCF would demand participation commensurate with its electoral strength and would not be excluded from eligibility for any ministry, even the most sensitive ones.[18] The PCF also kept the question of second-ballot withdrawals alive, as a means of threatening to force the PS to negotiate with it between the first and second ballots.[19]

Signers of the Common Program patch up their differences long enough to coordinate strategy for the second round of the French parliamentary elections in March 1978. Seen at a March 13 press conference are, from left to right: Georges Marchais of the French Communist Party, François Mitterrand of the Socialist Party, and Robert Fabre of the Left Radicals.

—Gamma/Liaison.

When the first-ballot votes were counted, both the PCF and the PS were disappointed by the results. The PCF had polled 20.6 percent of the vote, down from 21.3 percent in 1973; the PS had received 22.6 percent, up from 18.9 percent in 1973 but well below the results which had been forecast in public opinion polls.[20] Seeking to limit their losses on the second ballot, the parties of the Left hastily issued a joint programmatic declaration and agreed to reciprocal withdrawals in the runoff elections. In the declaration, both the PCF and the PS indicated their adherence to the 1972 Common Program and to the modifications which had already been agreed upon when the negotiations between the parties broke down the previous September. They also established mutually acceptable proposals for increased social welfare benefits. In return for rejoining the partnership on these terms, the PCF received assurances of its representation without discrimination in any left-wing government formed, with ministries apportioned on the basis of electoral rather than parliamentary strength. This seemed to assure the Communists nearly half the ministries in any postelection government of the Left.[21]

The last-minute reunion of the Left, however, failed to prevent the reelection of a Giscardist/Gaullist parliamentary majority. The prospect of a left-

16. See Mitterrand's speech in *Le Monde,* June 21, 1977; and the PCF Political Bureau's comments in ibid., June 22, 1977.

17. See Georges Marchais at the PCF National Conference, as cited in ibid., Jan. 8-9, 1978.

18. See the interview with Paul Laurent, the second-ranking PCF leader, in *L'Express,* Feb. 20, 1978.

19. Early indications that the PCF might withhold automatic second-ballot withdrawals were noted by Thierry Pfister in *Le Monde,* Dec. 24, 1977.

20. The last poll published before the election showed the PS winning 26 percent of the vote. *L'Express,* Feb. 20, 1978.

21. The precise wording of the agreement called for the formation of a government "taking into account the indications of the expression of universal suffrage and the parliamentary representation won by each party, with equality of rights and duties . . . . " *Le Monde,* Mar. 15, 1978.

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wing government, which had seemed nearly certain seven months earlier, had been lost.

Yet the results of the election were not altogether unsatisfying for the PCF leadership. The party had increased the number of its votes by some 700,000, even though its percentage of the vote had declined slightly. Because its candidates had done better than the Socialists in the first round in areas where the Left was strongest, the PCF had benefited more than the PS from reciprocal withdrawals in the run-offs. The PCF parliamentary delegation grew by twelve seats, that of the Socialists by only nine. The PCF had also demonstrated again the fidelity of its voter base, which followed the party through two abrupt voltes-face in six months—first, after September 23, 1977, when the PCF launched its attacks on its Socialist ally, and then, after March 13, 1978, when the PCF called on its voters to support Socialist candidates on the second ballot even though the party had failed to attain the minimum percentage of first-ballot votes that Marchais had stipulated as a prerequisite for such reciprocal withdrawals. Finally, the PCF leaders could seek solace in the fact that the Socialist Party had registered only limited gains, receiving 22.6 percent of the vote instead of the 26-28 percent predicted in the last polls.

The Aftermath of the Elections

Despite these encouraging factors, the election was a defeat for the PCF as well as for the Left as a whole. For the first time since World War II, the PCF had been outpolled by the Socialists, and the Left had lost its best chance since 1936 to install a left-wing government. With its supporters fully expecting victory, the PCF had to explain its defeat to limit demoralization and demobilization. There were good reasons for the Left's defeat: an exceptionally high voter turnout (83 percent of the electorate), which in France tends to favor the Right; a very effective campaign by Giscardist and Gaullist forces; and the basic conservatism of the majority of French voters. A portion of the Center-Left electorate may have been disgruntled with the existing majority and expressed this dissatisfaction by voting for the Left in by-elections, cantonal, and municipal elections, and by telling pollsters they would vote Socialist in the upcoming national legislative elections. But in the privacy of the voting booth, most of these potential swing voters rejected the risks of radical social change represented by the Left in favor of stability and security under a Giscardist/Gaullist majority. Divisions within the Left do not appear to have had a significant impact on the outcome of the elections. A comparison of public opinion polls of voting intentions before and after the PCF/PS split in September 1977 shows virtually no change in expressed party preferences.[22] Moreover, despite the rancor existing between Communist and Socialist leaders, supporters of both parties proved disciplined in shifting their votes to the single leftist candidate on the second ballot.[23]

In making their own evaluations of the election results, however, neither the PCF nor the PS was interested in such matter-of-fact explanations. Each party placed full responsibility for the defeat on its erstwhile partner. The PCF's Political Bureau declared that the PCF "bears no responsibility" for the Left's defeat and that the Socialists had brought on the defeat by their conviction that they could win without the PCF.[24] Later the Political Bureau added: "The direct cause of the failure of the Left to come to power lies in the disastrous and suicidal strategy of the PS and nowhere else."[25] The Socialist Party responded in kind, denying any responsibility for the loss and placing full blame on the PCF. Its Executive Bureau called upon workers to judge the "strategy of failure of the Communist Party, which had deprived them of their victory and of the changes which would have come to each one of them."[26]

Perhaps the most telling outcome of the 1978 elections developed when the PCF leadership's attempt to place full responsibility for the Left's defeat on the Socialists was not well received by portions of the party's own membership. Indeed, the leadership's election strategies and tactics touched off an unparalleled debate within the party. The malaise revealed may have lacked the intensity and soul-searching nature of the 1956 crisis produced by Nikita Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's excesses and by suppression of the Hungarian uprising, [27] but the internal debate which resulted was certainly noisier than had been the case two decades before. Because the PCF leadership denied

22. See Jean Charlot, "French Voting Intentions," loc. cit.

23. Jean Charlot calculated that 96 percent of PCF voters supported PS candidates on the second ballot where appropriate and that 66 percent of PS voters transferred their votes to PCF candidates where appropriate. In 1973, the results had been only slightly better: then 68 percent of PS voters affected had shifted to PCF candidates on the second ballot. *Le Point* (Paris), Mar. 26, 1978.

24. *L'Humanité*, Mar. 20, 1978.

25. Ibid., Apr. 5, 1978.

26. *Le Monde*, Apr. 14, 1978.

27. See Annie Kriegel's comments in *Le Figaro* (Paris), Apr. 12, 1978.

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Jean Elleinstein, right, member of the French Communist Party Central Committee and author of several histories of the USSR, at a May 28, 1978, meeting of the Communist Youth Movement in Paris. With him on the rostrum is Soviet dissident Leonid Plyutshch.

—Richard Melloul/SYGMA.

critics the right to express themselves in the party press, claiming that to allow them to do so would violate party rules,[28] disgruntled Communists sent letters, communiqués, and resolutions to the "bourgeois" press. *Le Monde* alone received approximately one hundred letters in a single month from PCF members, the overwhelming majority of which expressed unhappiness with the party's leadership and strategies.[29] Most of the criticism that reached the public originated with the party's intellectuals, but there were signs of discontent among ordinary working-class party members as well.

One line of criticism, elaborated most fully by Communist historian Jean Elleinstein,[30] contended that the party had erred in moving too slowly and too cautiously to reform its doctrine and also in breaking with the Socialists during the election campaign. According to this right-wing view, the failure of the PCF to rethink its brand of Marxism-Leninism as the Italian and Spanish communist parties had done explained why the party had been unable to extend its influence beyond its existing social base. The PCF had to be clearer in its rejection of the Soviet model, which Elleinstein contended was an "anti-model" of the way socialism ought to be built. By allying with the Socialists without carrying out internal reforms, he asserted, the PCF stimulated rapid Socialist growth but deprived itself of any share of the benefits of left-wing unity. Finally, at the tactical level, Elleinstein argued that the party's campaign theme of fighting poverty at the expense of the rich was poorly conceived. He and others pointed out that French workers are no longer poor. Rather, they and their white-collar and intellectual colleagues feel oppressed by novel, noneconomic problems—excessive bureaucratization, urban decay, feminist demands, and hierarchical relationships in industry and business—to which the PCF rarely pays any attention at all.

At the same time that Elleinstein was airing these views, the PCF leadership was being attacked from the left as well, by critics such as Communist philosopher Louis Althusser.[31] In the leftists' view, the party had erred not in reforming too little but in reforming too much. The PCF had strayed too far from the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism by abandoning its commitments to revolution and to such notions as the dictatorship of the proletariat.

28. See the party's defense of its decision in *France Nouvelle* (Paris), Apr. 10, 1978, and in *L'Humanité*, Apr. 15, 1978.

29. *Le Monde*, May 10, 1978.

30. Jean Elleinstein in ibid., Apr. 13, 14, and 15, 1978. See also Maurice Goldring, member of the editorial board of the Communist weekly *France Nouvelle*, in *Témoignage Chrétien* (Paris), Apr. 13, 1978.

31. Louis Althusser in *Le Monde*, Apr. 25, 26, 27, and 28, 1978.

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Only a return to its Leninist heritage could spare the party even further decline. The left wing agreed with the party leadership that the PS was still closely tied to its social democratic past, but asked why under these circumstances the PCF had allowed the PS to maneuver itself into a position from which it could dominate the Left. Surely the PCF knew enough of the Socialist Party's weaknesses to have been aware that this danger existed. It should not have let Mitterrand represent the Left in the 1974 presidential elections and should have made the decision to break with the Socialists, or at least to fight against growing Socialist preeminence, much earlier. When the party ultimately launched its attack on the PS, it did so in such a way that it appealed only to a narrow circle of sectarian Communists and distressed most other sympathizers of the Left.

Both sets of critics, on the right and on the left, agreed in attacking the lack of internal democracy in the PCF. They charged the leadership with Stalinist tendencies and with refusing to give consideration to the attitudes of grass-roots party members. They specifically pointed out that the leadership's abrupt reversals of party position—first in September by launching an all-out campaign against the PS, and then in March by calling on party sympathizers to support the PS in second-ballot runoffs—had been decided without consultation or even explanation at the grass-roots level. They further complained about the party's refusal to permit them to express themselves in the party press and charged that the party was using all possible devices to curtail the debate.

Early efforts by the leadership to limit and channel the debate were unsuccessful. Even as the leadership denied the significance of the dissent evident within the party and alleged that those who criticized the party were simply serving the



French Communist Party philosopher and Central Committee member Louis Althusser reads a copy of his party's newspaper L'Humanité *in May 1978, shortly after his articles criticizing the party's current strategy had appeared in the noncommunist newspaper* Le Monde.

—Jacques Pavlovsky/SYGMA.

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interests of the Right and of the Socialist Party, the unprecedented public exchange of views continued to rage for over a month.

When the PCF Central Committee met at the end of April to evaluate the March election results, the leadership hoped finally to put an end to the debate. In his report, Marchais attacked both Althusser and Elleinstein, for left-wing and right-wing deviations respectively.[32] He used the fact that criticism came from both the right and the left of the party to argue that the leadership's strategy was the correct one. He attacked the Socialist Party for returning to a social democratic orientation and for failing to keep commitments to radical social transformation made when the Common Program of the Left was signed in 1972. On this basis, he defended his own party's conduct during the elections and again placed full responsibility for the Left's defeat on the PS. Marchais minimized the importance of those Communists who had attacked the party, charging that they were intellectuals out of touch with the feelings of the working-class rank and file, and criticized them for promoting ideas which would "lead the party to liquidation." This report was adopted unanimously, without serious consideration being given to the dissenters' complaints.[33] In a press conference after the meeting, Marchais denied that there was malaise or controversy within the party. He dismissed the chorus of public criticism that had preceded

32. The report was published in full in *L'Humanité*, Apr. 28, 1978.

33. *L'Humanité* did not publish a summary of the Central Committee debate, but there were indications that some Central Committee members cautiously expressed understanding for some of the dissidents' positions. One PCF leader candidly admitted to a local PCF meeting that the debate was not published because it "might have threatened the unity of the party." *Le Monde*, May 17, 1978.

Secretary-General Georges Marchais holds a press conference at the headquarters of the French Communist Party on May 3, 1978, to downplay reports about a party Central Committee meeting the preceding week to deal with sharp criticism of the PCF's election strategy by party dissenters of various hues.

—AGIP/SYGMA.

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the meeting as "a small, marginal discussion without interest for the party."[34]

After such cavalier treatment of their views, some of the dissenters refused to accept the authoritative decisions of the Central Committee related to the debate and continued to criticize the party. Althusser, for instance, contended that Marchais and the Central Committee had failed to respond to any of the questions raised by the party's critics and urged the dissenters to stay in the party and fight for their positions with all the weapons offered by the party rules.[35]

By this juncture, however, the PCF leadership had become less tolerant of such attacks. The Political Bureau warned that the continued questioning of the party's decisions and of the authority of its leaders in the press was "unjustified and unjustifiable," and that "it is unthinkable for these activities . . . [to] take place without a necessary political reply."[36] Throughout the crisis, the leadership had pledged that expulsion from the party would not be used against the dissenters. But by early June, Marchais had issued a warning that, while he did not want to see anyone expelled, no one should be under the illusion that the leadership would permit the development of factions within the party.[37]

The PCF leadership also attempted to divide its foes by focusing its attacks on the left-wing critics, whose arguments had found less sympathy in the party. Althusser was specifically targeted and warned that his actions "would be judged when appropriate."[38] Simultaneously, tentative efforts were made to appease critics on the party's right wing. A supporter of Elleinstein was permitted to publish a piece in *L'Humanité* on relations between the party and intellectuals,[39] and Elleinstein himself was granted an interview with Secretary-General Marchais.[40]

Having taken the offensive, in May and June the PCF leadership directed local party units to vote resolutions of support for the Political Bureau and the Central Committee. It hoped to identify the dissenters and isolate them by forcing those who were wavering to commit themselves. The leaders were confident that the overwhelming majority would support the party's central organs and thus eliminate any suspicion that there was a "silent majority" of unhappy party members standing behind the limited number of vocal dissidents. Once the dissenters were placed clearly in a minority position by voters in cells, sections, and federal committees, any further action by them against the leadership would constitute a violation of party rules.

The results of the polling gave the leadership a solid vote of confidence. Marchais claimed that out of 2,724 sections, only five disagreed with the party leadership; out of some 27,000 cells, only 65 supported the dissidents' positions; and out of 630,000 party members, only a thousand publicly disagreed with the leadership.[41]

By this combination of responses to the challenges of its critics, the leadership of the PCF succeeded in reducing the turmoil within the party. Still, it is unlikely that the debate which raged this spring will be eliminated entirely before the party congress scheduled for next year. It is also unlikely that the leadership will acquiesce to the dissidents' demand for a special congress. The leadership wants time to heal the wounds of electoral defeat and internal debate and time to reassert discipline within the ranks before convening a congress. The PCF's campaign tactics clearly confused and troubled many of its members, but in assessing the extent of current division within the PCF, it is important to bear in mind three points. First, the overwhelming majority of PCF members remains loyal and disciplined even though sometimes uncertain or demoralized. The dissidents are comparatively few in number and are mostly intellectuals who have little rapport with the ordinary working-class party member.[42] The impact of the intellectual dissenters was magnified by the willingness of newspapers and journals sympathetic to the union of the Left (such as *Le Monde, Le Nouvel Observateur, Politique-Hebdo,* and *Témoignage Chrétien)* to publish the dissenters' views. Second, there is no indication that the dissension within the PCF has penetrated the ranks of the top party leadership. Indeed, the attacks from both camps of dissidents

34. *Le Monde,* May 4, 1978.
35. Ibid., May 17, 1978.
36. Ibid., May 12, 1978.
37. Ibid., June 6, 1978.
38. *L'Humanité,* May 13, 1978. See also ibid., May 18, 1978, and *France Nouvelle,* May 22, 1978.
39. Raymond Jean in *L'Humanité,* May 12, 1978.
40. The interview was not successful in reconciling Elleinstein to the leadership's position. Shortly afterward, Elleinstein joined Althusser and 300 other Communists in signing a petition criticizing the party leadership and calling for a special party congress. *Le Monde,* May 20, 1978.
41. Ibid., June 22, 1978.
42. The inability of the dissenters to attract much support from working-class party members was illustrated by the petition calling for a new party congress circulated by dissidents in Aix-en-Provence. The petition quickly gathered several hundred signatures from party members throughout the country. But with the exception of a few workers, all the signers were intellectuals. *Le Monde,* May 20, 1978.

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on the purported Stalinist techniques of the leadership made it all but inevitable that the leadership would close ranks in self-defense. There is undoubtedly diversity of opinion within the top echelons of the party, but the leaders willingly subordinate their differences in public and have a vested interest in preserving the appearance of unanimity. This is true not only of the Secretariat and the Political Bureau, but also apparently of the 90-member Central Committee, which voted unanimous approval of the Marchais report outlined earlier.[43] Finally, the leaders of the PCF are highly skilled in managing and directing debate within the party. The principles of democratic centralism and a long and venerated tradition of disciplined unanimity aid the leadership in imposing its will on the party membership.

All of these factors must be taken into consideration in trying to speculate about the course the leadership will chart for the PCF in coming years. The leadership will be able to choose freely among the options open to it only to the extent that it can continue to impose discipline on party cadres and retain the loyalty of PCF voters. What options do the Communists in fact have? What would be the results of a change of course? How, in the final analysis, are they likely to proceed?

Strategic Options of the PCF

The union of the French Left, a goal of the PCF since the early 1960's, was severely damaged in the 1978 election campaign and by postelection faultfinding. It will take a long time to overcome the doubts and recriminations now separating Communists and Socialists. Nevertheless, it is likely that union of the Left will continue to be the strategy of both the PS and the PCF, even if only for the lack of better options. The PS is still committed to social transformations in France that would be impossible to achieve if the party accepted Giscard's offer to join the majority. As a result, there has been no indication that the Socialists have given any consideration at all to the option of abandoning their left-wing alliance strategy in favor of ties with the Center. The mere discussion of this option by the PS leadership would probably provoke a schism in the party.

In contrast, the PCF has two options available to replace the left-wing alliance strategy: a return to a hardline revolutionary stance, or an extension of the existing alliance to include other "democratic forces" in a broad *union du peuple de France.*[44] Recent attacks by the leadership on critics proposing a more hardline position indicate that it is unlikely that the PCF will return to a more revolutionary orientation. The party's moderate image and its experiment in cooperation with the PS have facilitated the election to local and national office of numerous PCF adherents and thus provided the PCF with political influence, prestige, patronage, and financial resources that are strong disincentives to a return to the hardline position. As Ronald Tiersky noted some years ago, "Stalinism is becoming a dying ember in French communism, still capable of relighting a horrible conflagration, but progressively less likely to do so."[45]

The PCF has made some tentative moves toward the formation of a broad popular union. It has sought to attract the support or cooperation of Gaullists and Catholics disaffected by Giscard's failures to achieve promised social reforms or to remain loyal to de Gaulle's independent foreign and defense policies. In 1977, for example, the PCF modified its view on the French nuclear deterrent and adopted one nearly identical to de Gaulle's position of the 1960's, i.e., retention of the *force de frappe* and its deployment against threats from any quarter. And during the 1978 election campaign, it made additional overtures to the Gaullists, including withdrawing its own candidates on the first ballot in two districts and endorsing left-wing Gaullists there who had broken with the Giscardist majority.[46] To attract the support of practicing Catholics, the PCF has attenuated its traditional anticlericalism and has adopted a position on the issue of state aid to private church schools which is more moderate than that of the PS.[47]

In pushing for a broader popular union, the PCF had hoped to expand the base of support for the united Left and, by adding new elements to the coalition, to dilute the influence of the PS and to enhance its own ability to control developments within the coalition. The results in these respects have been disappointing. The PCF has had little

43. Ibid., Apr. 30-May 2, 1978.

44. See Francois Hinckner, "What Is the Union of the French People?" *Cahiers du Communisme* (Paris), May 1976, pp. 24-33.

45. Ronald Tiersky, "French Communism in 1976," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1976, p. 46.

46. In both these districts, the PCF had outpolled the PS in 1973. The election results in 1978, however, were not very satisfactory. The PS outpolled the PCF-backed Gaullists on the first ballot, and in one district the Socialist candidate went on to win the parliamentary seat at stake.

47. See "PS: Debate on Education," *Projet,* No. 112, February 1977, pp. 215-27.

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success in directly or indirectly attracting more Catholic support and has had an equally difficult time attracting Gaullists. Consequently, the strategy of *union du peuple de France* does not appear viable as an alternative to the union of the Left. It may prove useful to the PCF, however, as a threat to be wielded to extract concessions from the Socialist Party.

Thus, by default, the Communists probably will continue to pursue the course of alliance with the Socialists. But it is unlikely that the union of the Left will regain the dynamics and spirit of cooperation that characterized it in 1972-74 and 1976-77. Alliance solidarity has tended to grow as the two parties have prepared for elections in which they needed to cooperate to secure mutual advantages. Over the next few years, no such elections are expected. Voting for the European parliament next spring will be on the basis of proportional representation, obviating the need for cooperation in runoff elections, and the contest is unlikely to offer much opportunity for PS-PCF cooperative ventures in any case. France's role in European institutions has always been a difficult issue for the two parties to agree upon. The presidential election due in 1981 is also unlikely to have a unifying effect, since both the PCF and the PS have indicated already that each will present its own candidate. Finally, if Giscard succeeds in changing the legislative election system from one of district representation to one of proportional representation, as he has pledged, the Left will also in the next National Assembly elections lose one of its greatest incentives for unity, the need to cooperate on second-ballot runoffs.

In looking to the future, supporters of the Left in France must now confront a serious dilemma. French voters have proved unwilling in the past to bring to power a left-wing coalition in which the PCF would have the dominant position. Now that the Socialists are stronger than at any time since World War II and are able to outpoll the Communists, this obstacle to a leftist government would seem to have been surmounted. The 1978 election campaign of the Communists, though, raises the question whether the PCF will agree to come to power in a left-wing coalition that it does not dominate. Its conduct certainly appeared designed not to promote the victory of the Left, but rather to limit the growth of the PCF's Socialist rivals, even at the expense of leftist victory.

* * *

Not long ago, Maurice Duverger described the PCF as the West European communist party "least advanced" on the road to Eurocommunism.[48] Up to now, the PCF has avoided any thorough reexamination of Marxist-Leninist theory and has restricted its ideological innovations to minor adjustments of doctrine. This is not due to any lack of theoreticians. The party is well endowed with them, even if none has the stature or the ability of an Antonio Gramsci or a Palmiro Togliatti to come up with an integrated doctrinal view of "socialism in French colors." But theoreticians and intellectuals are suspect in the PCF and are generally isolated from positions of influence. The party's leaders are less sophisticated than other West European Communist leaders in their understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory and prefer to use it to justify their strategic choices, even at the cost of doctrinal inconsistency and ambiguity. The present situation offers a case in point. The PCF appears to have manipulated basic theory to produce a party doctrine which serves primarily to justify the party leadership's current strategy and tactics.

Of course, even if the PCF is the least advanced Western party on the road to Eurocommunism, it is far enough down that path to have earned Soviet attacks. In recent years, Soviet party officials have come to criticize sharply the expanding trend toward Eurocommunism and have urged West European communist parties to abandon alliances with reactionary and revisionist forces, in order to concentrate on their revolutionary duties. Some analysts have speculated on this basis that the PCF's harsher line toward the Socialists might have originated in an acceptance by the party of Moscow's new line. However, since the mid-1960's the PCF has charted a course independent from Moscow and has developed its own view of "socialism in French colors."[49] When forced to choose between conflicting demands coming from the international communist movement and from the dynamics of French domestic politics, the PCF has chosen regularly to give preference to domestic political considerations. Clearly, the dramatic reversal of the PCF's attitude toward the PS was not the result of any urging from Moscow, but rather of the PCF's own calculations that the party's competitive position was being threatened by the dynamic growth of the Socialist Party.

48. *Le Monde*, Dec. 15, 1977.

49. See Annette Eisenberg Stiefbold, *The French Communist Party in Transition: PCF-CPSU Relations and the Challenge to Soviet Authority*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1977.

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Relations between the PCF and the CPSU have not been good over the past few years, and the PCF does not seem interested in mending them. Despite its conflict with the PS, the PCF has continued to speak out against violations of human rights in the Soviet Union. Earlier this year, it condemned the expulsion from the USSR of cellist Mstislav Rostropovich. More recently, it has criticized the conviction of and harsh sentence meted out to Soviet dissenter Yuriy Orlov as "unacceptable" and a disservice to socialism.[50] Of even greater significance, the PCF opened a new line of criticism of the Soviet Union shortly after the March elections by permitting publication in the PCF weekly of an article critical of the overall organization and productivity of the Soviet economy.[51] Prior to this, the PCF had restricted its criticism of the USSR to the area of human rights and had condemned for "anti-Sovietism" and Trotskyite or Maoist deviations those who pointed to Soviet societal bureaucratization and economic inefficiency. It is too early to tell if the party's new line of criticism will be pursued with any consistency, but the very fact of its publication suggests that the PCF is hardly ready to return to the fold of communist parties blindly loyal to the Soviet Union.

During the past 15 years, the French Communist Party has modified its doctrine somewhat, but it has not abandoned the goal of revolutionary change in the French polity. Whether the party has abandoned completely the option of achieving change through violence and whether democracy could survive in the transformed society envisaged by the PCF are still open questions. Neither manipulation of their alliance with the Socialists nor the betrayal of their allies during the 1978 election campaign, though, can be considered evidence of a return to a preference for violent revolution. The Communists have a good bargaining position vis-à-vis the Socialist Party, and they have shown that they know how to fully exploit the advantages of the situation in which they are operating. What is clear now, in the aftermath of the 1978 elections, is that the PCF is willing to come to power only under circumstances that would permit it to make real progress toward the ultimate goal of creating a socialist French polity. The party's course for the future will be determined by this fact.

50. *L'Humanité,* May 19, 1978.
51. See Marie Lavigne's article in *France Nouvelle,* Apr. 24, 1978.

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The PCE in Spanish Politics

By Eusebio Mujal-Leon

Little more than a year after participating in the first free Spanish parliamentary elections in over 40 years, the *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE) stands at a crossroads. The most avowedly Eurocommunist party on the continent, the PCE has so far been unable to translate into electoral success the influence it had exerted as the best organized opposition force in the country during Francisco Franco's last years and the attention gained from the often-times virulent quarrels it has had with the Soviet Union.

In the elections of June 1977, the Communist Party captured 9.2 percent of the national ballots or nearly 1.7 million votes, but the PCE still trailed far behind the *Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCD) led by incumbent Premier Adolfo Suárez and the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE)—which garnered 34 and 29 percent of the vote respectively. Although in one sense these results came as no surprise (various opinion polls released in the four or five months prior to the elections had forecast that the PCE would win between 8 and 12 percent of the ballots), they nevertheless represented quite a setback to a party whose leaders had been predicting that any effort to reform the Francoist system would inevitably fail and whose militants had only the year before been exhorted to lay claim to "a hegemonic role in the process of change."[1] As it was, the showing of the Spanish Communists compared rather unfavorably with those of the French and Italian Communists in the immediate post-World War II period and with the 15 percent of the vote that their Portuguese counterparts had polled in April 1976.

New parliamentary elections are likely next year in Spain, and the PCE clearly recognizes that improving on its performance of a year ago will be essential in these elections. Otherwise, the party will risk having the political/electoral boundaries on the left frozen and might find itself relegated to an essentially marginal position in the political system.

This essay will explore some of the reasons for the Communist failure in June 1977 and the efforts undertaken by the PCE in the months after the elections to increase its influence in Spanish politics. The concluding section will assess the short- and medium-term prospects for the party in the post-Franco era.

Causes of the Electoral Failure

Operating illegally after the end of the Civil War in 1939, the PCE developed into the most effective component of the opposition to the Franco regime. Furthermore, in the years after 1956 and under the leadership of Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo, the Spanish Communists shifted policy in many areas. The PCE not only abandoned its traditional anticlericalism, but also, taking advantage of regime-sponsored syndical elections, built a political base around the unofficial, parallel trade union movement known as the *Comisiones Obreras* (CC.OO.). Rejecting the Soviet model for Spanish and other West European societies, the Spanish Communists discarded the traditional Leninist notion that so-called bourgeois liberties were at best formal and indicated that they had come around to the view that political, civil, and religious liberties were

1. The phrase appears in the principal report approved at the Third Conference of the Madrid Provincial Conference in April 1976, mimeograph, p. 18.

Mr. Mujal is a doctoral candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, MA) and spent 1977 in Spain on a grant from the Social Science Research Council. He has published a number of analyses of the Iberian Left. Portions of this article are derived from a paper for a conference on the West European Left to be held in September 1978 in Bologna, Italy.

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The Spanish Communist Party celebrates its legalization and begins its quest for electoral support at a press conference on April 15, 1977, in Madrid. Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo, at the center, introduces party leaders to the press. The banner in the background reads: "To Vote for the Communists Is to Vote for Democracy."

—Spengler/SYGMA.

fundamental rights in any political system.[2] Particularly after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, party leaders became increasingly vocal in their criticism of the Soviet Union and of other Eastern bloc countries.

The success with which the PCE had managed to cope with the rigors of clandestinity and the party's moderate domestic and independent international policies seemed to suggest that the Communists would without great difficulty assume an important role in Spanish politics. But the results of the June 1977 elections indicate such an assessment to have been overdrawn.

There are any number of explanations which one can adduce to help account for the results. Some observers would underscore the fact that the PCE, illegal until less than two months before the election, could not in the space of a few weeks overcome the effects of 40 years of hostile anti-Communist propaganda and the memories of its own at times ruthless tactics during the 1936-39 Civil War. Moreover, there was the nature of the electoral law under which the balloting took place. The Suárez government fashioned a law which quite clearly discriminated against the Left. For one thing, specific provisions in the law made it less than directly proportional and thus worked to the advantage of the larger parties. The electoral law was discriminatory in other ways as well. For example, it overrepresented the more conservative agricultural parts of the country. It also kept the voting age limit at 21 years (thus eliminating from the rolls some 2 million young people among whom the opposition had gained quite an audience) and placed numerous obstacles in the way of the more than half a million emigrant workers who theoretically could have participated in the elections. There was, in addition, the presence of an invigorated and youthful PSOE, which, although laying claim to the mantle of Marxism and class struggle, had neither a history of subservience to the Soviet Union nor a reputation for intolerance. The Communist decision to direct the brunt of criticism during the electoral

2. For an assessment of these changes, see the author's chapter entitled "The Domestic and International Evolution of the Spanish Communist Party" in Rudolf L. Tökés, Ed., *Eurocommunism in the Age of Détente,* New York, NY, New York University Press, 1978.

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campaign at the collection of Francoist notables in *Alianza Popular* (AP) and not at Suárez and the UCD may also have backfired. It permitted the PSOE to present itself as an intransigent opponent of Francoism, opposed not only to the *Alianza* but to the more seductive image offered by Suárez.

These explanations are correct as far as they go. They are insufficient, however, to the degree that they do not explicitly recognize that the poor Communist performance in June 1977 reflected above all the success of King Juan Carlos and Premier Adolfo Suárez in keeping the political initiative from the PCE in the years after Francisco Franco's death. The Communists could not galvanize the forces necessary to impose a *ruptura* between the Francoist past and the democratic future and were thus unable to capitalize on their political/organizational superiority. Adolfo Suárez accomplished the *reforma* within the framework, if not the spirit, of the laws and institutions legated by Franco. He consummated the *ruptura* but at a pace which, because it was deliberate, permitted the emergence of the PSOE as a challenger to the Communists on the left.

The Historical Background

The struggle for power in the post-Franco era really began nearly two years before the death of the caudillo with the assassination of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco in December 1973. That brutally efficient act of political violence, attributed to a branch of the Basque terrorist organization *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA), marked the death knell of the Franco regime.

While opposition organizations like the Communist Party had long been active in the struggle against the dictatorship, their predictions of its imminent downfall had become marked by an air of unreality. In the 1940's, the regime had defeated the opposition-sponsored guerrilla movement and had weathered the international isolation into which the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945 had thrust it. More recently, it had withstood the resurgence of powerful strike movements. In late 1973, it gave every indication of being able to assure its permanence.

Carrero Blanco's assassination changed all that. Not only was he the titular head of state and Franco's close confidant, but the aging leader had charged him with insuring the continuity of the system. His physical disappearance meant the elimination of a key piece from the political chessboard. The Spanish political elite understood as much, and on February 12, 1974, even Carrero Blanco's extremely conservative successor, Carlos Arias Navarro, promised the establishment of "national political associations" and a general liberalization of the political system. The speech aroused the hopes of many moderate opponents of the regime, but it did not take long for disillusionment to set in. Government efforts to exile the bishop of Bilbao for including a call for Basque civil rights in a homily, and the decision to execute anarchist Puig Antich in Barcelona came only a few weeks after Arias' speech and indicated the new Premier would have a difficult time shedding the habits and background he had acquired as Minister of the Interior.

A psychologically invigorated—albeit not terribly well organized—opposition faced the Arias government in early 1974. Most of these as yet fledgling groups could be said to belong to one or another of four families.

Among the Socialists could be numbered the Felipe González-led PSOE, the *Partido Socialista Popular* (PSP), and a rapidly growing assortment of regional Socialist groups. The PSOE had been the premier organization on the Spanish left in the years preceding and during the Civil War. During the two decades following the end of that conflict, the PSOE endured the harsh repression unleashed by the regime, and by the early 1960's, it had lost much of its influence among opponents of Franco. Under the exiled leadership of Rodolfo Llopis, the party increasingly lost touch with the changes taking place in Spain and proved progressively unable to rally the new generations of Spaniards to the PSOE banner. One manifestation of this loss of influence was the growth of a variety of groups, each hoping to become the occupant of historic socialism's space in the Spanish political spectrum. This was the case, for example, of the *Partido Socialista del Interior* (later to become the PSP), headed by a prestigious university professor, Enrique Tierno Galván. Other Socialist groups developed, particularly in Cataluña, Galicia, the Basque country, Aragón, and Andalucía, but these had a markedly regional cast. We should also note here the presence of the *Unión Social Demócrata Española* (USDE) led by Dionisio Ridruejo and Antonio García López, which aimed at shifting the axis of Spanish socialism away from its Jacobin tradition and toward social democracy. At any rate, the PSOE languished under the asphyxiating control of the Llopis exile leadership until its 12th Congress in October 1972, at which time militants from the interior (most notably, Pablo Castellanos, Felipe González, and Enrique Múgica) captured control of the party. In 1973, the Socialist Inter-

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national gave its blessing to the younger leaders.[3] This decision was to have important longer-term consequences, for it insured West German and Swedish moral, organizational, and financial support for the PSOE.

Another opposition component was the various Christian Democratic groups. Potentially the most important of these organizations were the *Federación Popular Democrática* (FPD) of José María Gil Robles and the *Izquierda Democrática* (ID) of Joaquín Ruiz Giménez. Regional Christian Democratic movements existed to one degree or another in Cataluña, Galicia, Valencia, and the Basque country, but it was only the pre-Civil War *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) from the last region that had anything resembling a mass audience. Most of the Christian Democratic groups were what the Spanish call *grupos testimoniales,* coalescing around individuals of great personal prestige but having little effective political organization. Their political future lay (despite Ruiz Giménez' proclivities for alliance with the Left) in the yet-to-be-established Center, but whether they would occupy that part of the political spectrum depended not only on how the transformation of the regime came about but also on the decision of the Spanish episcopate to help actively in the organization of a mass Christian Democratic party.

So-called extreme Left groups made up a third sector of the opposition.[4] These organizations had proliferated during the 1960's in reaction to what they perceived as the abandonment of revolutionary principles by the PCE. Some of the groups, like the *Partido Comunista de España—Marxista Leninista* (PCE-ML) and the *Partido del Trabajo* (PT), were avowedly Maoist and had split off from the PCE because and in the wake of the Sino-Soviet rift. By contrast, others, like the *Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores* (ORT) and *Bandera Roja* (BR), had had their origins in the radicalization of the apostolic labor organizations in the early 1960's but had eventually come to assume rigidly dogmatic Marxist-Leninist positions.

None of the various groups could match the strength of the PCE, the fourth component of the opposition. In 1974, the Spanish Communist Party was the only one of the organizations challenging the regime which, it may be said without great fear of contradiction, had a genuinely national audience, could be considered an authentic political party, and could present a real, if not altogether attractive, alternative to the regime.

Rebuffed over the years in its efforts to create a broad front against the Franco regime (the last call in 1969 for the conclusion of a *pacto para la libertad* had not found many supporters), the Spanish Communists redoubled their efforts to bring the opposition together in the months after Carrero Blanco's assassination. Encouraged further by the April 1974 revolution in Portugal, the PCE entered into contacts and negotiations with Don Juan de Borbón (the son of Spain's last monarch and father of prince Juan Carlos) and with the PSOE, PSP, USDE, and various Christian Democratic organizations. These were all under way when news about a Franco illness broke in June 1974. The Communists, convinced that Franco would not physically last out the summer and that his regime would disintegrate rapidly after his death, insisted on the rapid creation of a unitary opposition front. Don Juan declined the offer, as did most of the other groups, including the PSOE. The Socialists saw an undue haste in the project and felt, not unreasonably, that they were being asked to join in an endeavor which would help establish a Communist preponderance over the rest of the opposition.[5]

Sure that the other groups were making a historic error from which they were unlikely to recover, the Communists went ahead with their plans and in late July 1974, just as Franco left the hospital, announced the creation of a *Junta Democrática.* The *Junta* was an unlikely coalition. It included, besides the Communists and the *Comisiones Obreras,* groups like the PSP, the *Partido Carlista* (supporters of the pretender to the throne, Carlos Hugo de Borbón Parma, and advocates of *autogestion* or workers' self-management), the *Alianza Socialista Andaluza,* and independent personalities. All of them rallied around a 12-point program (to which they were committed only until constituent assembly elections could be held) calling for the establishment of a provisional government, total amnesty, the legalization of all political parties, syndical liberties, separation of church and state, and eventual Spanish

3. Ramón Chao, *Después de Franco, España* (After Franco, Spain), Madrid; Ediciones Felmar, 1976, pp. 215-17. For the international aspects of the struggle, see the section entitled *Relaciones Internacionales* in the report of the Executive Committee to the delegates at the 13th PSOE Congress in 1974. *XIII Memoria de la Gestión que Presenta la Comisión Ejecutiva* (13th Report of Activities Presented by the Executive Committee), n.p., October 1974, pp. 4-9.

4. For a useful overview of these groups, see Xavier Raufer's article in *Est & Ouest* (Paris), Mar. 16-31, 1976, pp. 12-20.

5. The PSOE had some difficulty enforcing the decision to abstain once this *Junta Democrática* took shape. In places like the Canary Islands, the party federation initially joined the *Junta* and left only after intense pressure from the national organization.

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entry into the European Economic Community.[6]

Strictly speaking, the *Junta* did not represent much beyond the PCE. Yet, from a public relations point of view, it was an outstanding success. Impressive confirmation of this fact came with the revelation that in August 1974 Nicolás Franco, nephew of the *Generalíssimo,* had traveled to Paris for a meeting with Carrillo and other representatives of the *Junta*. It benefited, moreover, from the enormous psychological advantage of being the only functioning opposition front for nearly a year.

The *Junta* appeared on the Spanish political scene at a particularly fortuitous moment. One did not need to be an overly perceptive observer of Spanish politics to grasp that the country's political structures were slowly but surely losing their legitimacy. This is not the place to enter into an extended discussion of the reasons for the shift in public opinion. Suffice it to point out that there was a growing awareness among Spaniards of all classes that the status quo could not long endure.

Symptomatically, the changes taking place in Spanish society had begun to undermine even as staunch a pillar of the regime as the armed forces. After Carrero Blanco's assassination, it had become manifest in particular that a generational cleavage existed in the military between those officers who had fought in the Civil War and wanted the army to function as a partisan political instrument with the principal objective of insuring the state's fidelity to the Francoist heritage, and other, younger officers who opposed such an orientation and wanted the professionalization of the military. Some of the latter joined in the clandestine *Union Militar Democrática* (UMD). The UMD advocated the democratization of the Spanish political system, but, in contrast to the Portuguese *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA), most of the officers involved in the movement believed the military should not play a major role in the process of change. The government arrested eight officers affiliated with the UMD in June 1975; however, exact figures on the organization's strength were never revealed, and the extent of its influence can only be surmised. Luckily for the regime, the Spanish army was not involved in any disastrous colonial venture, and when hardline officers called for intervention in the Spanish Sahara in October 1975, the government decisively rejected that alternative.[7]

Hardly an issue of the PCE's biweekly *Mundo Obrero* went by in 1974 and 1975 that did not cite some new evidence of discontent within the regime or indicate that the end of Francoism was in sight. In retrospect, however, Communist assertions that the *huelga nacional* would take place under the direction of the *Junta,* that the *Junta* alone could unleash a strike movement powerful enough to neutralize the army and the 50,000-man *Guardia Civil* appear to have been far off the mark. In fact, a trial-run *acción democrática nacional* called by the *Junta* in June 1975 had little success. The Communists not only overestimated their own strength and that of the opposition in general but also undervalued that of the regime.

With the wisdom of hindsight, we can see that the *Junta* did not bring together a sufficiently broad spectrum of the opposition to force a radicalization of the prerevolutionary situation developing in the country after December 1973. A judgment as to whether responsibility for this fact should be assigned to the Communists for their obstinacy in insisting on a *Junta* including individuals and organizations to which the PSOE objected, or to the Socialists for making those objections depends in large measure on one's ideological perspectives and political preferences.

To focus exclusively on the disunity of the opposition as the factor responsible for the failure of efforts to bring Franco down would be incorrect, however. The other side of the coin was that few of the groups which had been economically or politically favored since 1939 were willing to break with the regime. Discontent was one thing; active opposition, quite another. Many incipient oppositionists still held out the hope that upon his accession to the throne Juan Carlos would move to force a real liberalization of the regime and thus pave the way for its economic and political integration into Western Europe. They had been deeply disturbed by the radicalization of the Portuguese revolution, and while they understood the need for reform of the system, they also feared what would happen were the situation to get out of hand in Spain. The great majority of the population, moreover, still suffered from the depoliticization and demobilization encouraged by the authoritarian Francoist regime, and the experience of the Civil War, although a vanishing memory, still lingered in the popular consciousness, inhibiting political activity.

The PCE, in any case, was not as finely honed a

6. See the text of the declaration in *Mundo Obrero* (published in Paris until the spring of 1977 and then in Madrid), July 29, 1974.

7. The Communists recognized the difference in the situations of the Spanish and Portuguese military quite early on, and they argued that the Spanish armed forces should remain neutral and not become actively involved in politics. See, for example, Santiago Alvarez in *Nuestra Bandera* (published in Brussels until issue No. 87 and thereafter in Madrid), No. 75, May-June 1974, p. 33.

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political weapon as its leaders might have supposed or let on. The party's organizational strength was impressive if measured relative to that of other groups, but the PCE was not exempt from problems. This was particularly true in Madrid, where the party organization received severe criticism from Carrillo for its political work and where in 1974 the party had suffered a heavy blow with the arrest of Executive Committee member Francisco Romero Marín. His arrest brought with it the confiscation of an important part of the propaganda apparatus and forced the restructuring of the entire organization. This was a difficult enough thing to do without having to prepare at the same time for an assault on the citadels of power.

Furthermore, there were important sectors of the party (not just *gauchiste* intellectuals but working-class activists) who were not enthusiatic about the idea of a *pacto para la libertad* insofar as it meant setting up an alliance, however temporary, with the representatives of "monopoly capital." Leftist dissidents in Madrid and Valencia had sought to draw these discontented elements from the party by forming an organization called the *Oposición de Izquierda al Partido Comunista* (OPI).[8]

In the labor sphere, too, the party had its share of problems. Through its influence in the *Comisiones Obreras,* the PCE had developed into the preponderant force in the Spanish labor movement, but while the CC.OO. had originally benefitted from an ambiguous juridical status, by the late 1960's and early 1970's the regime had begun to crack down harshly on labor dissidence. One particularly successful raid in June 1972 netted Marcelino Camacho, Nicolás Sartorius, Francisco Garcia Salve, and other top leaders of the movement during a meeting of the *Coordinador General* and effectively decapitated the *Comisiones*. Control of the national movement had to pass to the Catalan branch, whose leader Cipriano Garcia had not been at the ill-fated session.

The Post-Franco Era

While Franco lived, the struggle between the various groups and factions in the opposition and the establishment, it turned out, was largely limited to one for position. Only when Franco died in November 1975, after a prolonged agony lasting well over a month and involving no fewer than half a dozen major operations, did the battle for control of the tempo and substance of change in the political system truly get under way.

Some had feared and others had hoped that his death would open the floodgates, but it appears that the lengthiness of the wait helped make the moment of his passing anticlimactic and probably contributed to a smooth transmission of power to Prince Juan Carlos.

The first government of the monarchy assumed office in December 1975. Those who had wished for a rather clear break with the past were disappointed. Unsure of where real power lay within the regime and unwilling to test the extent of the powers Franco had legated to him, Juan Carlos kept on the incumbent premier, Carlos Arias Navarro, a man of deep conservative instincts. The cabinet, on the other hand, included a group of reformers, the most important of whom, José María Areilza and Manuel Fraga Iribarne, were appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior respectively.

While Fraga and Areilza held strategically and symbolically important ministries, the government as a whole was only slightly more "liberal" than traditional Francoist governments. Moreover, the term of the first government of the monarchy was characterized by a struggle between reformers and their opponents. Conservatives, drawing support from *ultras* entrenched in the Cortes, in the state bureaucracy, and in the highest ranks of the military, successfully weakened reform measures and in general managed to obstruct and delay. Arias sought to convey the impression that he stood above the fray, but, in fact, the *bunker*, as Santiago Carrillo and others on the left pointedly called the most conservative elements,[9] knew very well that the Premier was their ally.

Although the Communists remained convinced that all efforts to reform the political structures of the regime would fail, the entry of the "reformist" wing into the government in December 1975 visibly complicated the situation for the PCE. The Communists feared that other groups in the opposition, particularly the PSOE, would betray them and accept preferential treatment, perhaps even legalization, from the government. These circumstances made it imperative, from the Communist point of

8. The text of their manifesto was published in the version of *Mundo Obrero* put out by a pro-Soviet faction challenging Carrillo. See the issue of June 15-30, 1973.

9. Carrillo first used the expression in his report to the delegates at the Eighth PCE Congress in 1972. See *Octavo Congreso del PCE* (Eighth Congress of the PCE), Bucharest, 1972, p. 7. However, Luis Ramírez may have come up with the appellation initially. See *Horizonte Español 1972* (Spanish Horizon, 1972), Paris, n.p., n.d., Vol.1, p. 1.

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

The jornadas de lucha *in Spain—left, work celebrate outside a Labor Tribune in Madrid on January 30, 1976, where two fellow workers had just been acquitted of charges of illegal trade union organizing and strike activity at a Chrysler plant in the Spanish capital; right, workers of ITT and other firms march in the center of Barcelona on January 14, 1976, before being scattered by police.*

—Ortiz/SYGMA and Alain Keler/SYGMA.

view, that a showdown with the regime come as quickly as possible.

Originally, the PCE had envisioned the formation of a united opposition front that would be able to go on the offensive immediately after Franco's death. Soon after the constitution of a rival *Plataforma de Convergencia* by the PSOE and others in June 1975, the *Junta* had entered into conversations with those groups with a view to bringing about the rapid unification of the two organizations. The talks, although spurred by the proclamation in August 1975 of a decree law suspending habeas corpus for two years and the subsequent execution of several terrorists in September, did not progress as the PCE wished, and the opposition faced the first government of the monarchy still divided.[10]

With a united opposition front impossible for the short term, the PCE opted to shift its emphasis to mass mobilization. Such an approach not only would serve to channel growing popular discontent with the deteriorating economic situation (over 20 percent inflation and rising unemployment) against the regime but also, by helping to destabilize the political situation, might prevent any rapprochement between the government and the moderate opposition. The *jornadas de lucha* began in December 1975 with the Communists' instructing their militants and sympathizers in the *Comisiones Obreras* and neighborhood and housewife associations to organize protests against the suspension of collective bargaining and the wage freezes imposed by the government.

The movement was launched where the party was strongest, among transport, metallurgical, and construction workers and in the industrial belts around Madrid and Barcelona, but it soon spread. At its apogee in January and February 1976, it in-

10. The most important issues separating the *Junta* and the *Plataforma* had to do with the former's call for a provisional government and with the Communists' rejection of Juan Carlos as a "slightly disguised continuity." Interview with Carrillo in *L'Humanité* (Paris), Oct. 25, 1976. The PCE, moreover, had been instrumental in having the *Junta* adopt as an article of faith the view, clearly expressed in the *Manifesto de Reconciliación Nacional* (Manifesto of National Reconciliation), that the democratic evolution of the state by way of legal reforms [is] objectively and subjectively impossible." *Mundo Obrero,* 3rd week of April 1975.

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volved more than 300,000 workers in Madrid alone and virtually paralyzed both the capital and Barcelona.[11] In the former, the government had to order the militarization of the Metro and mail services; in the latter, the militarization of municipal employees.

The success of these strikes and the tragic deaths of five demonstrators during a peaceful march in favor of amnesty in the city of Vitoria impelled the opposition toward a general agreement. By early April 1976, the PCE could at last see the fruit of its longstanding efforts: representatives of the *Junta* and the *Plataforma* held a press conference at a prominent Madrid hotel and announced the fusion of the two organizations and the formation of *Coordinación Democrática.*

It was a pyrrhic victory. Although *Coordinación* brought together a multiplicity of opposition currents, the very extension of the coalition (which now included organizations ranging from Maoist groups like the ORT to Liberal and Christian Democratic groups) made concerted action difficult. The PCE could and did congratulate itself about outbidding the government for the temporary allegiance of moderate groups, but in order for *Coordinación* to become a reality, the Communists had had to abandon some of their most cherished notions. The new coalition's declaration of principles issued no call for a provisional government and made no reference to Juan Carlos or the monarchy.[12] Moreover, despite the relative success of the *jornadas,* few groups in the opposition saw mass mobilization as the way to change the political system.

The constitution of *Coordinación* and its acceptance of the need for a *ruptura pactada* (agreement for a break) in effect meant the defeat of the mass mobilization tactics supported by the Communists and the extreme Left and the victory of those groups which argued that the opposition should eschew confrontation. Ruiz Giménez' *Izquierda Democrática* had defended the latter position with particular vehemence, and ID had conditioned its entry into *Coordinación* on prior agreement that there would be no call for a provisional government and that the other elements in the opposition would consider the holding of free elections to be the equivalent of a *ruptura.*[13]

The governmental policy of selective toleration so evident in the authorization of meetings of the Christian Democratic *Equipo* in January 1976 and of congresses like those of the PSP, the PSOE-affiliated trade union movement known as the *Unión General de Trabajadores,* and the *Federación de Partidos Socialistas* in May and June, and in the prohibition of events like the provincial and regional assemblies of the *Comisiones Obreras* and of organizations affiliated with the PCE increased the friction between the Communists and the moderate opposition groups. Yet, the government headed by Arias Navarro proved incapable of taking advantage of these divisions. Indeed, it was either unable or unwilling to crack the whip at a surprisingly defiant Cortes that was threatening to emasculate what were already little more than cosmetic government-proposed revisions of the penal code and political associations law. Juan Carlos voiced his disappointment with the Premier's performance (he called Arias an "unmitigated disaster") in the course of an interview he granted a *Newsweek* correspondent in late April.[14] The debility of the Arias government threatened to imperil the future of the monarchy itself, and shortly after the King returned from an official visit to the United States, he finally acted, asking for and receiving the resignation of the Premier.

Suárez in Charge

If Juan Carlos had held back in replacing Arias, it was primarily because he was unsure who his new premier would be. The appointment of a new premier was no simple matter, for among the procedural obstacles Franco had placed in his successor's way, the most important was that the Council of the Realm had the power to select a *terna* of three candidates from which the King could choose. From the *terna* presented to him in July 1976, Juan Carlos selected Adolfo Suárez, a relatively young man who had previously been Secretary-General of the only legal party, *Movimiento Nacional,* under Arias.

Few people in Spain in July 1976 believed that this decision was a good one. The Communist economist, Ramon Tamames, called the appointment "a historic error," and *Mundo Obrero* dismissed Suárez' first nationwide telecast as purely verbal reformism.[15] They were not alone. Only the more

11. See Victor Díaz Cardiel et al., *Madrid en Huelga* (Madrid on Strike), Madrid, Editorial Ayuso, 1976.
12. *Mundo Obrero,* Apr. 9, 1976.
13. See *La Democracia Cristiana Afronta el Futuro* (Christian Democracy Confronts the Future), a report presented to the first ID Congress in early April 1976, mimeograph, pp. 5-8.
14. *Newsweek* (New York, NY), Apr. 26, 1976.
15. The first reference may be found in *Cuadernos para el Dialogo* (Madrid), July 10, 1976; the second, in *Mundo Obrero,* July 14, 1976.

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conservative elements applauded the choice and, then, primarily because Suárez had made his career as an *apparatchik* in the Falange and seemed a fairly conservative sort.

That Suárez would last out the summer, much less that he would preside over a historically almost unprecedented transition from authoritarianism to democracy, was a thought that entered few minds. And yet the new Premier, young enough to have a political future still before him and not lacking opportunism, did just that. He understood that decisive action by the government was necessary to break the false unity of the opposition and impose the "reformist" solution. Indeed, in retrospect, there appears to have been little that separated the Suárez reform plan from that of someone like Fraga except that the new Premier grasped the importance of style. As some wags put it in explaining the difference between Arias and his successor, the former did not bother to listen, while Suárez listened and then went his own way.

Suárez faced an opposition which at first glance appeared more united than ever. Indeed, in October 1976, a new opposition coalition named the *Plataforma de Organizaciones Democráticas* (POD) would appear on the political scene. However, beneath the surface tranquility, the opposition was, in fact, deeply split. Although the more moderate groups like the Christian Democrats, the PSP, and the Liberals saw the political reform program which Suárez offered as insufficient in many aspects, they thought it offered a solid basis for negotiations, particularly with respect to certain aspects of the electoral law.[16]

By contrast, the Communists (and others to their left) bluntly rejected the *reforma*.[17] The PCE Executive Committee in a September 1976 statement called it a "fraud" and "undemocratic."[18] As a precondition for any discussion about the electoral process, the Communists demanded the prior legalization of all political parties and the neutralization of the state apparatus.

Publicly, then, the PCE remained committed to a *ruptura*, but one wonders how much of the intransigence was simply posturing with a view to strengthening the party's hand in an eventual negotiation or to insuring its legalization at or about the same time as other opposition groups. In any case, the PCE could hardly keep repeating that things had not changed. They had, and substantially so. There was a de facto toleration of the party which could not have been imagined a year before. The unofficial headquarters of the PCE had been installed in downtown Madrid, less than a half mile from the *Dirección General de Seguridad* where Central Committee member Julian Grimau had been tortured in 1964.

It should not surprise us that the rather rapid changes Spanish society experienced in the year after Franco's death had an impact on the PCE as well. After all, those changes were taking place along lines that were quite different from what the Spanish Communist leadership had predicted. A close reading of Communist documents from that period suggests the existence of a strong internal debate on the political implications of the controlled decompression initiated by the King and Adolfo Suárez. Although the materials for an exhaustive analysis of trends within the party and the unraveling of the political and personal elements that helped create them are not available, it may be useful to focus on the different perceptions which manifested themselves in connection with the nationality question and the labor movement.

The PCE had traditionally presented itself as the most vigorous proponent of autonomy and self-determination for the various regions, declaring its advocacy of federalism but calling for referenda in Cataluña, Galicia, and the Basque country to determine whether the local populations wanted outright independence or some form of association with the Spanish state.[19] There was little disagreement within the party as to these general propositions, but difficulties arose when one sector of the party (some Basques and representatives of the Valencia branch of the PCE, among others) demanded that in the program for the *ruptura* the leadership include a demand for self-government of all regions, not simply those mentioned above, and for the establishment of regional provisional governments the moment the Left consummated

16. See Eugenio Nasarre's *Ponencia Sobre Estrategia Política* (Report on Political Strategy), delivered Oct. 12, 1976, at a meeting of the top Christian Democratic leadership at Miraflores, mimeograph.

17. Earlier, at a Central Committee meeting in Rome in late July 1976, the PCE had demanded that Suárez (1) grant a complete and general amnesty for all political crimes; (2) declare inoperative the law on political associations submitted by Arias; (3) resign and submit to the formation of a provisional government; (4) accept quick elections to a Constituent Assembly; and (5) grant full autonomy to the Catalan, Basque, and Galician regions. See Santiago Carrillo's report to the plenum, *De la Clandestinidad a la Legalidad* (From Clandestinity to Legality), n.p., July 1976, pp. 9-11.

18. *Mundo Obrero*, Sept. 15, 1976.

19. General statements of the party's position may be found in Dolores Ibárruri, *España, Estado Multinacional* (Spain, Multinational State), Paris, Éditions Sociales, 1971, and in Santiago Alvarez, "Notes on the National Problem in Spain," *Nuestra Bandera*, No. 84, March-April 1976, pp. 13-25.

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the *ruptura* at the national level.[20] This policy, in many ways consistent with traditional party demands, seemed dangerously utopian to a rival faction whose public voice was Executive Committee member Pilar Brabo and who argued against *rupturas parciales*.[21] The call for regional governments in the short term, Brabo declared, would only serve to obstruct the drive for a national *ruptura* and would lend a certain credence to the views of those who said the Communists advocated the dismemberment of the national state. The PCE already had its hands full dealing with those like Catalan politicians Josep Pallach and Josep Tarradellas who advocated separate negotiations with Suárez, and did not need a similar problem in every region.

Comparable differences between maximalist and minimalist opinions developed in the labor movement. There, the point at issue was whether to transform the *Comisiones Obreras* into a traditional labor union. *Comisiones* had emerged in the early 1960's as a loosely structured movement, based on factory assemblies, whose militants took advantage of regime-sponsored syndical elections to infiltrate the official *Organización Sindical* (OS).[22] This mixture of legal and illegal work had helped the movement deal with the rigors of repression. By the latter part of the 1960's, it had become the principal labor organization in the country. Its success appeared to suggest that it would one day simply take over the OS. So long as other groups in the labor movement were organizationally weak, the CC.OO. could eschew traditional labor union structures, with their bureaucracies and membership rolls, and maintain the fiction that as a *movimiento sociopolítico* it was a trade union of a new type, composed of all the workers in a factory and independent of all political parties. Basing himself on this notion, Marcelino Camacho in the winter of 1975 called for a constituent workers' congress and offered *Comisiones* as the vehicle within which other trade unions, like the UGT, could participate.[23] By the summer, the rapid growth of the other labor organizations led to a reassessment of that strategy on the part of the Communist leadership and to instructions to Communist militants in the labor movement to push for the transformation of *Comisiones*. Proposals along these lines were submitted and approved at the July 1976 General Assembly of the CC.OO., but the move, despite its inevitability, caused consternation among some in the party who continued to talk about the need and possibility for a *ruptura* at both the political and syndical levels.

By the time the government held its long-awaited referendum on the political reform program in December 1976, the PCE had abandoned all hope it might be able to impose a *ruptura*. While the party urged a negative vote in the referendum, this was more or less pro forma. The Executive Committee had already issued several statements indicating that the PCE had dropped its long list of demands and would participate "in a positive way" in the political process if there were political liberties.

The focus of Spanish Communist efforts now shifted to bringing about legal recognition of the PCE's presence in the country. Before its legalization on April 10, the party had to withstand several acts of violence perpetrated by the extreme Right: the most cold-blooded was the murder of five people, including four Communist lawyers, at their offices in late January 1977. This assassination came the evening of the day an extreme leftist commando kidnapped the head of the Supreme Military Tribunal, but the crisis only served to draw opposition and government together. Thus, a potentially disastrous military intervention did not materialize.

Less than a week after the PCE's legalization, the party's Central Committee met for the first time in 39 years in the Spanish capital. With only Dolores Ibárruri absent (she was still in Moscow but would return a short while later), the ranking leaders of Spanish Communism met to prepare the strategy for the upcoming parliamentary elections. Santiago Carrillo's report to the session emphasized the need for the PCE to follow a moderate course so as not to provoke political destabilization. He called for the establishment of a *pacto constitucional* among all the parties of the Center and Left and repeated the party's oft-stated position that the new Cortes should draft a new Constitution to replace the *Leyes Fundamentales* and then be dissolved.[24]

The same Central Committee session approved the party's electoral program. This called for the

20. *Mundo Obrero,* July 7, 1976, carried an article by Ernest Martí (Joaquim Sempere) of the Catalan party making this point.

21. *Ibid.,* June 11 and July 26, 1976.

22. For an exhaustive analysis of the evolution of the labor movement in Spain, see Jon Amsden, *Collective Bargaining and Class Struggle in Spain,* London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972.

23. *Cuadernos para el Dialogo,* June 19, 1976. The *Manifiesto de la Unidad Sindical* (Manifesto of the Unified Trade Union) issued in January 1976 can be found in *CC.OO. en Sus Documentos, 1958-1976* (The Workers' Commissions in Their Documents, 1958-1976), Ediciones HOAC, 1977, Appendix, pp. 5-30.

24. Santiago Carrillo, *Informe Presentado al CC* (Speech to the CC), mimeograph, April 1977.

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Although the Spanish Communist Party was then still illegal, many of the 100,000 who demonstrated peacefully in Madrid on January 26, 1977—in memory of five communist figures gunned down by rightist extremists the previous week—openly carried party symbols. In this photo, a demonstrator holds aloft a commemorative wreath in the form of a hammer and sickle with a ribbon proclaiming: "We Shall Not Forget You."

—Jacques Pavlovsky/SYGMA.

Constitution to make specific references to the legalization of all parties, to establish the supremacy of parliament over other branches of government, to set the vote at 18, to grant autonomy for nationalities and regions, and to enshrine the principle of church-state separation. In its economic aspects, the document called for fiscal amnesty and reform, the extension of unemployment insurance to those without jobs in the agricultural sector (a particularly serious problem in Extremadura and Andalucía), greater state participation in the social security system, and the creation of a *consejo económico y social* to function as the national planning board. The party did not advocate any major nationalizations, and on the whole, its short-term economic program was remarkably similar to that of the UCD.

Perhaps the most polemical aspects of the plenum were the decisions it took to shift the party's historical allegiance from the tricolor Republican flag to the traditional bicolor one associated with the monarchy and reimposed by Franco after 1939, and to drop its insistence on a republican form of government. These decisions caused some commotion in sectors of the party, and at the plenum 11 members of the CC showed their opposition by abstaining.[25]

The campaign officially began three weeks before election day, but for the Communists, keenly aware that most polls gave the party a rather low percentage, it started immediately after the CC meeting. The party's primordial objective was to minimize the electoral support for *Alianza Popular*. Fraga and his associates there became a favorite target of Communist orators, who dubbed the group the *alianza impopular*, and, in fact, the only real flashes in an otherwise restrained campaign came when the two arch-rivals crossed verbal swords. At the same time, the Communists also directed much criticism at the PSOE. The PCE held several things against Felipe González and his party, but perhaps the most important was that the PSOE through a combination of skill and luck seemed likely to reap many of the fruits of what the PCE considered to be its unique contributions to the democratization process. Sparring for hegemony on the left, each one accused the other of invading its political space. Indeed, the critical remarks the Communists made about Felipe González on numerous occasions contrasted with their generally neutral or sometimes even favorable comments about Suárez.

The Aftermath of the Elections

The Spanish Communists emerged from the June 1977 elections in a clearly minority position (see the table on page 26): they had only 20 seats

25. The shift on the monarchy issue had been under discussion in the Executive Committee for several months and had been prefigured by a Carrillo statement to an April 1976 press conference in Paris that his party would not be an obstacle if "through some miracle" the Crown brought democracy. See *Nuestra Bandera*, No. 84, March-April 1976. The move, in any case, was not without its historical ironies. In December 1967, in one of the first public signs of disagreement with the Soviet Union, Carrillo had taken the Soviets to task for publishing an article in *Izvestiya* suggesting that a monarchy-led transition might be a viable path to the post-Franco era. *Mundo Obrero*, Dec. 31, 1967.

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Provisional Results of the June 1977 Elections in Spain

Party	Votes	Percent	Deputies
Unión de Centro Democrática	6,220,889	34.7	165
Partido Socialista Obrero Español/Partit Socialista de Catalunya	5,240,464	29.3	118
Partido Comunist de España/Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya	1,655,744	9.2	20
Alianza Popular	1,494,693	8.3	16
Unidad Socialista/Partido Socialista Popular	799,376	4.5	6
Pacto Democratic per Catalunya	498,744	2.8	11
Partido Nacionalista Vasco	286,540	1.6	8
Others[a]	1,721,581	9.6	6
TOTAL	17,918,031	100.0	350

[a]Included in these figures are the votes and deputies of the *Coalición Electoral Unió del Centre i de la Democracia Cristiana de Catalunya* (167,654 votes and 2 deputies); of *Esquerra de Catalunya* (134,953 and 1); of *Candidatura de Centro Independiente* (67,748 and 2); and of *Euskadiko Eskerra* (58,377 and 1).

SOURCE NOTE: Data from *Informaciones* (Madrid), Jan. 14, 1978. The total of votes for "Other" parties given in this source was 2,109,163, or considerably more than the reported 9.6 percent of all votes. The figure of 1,721,581—derived by the author as a residual of the total votes—does equal 9.6 percent of the total. No offical results had been released at the time of writing.

in the Chamber of Deputies as compared with the 165 of the UCD and 118 of the PSOE. When the UCD and PSOE came to agreement on a specific issue, as they did on several occasions in the first few weeks of the new Cortes' term, no one could stop them.

PCE leaders attributed the results of the election primarily to the lingering effects of 40 years of anti-Communist propaganda, and Communist analyses in general sought to minimize the defeat suffered by the party. They instead emphasized that the results clearly favored those forces interested in building democracy in Spain and had gone against *Alianza Popular* and other, more overtly Francoist groups like the *Frente Nacional* which yearned for a return to the past.

In keeping with the theme of consolidating democracy, the thrust of Spanish Communist efforts after June 15 was to encourage the creation of a *gobierno de concentración nacional* with the participation of the UCD, Catalan and Basque minority groups, and parties to their Left, including possibly the Communists. All would come to terms on a *pacto constitucional* and an economic recuperation program to last four or five years.[26] The Communists insisted again and again during the summer and fall of 1977 that only such a government could rally the popular support necessary to stymie those interested in destabilizing Spanish democracy, but behind their warning about the dangers of polarization—Marcelino Camacho cautioned about the possible rise of a Pinochet as in Chile, and Carrillo railed against those "who do not see what is right in front of their noses"[27]—the Communists were also laying the foundation for closer collaboration with the UCD, collaboration which would in part be directed against the PSOE.

The proposal for a *gobierno de concentración nacional* did not elicit overly enthusiastic responses from the Socialists. Flush from their electoral triumph, Socialist leaders were staking out for their party a claim as immediate left alternative to the government and had begun to envision the development of a two-party system in Spain: PSOE-UCD or PSOE and whatever the Center-Right might come up with. The PSOE expected that after new general elections it would be able to form a government on its own terms and saw in the Communist call for a broad coalition government a rather transparent effort to weaken the Socialists.[28]

As might be expected, the idea of a Socialist government did not sit well with either the Communists or the UCD. Sparring between the PCE and PSOE had been constant much before the June 1977 election, but in the aftermath of the contest, relations deteriorated, with leaders of the two par-

26. See the Carrillo interview/article in *Mundo Obrero*, June 16, 1977.

27. See *Diario 16* (Madrid), Sept. 1, 1977, and *Mundo Obrero*, Aug. 16, 1977, for the statement by Camacho, and *Mundo Obrero*, Sept. 8-14, 1977, for that of Carrillo.

28. A good idea of how the PSOE views its role in Spanish politics can be gained from Antonio Guerra, *Felipe González: Socialismo es Libertad* (Felipe González: Socialism Is Liberty), Barcelona, Galba Edicions, 1978, pp. 129-265.

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ties engaging in rather personal attacks.[29] The Socialists' relations with the UCD were not much better. Suárez and his associates had been bitterly attacked by the PSOE during the campaign, and although the virulence of the attacks diminished after the elections and the UCD and the PSOE sometimes voted together in the first session of the Cortes, the honeymoon was brief.

By late summer 1977 and particularly after the Socialists forced through a motion-of-confidence vote in the Cortes in September (which they lost and on which the PCE abstained), the UCD and PCE were ready to draw together in an attempt to trim the Socialists' sails. The *Pacto de la Moncloa,* an economic and political agreement signed in late October whose name derives from the residence of the Premier near the University of Madrid, was the most explicit manifestation of this confluence of interests between the Center and the Communists. While the PSOE signed the agreement only reluctantly and warned it would be up to the government to make the *Pacto* work, the PCE hailed the agreement as a vindication of its policies and as the first step toward shifting the axis of Spanish politics from the parliamentary sphere (where the party was so weak) to other terrain where the Communists' ability to maneuver was greater and their influence in the labor movement could be more effectively employed.[30]

Although the signing of the *Pacto* was a victory for the PCE, the party was not able to exploit the move fully.[31] The Socialists would not accept the Communist suggestion that a supraparliamentary commission be set up to oversee implementation of the accords, and the PCE just did not have the leverage necessary to compel the Suárez government to live up to its end of the bargain. Indeed, it became especially clear after a ministerial reshuffle in February 1978 that the government interpreted the accords quite differently than the PCE.

The struggle for hegemony on the left between the PCE and PSOE centered during this period (and still does) in the labor movement. The Communists, as we have already noted, had developed an important presence in Spanish labor in the 1960's and early 1970's through the influence they exerted in the *Comisiones Obreras.* PCE leaders had confidently expected that their party would turn its long-standing efforts at penetration of the official *Organización Sindical* to advantage and would one day simply assume control of the national labor structure. The success of the Suárez *reforma política* and the lengthiness of the transition to the post-Franco era foiled these plans. In the months after Franco's death, the *Comisiones Obreras* was shown to be an organization which, despite its claims to independence and autonomy, was firmly under the control of the Communist Party. (In mid-summer 1976, it came out that 21 out of 27 individuals on the CC.OO. National Secretariat were members of the PCE, and later that summer during a visit to the USSR Marcelino Camacho put his foot in his mouth by giving an interview to TASS in which he extolled life in that country.[32]) Moreover, the lengthy transition to the post-Franco era gave the Socialist-inspired UGT the opportunity to build a much needed infrastructure.

29. Carrillo at one point remarked that Gonzalez and the PSOE were behaving like amateurs in politics. González answered back in an interview with *Le Monde* (Paris), Oct. 16, 1977, declaring that he wondered how Carrillo could emit such a judgment given his track record: "When I am his age, have his experience and his degree of professionalism, I would not want to be at the head of a party which collected 9 percent of the vote."

30. See the Santiago Carrillo speech at the Festival of the PCE, as reported in *Mundo Obrero,* Oct. 20-26, 1977.

31. At the outset, the Communists were full of bravado. "The party will control the fulfillment of the accords," declared *Mundo Obrero* in its Oct. 20-26, 1977, issue.

32. *Cambio 16* (Madrid), Sept. 6, 1977, p. 7.

Dolores Ibárruri, the legendary President of the Spanish Communist Party, and Santiago Carrillo, PCE Secretary-General, prepare to take their seats as deputies in Spain's Cortes on July 14, 1977.

—Victor Steinberg-Gamma/Liaison.

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The four major signatories of the October 25, 1977, Pacto de la Moncloa. *This agreement committed the Spanish opposition parties to support the programs of Premier Adolfo Suárez's government to combat Spain's economic ills. From left to right: Santiago Carrillo, Secretary-General of the Spanish Communist Party; Felipe González, leader of* Partido Socialista Obrero Español; *Premier Suárez; and Manuel Fraga Iribarne, head of the conservative* Alianza Popular.

—Spengler/SYGMA.

The sterling PSOE performance in June 1977 (the Socialists, it should be underscored, received triple the Communists' number of votes) provided a further shot in the arm to the UGT. Many Socialist labor activists, eager to give their party an advantage in dealing with the Communists which no other Latin European Socialist party had had since the end of World War II, anticipated the UGT would develop a hegemony in the labor movement analogous to the one the PSOE had begun to build in the political sphere. The Communists, for their part, were keenly aware of the need to hold the line in the working class: a UGT triumph in the upcoming syndical elections would be a serious blow to any hopes the PCE had of reversing the correlation of forces on the left.

The animosity between Communists and Socialists that had already become evident in the Cortes and had been exacerbated by the Moncloa agreement, grew even more acute as a result of competition in connection with the syndical elections. For example, Nicolas Redondo, a Socialist deputy and head of the UGT, kicked off the syndical campaign in Barcelona by telling his audience that CC.OO. was "a reformist union at the service of the UCD and of the bourgeoisie."[33]

Many issues separated the two unions. For instance, UGT and *Comisiones* were sharply divided on the issue of the *Pacto de la Moncloa,* with the former criticizing the agreement (more harshly than the PSOE, in fact) and the latter expressing wholehearted approval of it from early on. They were also at odds regarding the claims the UGT made to the *patrimonio sindical* confiscated by the Franco regime in 1939 and on the question of whether the delegate lists for the syndical elections should be

33. *Mundo Obrero,* Nov. 10-16, 1977.

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closed or open.

With respect to the last issue, the UGT favored closed lists. It argued that such a procedure would encourage the identification of the worker with a union instead of an individual and would therefore not only provide an accurate reading of the strength of particular unions but also encourage the creation of a stable industrial relations system in the country. Behind this argument, of course, lay more than the conviction that trade unions were the best instrument for the defense of the rights of the working class. The UGT believed that closed lists would help it to attract those workers' votes which had gone to the PSOE in June 1977.

Comisiones had a different point of view on this issue. Drawing on a lengthy tradition of workplace *asambleas* and a disdain (tempered over time, however, by the necessity to consolidate control of the union) for traditional trade union structures, the CC.OO. called instead for a system of open lists and for the *comites de empresas* (or workers' councils) to have bargaining power over trade union sections in the factories.

The dispute over which system should be introduced intensified as the UGT accused the government of favoring *Comisiones* by seeking to adopt the system the CC.OO. desired. That the government did not want a UGT victory in the syndical elections is quite clear; that it wanted CC.OO. to win is much less so. Some individuals in the government (primarily Minister of Labor Jiménez de Parga, whose brother worked for the *Comisiones* and was Vice-President of the Soviet-Hispanic Friendship Association) may have preferred such an outcome, but those close to Suárez and with real influence in the government were less interested in promoting the Communist-led union than in keeping the UGT down and in confusing the labor situation to the point where the UCD could promote its own trade union alternative.

That such was the underlying objective of government labor policy became readily apparent when the Suárez government issued its decree regulating the syndical elections.[34] The law set up a system of closed lists in enterprises with more than 250 workers (approximately 30 percent of the electorate) and open ones in factories with fewer than that number. In the latter, moreover, there was no requirement that the prospective delegate's syndical affiliation appear on the ballot. This permitted the government subsequently to claim that many of the delegates in those factories were independents.

After several months of delay, negotiation, and procedural squabbling, the syndical elections began in early 1978. The voting lasted well over three months, and at the time of this writing final results are not yet in. Available provisional results indicate that *Comisiones* came in first nationally with between 38 and 44 percent of the delegates elected, compared to between 27 and 31 percent for the UGT.[35] *Comisiones* won most clearly in the regions of Cataluña (particularly in Barcelona), Asturias, and Madrid, and in parts of Andalucía. CC.OO. did best in factories with less than 50 workers, and its margin with respect to UGT was least in those with more than 250.[36] Compared to *Comisiones,* the UGT just did not have the necessary cadres: its policy of

34. For the text of the electoral norms, see ibid., Dec. 29, 1977-Jan. 4, 1978.

35. *El País* (Madrid), Mar. 28, 1978, reported the percentages as CC.OO. 38 and UGT 31. Julian Ariza of the *Comisiones* National Secretariat, writing in *Nuestra Bandera,* No. 94, p. 47, claimed 44-46 percent for the CC.OO and 27-38 percent for the UGT. Several weeks later, an article in *Mundo Obrero* (Aug. 10-16, 1978) indicated that out of 178,540 delegates chosen and verified so far, 36.9 percent belonged to CC.OO., 23.2 percent to UGT, 19.5 percent had no affiliation, and 13.2 percent were classifiable as independents.

36. See *Saida* (Barcelona), Mar. 21, 1978, p. 18.



Marcelino Camacho, head of the Communist-run Comisiones Obreras, *seen on the rostrum at the Ninth Congress of the Spanish Communist Party in April 1978.*

—Alex Bowie-Kappa/Liaison.

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nonparticipation in syndical elections under Franco hurt it, and the harm was only partially obviated by the training program it ran with some of its West European counterparts. Although the UGT did not do badly (particularly if we keep in mind that in the early part of this decade, the Socialist-led union had nuclei active primarily only in Asturias and the Basque country), CC.OO. was on balance the victor. Since the Socialists had more or less counted on duplicating their June 1977 showing, the fact that the Communists held their own dealt a serious, although not necessarily fatal, blow to PSOE hopes of cementing a bipolar system in Spain.

PCE Efforts to Improve Image

Our consideration of Communist strategy and politics in the post-June 1977 period would not be complete without an analysis of what for want of a better term we might call the ideological/propagandistic offensive which the PCE undertook to improve its popular standing. Because of space restrictions, we shall limit our consideration of this, focusing first on the polemics with the Soviet Union sparked by publication of Santiago Carrillo's book *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado* ("Eurocommunism" and the State) and by Carrillo's visits to the USSR and the United States in the fall of 1977, and then turning to a discussion of the Ninth Congress of the PCE in April 1978 and its decision to abandon the term Leninism. Although all these initiatives had a serious and substantive side, we should not overlook the fact they were also public relations gambits undertaken by Carrillo and others in the PCE in an effort to make up the ground the Communists had lost to the PSOE in June 1977.

"Eurocomunismo" y Estado, published shortly after the tripartite summit of Spanish, French, and Italian Communist leaders in Madrid in March 1977, will not be remembered for the originality or depth of its analysis. The political importance of the document derives from the fact that for the first time a secretary-general of a West European Communist party put his name to a book which so bluntly assailed the Soviet Union, coming very close to denying the socialist nature of the USSR and declaring that profound structural transformations were necessary there before the Soviet state could be considered a "democratic workers' state."[37]

The Soviet reaction to this polemical blast did not come right away: for whatever reasons, only in late June, after the Spanish elections, did the Soviet journal *New Times* publish a vitriolic personal attack on Carrillo. (Had it come before, he only half-jokingly suggested, the PCE might have done better in the elections.) The article accused him of propounding ideas which "accord[ed] solely with the interests of imperialism, the forces of aggression and reaction."[38] Some saw in the attack an effort by the Soviets to force Carrillo's outster, but the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) more probably was primarily interested in trying to isolate Carrillo and his party from their West European counterparts. In this effort, the Soviets were at least partially successful. Although the PCF and PCI expressed a general solidarity with the beleaguered Secretary-General of the PCE, they were also at pains to disassociate themselves from what they perceived to be his desire for confrontation with the Soviet Union.[39]

In the summer of 1977, then, relations between the PCE and CPSU stood at an all-time low, worse even than when the Soviets had encouraged Enrique García and Enrique Líster to split from the Spanish party in 1969-70. With many observers wondering what the next step in the conflict might be, the Spanish Communists announced in early September that a V. Pertsov, attached to the CPSU Central Committee and in Spain ostensibly to attend the San Sebastian film festival, had met with Carrillo and other Spanish Communist leaders in an effort to lessen existing tension. One formula the two sides discussed included possible PCE attendance at the 60th anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution in Moscow. Both sides had an interest in tempering the dispute at least temporarily. For the Soviets, having as heterodox a party as the PCE come to Moscow would help to reinforce the much-worn idea that Moscow was still the mecca of the international communist movement. The Spanish also had an interest in attending: Carrillo planned to visit the United States in late November, and a trip to Moscow would give his foreign initiatives a sense of balance and, perhaps, help undercut criticism within the PCE and among some West European Communist parties that he liked to grandstand

37. Santiago Carrillo, *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado,* Barcelona, Editorial Grijalbo, 1977, p. 212.

38. See "Contrary to the Interests of Peace and Socialism in Europe—Concerning the Book 'Eurocommunism and the State' by Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 26, June 1977, p. 11.

39. See, for example, "Eurocommunism, *Novoye Vremya* and Us," *l'Unità* (Rome), June 28, 1977, and the text of the press conference of Santiago Carrillo and Enrico Berlinguer a few months later, in *Mundo Obrero,* Nov. 17-23, 1977.

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Spanish Communist chief Santiago Carrillo on the move: at the left, touring Yale University on November 15, 1977; at the right, leaving Moscow 10 days earlier, after being refused permission to deliver a speech on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution.

—Wide World and Alain Nogues/SYGMA.

and was too extreme in his criticism of the CPSU.

Negotiations between the PCE and CPSU continued into the fall, and the two parties finally came to agreement during the October visit to Madrid of *Pravda* editor and CPSU Central Committee member V. Afanas'yev. Carrillo and the Spanish delegation arrived in the capital of the USSR a few weeks later; then, in a move which made the PCE leader an international cause célèbre, the Soviets did not permit him to speak.

Press accounts of the incident generally placed responsibility on the CPSU or on some faction in its leadership, but there is evidence which suggests that Carrillo was not quite an innocent victim and that the affair was really more a public relations effort worked out in anticipation of the Carrillo visit to the United States and designed to reinforce the impression, domestically and internationally, that the Spanish leader was the most anti-Soviet and thus the most Eurocommunist personality in Western Europe. What is the nature of this evidence?

For one thing, all accounts of the affair agree that during Afanas'yev's visit to Madrid in mid-October, both sides came to terms on the general guidelines for the Carrillo speech and on the date of his arrival in Moscow. Approximately one week before his scheduled arrival, Carrillo notified the organizers of the event that he could not reach Moscow in time for Leonid Brezhnev's inaugural speech since he had in the meantime promised to attend the closing session of the Fourth Congress of the Catalan Communist party.[40] There can be little doubt that with nearly 20 percent of the regional vote in June 1977, eight deputies in the Cortes, and some 40,000 members, the *Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya* (PSUC), as the Catalan filial body of the PCE is known, is the most important component of the Spanish Communist Party. But Carrillo could easily have chosen not to go to Barcelona, and he undoubtedly expected the CPSU would interpret his absence for the snub that it was.

Aside from this provocation, there is the question of the Carrillo speech. According to the official PCE version, Carrillo turned it over for translation upon arrival.[41] However, no text of the speech has been

40. *Mundo Obrero,* Nov. 10-16, 1977.

41. *Ibid.* The PCE has been very unclear about what Carrillo was to have said. In remarks reported by *Corriere della Sera,* the Secretary-General of the PCE was quoted as saying that his speech contained "more or less the same ideas as Berlinguer's." *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), Nov. 4. 1977. Some people in the Italian party have been uneasy about what they perceive as Carrillo's tendency to grandstand. Giancarlo Pajetta, for example, has made some disparaging remarks about Carrillo's having "an Iberian temperament" (*El País,* Nov. 4, 1977); and in an interview a few days after the uproar in Moscow (*Corriere della Sera,* Nov. 8, 1977), Pajetta, wanting to distinguish between PCE and PCI attitudes, remarked that "[the Italian Communist] verdict, even when it is critical, and. . .our stances, even when they are different, are never connected to propagandistic motives or concessions to this or that adversary." During his trip to the United States, Carrillo, when asked about possible differences with the PCI, was cautious.

(*continued on page 32*)

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published anywhere. Some people have speculated as to whether there ever was a speech (or just vague notes which Carrillo jotted down as an outline and which Soviet leaders would not accept) or whether the speech was so weak compared to that of Enrico Berlinguer that Carrillo, to many the enfant terrible of the Communist movement, might have opted not to deliver it. Indeed, what better way to start a trip to the United States than to have been rejected so publicly by the Soviets? This aspect of the incident becomes particularly relevant if we remember that Carrillo and others in the PCE expected, incorrectly as it turned out, that Carrillo would have direct contacts with the Carter Administration once he arrived in the United States.

It was during Carrillo's trip to the United States (he spoke at several major universities and at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York) that he first mentioned the possibility that during the Ninth PCE Congress scheduled for early 1978 the party would drop the appellation Leninist and define itself simply as a "Marxist, democratic, and revolutionary" organization. The proposal, like the foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the PCE with the publication of *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado* and the visits to the USSR and the United States by Carrillo, had as its principal objective a quest for votes and democratic credibility.

In the weeks and months preceding the Congress—the first legal one held since 1932, when the PCE had had some 5,000 members—party leaders sought to make sure that the debate on dropping Leninism did not get out of hand and, particularly, that it did not catalyze too great a debate on the content of Communist policies since 1956, when Carrillo had assumed a dominant position within the party. To that end, Carrillo—who one former member of the Executive Committee said behaves within the PCE "like Juan Carlos in the country"[42]—only presented the 15 theses of the new party program to the Central Committee the day before that body met to convene the national congress. Approval of all the theses was virtually unanimous. Carrillo also had the Central Committee adopt a one-third rule: a minority thesis had to collect at least one third of the delegate votes at any assembly in order for it to be raised at the next higher meeting.

Provincial and regional organizations did not stand idly by either. In as important a province as Madrid, the provincial leadership originally wanted a full half of the delegates from the region to be chosen from above. Although the leadership eventually gave in on this score, it successfully opposed counterproposals that delegates to the Congress be elected directly by the party base and adopted the rule that the participation of any party member from the provincial conference could be prevented if 20 percent of those in his neighborhood *agrupación* voted against him.

These efforts to confine debate had their intended effect with respect to the Congress, but they did not really work at the various provincial and regional conferences preceding the Congress. One reason for this was that many of the new members who had joined the party in the last decade (the PCE claimed 45 percent of its 200,000 members had entered after 1970) took party leaders at their word when they promised the democratization of party structures. Party leaders could try to channel dissent, but they could not afford to suppress it altogether.

Also, Carrillo and others in the leadership, it is fair to say, underestimated the emotive power of the Leninism issue within the party. It was one thing to abandon Leninism in practice, as the party had increasingly done in the years after 1956; it was quite another to recognize that rejection formally and to develop a substitute doctrine. Some of those who opposed Thesis 15 (the proposal to drop Leninism) wanted the PCE to uphold as still valid such fundamental Leninist notions as the armed seizure of power and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Others who were less nostalgic and recognized how much the world had changed since 1917 saw no necessary contradiction between Eurocommunism and Leninism properly understood. However, they wanted the party to be clear about its objective of eventual working-class hegemony and desired a full-fledged debate on Leninism and its implications to promote the development of a coherent "Eurocommunist" alternative. Those who thought in this fashion (they were to be found primarily in the PSUC and in Asturias, Andalucía, and Madrid) feared that electoral avarice would lead the party quietly to drop some fundamental principles. Still others in the party would have liked to abandon Leninism entirely but voted with those who opposed Thesis 15 (and Carrillo) because they felt only a thorough airing of this issue would permit the PCE to rid itself of the scars of 40 years of Stalinism.

Ideological, personal, and generational cleav-

Talking about differences of style between himself and PCI leaders, Carrillo often declared that he knew of a word ("*sfumaturra*") which captured as did no other the Italian Communist tendency. He also speculated on the impact operating next to the Vatican has had on Italian political parties.

42. *La Stampa* (Turin), Feb. 26, 1978.

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Headquarters of the Central Committee of Partit Socialistas Unificat de Catalunya, *the regional organization of the Communist Party most resistant to the doctrinal modifications drafted by the Carrillo leadership for adoption at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1978.*

—Liba Tayler/Camera Press.

ages—all of which combined to create a serious PCE identity crisis—helped make the pre-Congress discussion rich and lively. The situation became particularly volatile in three zones: Asturias, Madrid, and Cataluña.

In Asturias, a region where the PCE had expected to do well in June 1977 but had not, disaffection had been growing for quite some time. The heavy-handedness of the central party organization in imposing the legendary Dolores Ibárruri as the head of the Communist list in the general elections had generated a good deal of resentment. The various opponents of Thesis 15 drew on this sentiment. Indeed, tension within the party in Asturias reached such a point by late March 1978 that on the opening day of the regional conference nearly one third of the delegates, including José Ramón Herrero Merediz, a member of the Central Committee, walked out.[43]

In Madrid, the battle over the theses became embroiled in a dispute over control of the provincial organization.[44] While the conference only approved three of the proposed Central Committee theses without alteration, supporters of the official theses did manage to channel delegate discontent by supporting partial amendments which would "clarify but not contradict" the official proposals. As in Asturias, none of the rival theses received the one third of the votes necessary to place it before the Congress as a minority position. The closest vote came on a motion to postpone the decision on Thesis 15 until an extraordinary congress had been convened to debate the issue. This motion failed only after Simón Sánchez Montero of the national Executive Committee made a forceful speech against the proposal.

The pre-Congress debates reached their zenith in Cataluña. The PSUC had convened its Fourth

43. *Diario 16,* Mar. 27, 1978, and *El País,* Mar. 28, 1978.
44. *Diario 16,* Mar. 17, 1978. See also the article by Fernando Lopez Agudin in *Triunfo* (Madrid), Mar. 18, 1978, pp. 24-26.

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Congress in early November 1977, at which time the delegates had included in the program an allusion to the PSUC as heir to "Marxism, Leninism, and other contributions to revolutionary thought and practice."[45] This had been done before Carrillo announced that the PCE would probably drop Leninism, and the failure to coordinate matters on this score had serious consequences.

Those who argued for the retention of Leninism—and their base was above all in the labor movement in Cataluña—were able to wrap themselves in the mantle of Catalan nationalism and to take advantage of the concern many militants felt about the loss of definition suffered by the party.[46] A further complication for Carrillo and Thesis 15 arose because those who sided with the Central Committee theses from the beginning came from a faction derisively known as *bandera blanca,* which had for a long time been the object of bitter attack within the PSUC for its alleged "social democratic" orientation.

By the time the PSUC national conference met in early April, the lines had been firmly drawn. Carrillo emerged the victor, but he did not go unscathed. Thesis 15 was approved by a narrow margin of 97 to 81, and the favorable vote came only after eight members of the PSUC Executive, who had up to that point been bound by the rule of democratic centralism, threatened to resign if they were obliged once again to vote with the Executive Committee majority. Amidst talk of a split in the party, the others in the Catalan leadership relaxed the rules on internal discipline. As a result of that decision, a motion to have Leninism mentioned in the statutes won by the same margin as Thesis 15.

After all this commotion, the PCE Congress was in a way anticlimactic. Only in Cataluña had the minority theses prospered, and by the time the Congress came around, every one knew what the outcome of the voting would be. As expected, the delegates approved the report Carrillo presented in the name of the Central Committee by a lopsided margin (898 for, 37 against, and 51 abstentions, but with 361 votes unaccounted for), although many criticized its excessively personalistic thrust and its lack of clarity about Communist medium- and long-term strategy.[47] Since the official theses—

45. *IV Congress del Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (Recull de Materials i d'Intervencións) (Fourth Congress of the Unified* Socialist Party of Cataluña [A Compilation of Materials and Interventions]), Barcelona, Editorial Laia, 1978, p. 51.

46. See the excellent article by Enrique Sopena in *Informaciones* (Madrid), Apr. 6, 1978.

47. The text is carried in *Mundo Obrero,* Apr. 20, 1978.

Members of the Central Committee vote on a procedural matter during the Ninth Congress of the Spanish Communist Party in Madrid in April 1978. The banner to the rear reads: "9th Congress—A Communist Debate on Democracy and Socialism."

—J.L. De Pablos-Kappa/Liaison.

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particularly the first dealing with the characteristics of change in Spanish society (the transition to the post-Franco era had taken place quite differently than Carrillo had predicted and the thesis claimed) and the 13th focusing on national defense—had been substantially modified in the various commissions, the plenum approved most by large margins. The only electric moments in an otherwise dull congress came late on the third day when, after an at times stirring debate between spokesmen for majority and minority positions, the delegates voted on Thesis 15. The verdict: 968 votes in favor of a slightly revised version of the leadership's original proposal, 240 votes against, and 40 abstentions.[48]

Despite its predictability, the Ninth PCE Congress was in many ways important because it signaled the beginning of a renovation of the Spanish party. Of the 160 members of the Central Committee elected there, 56 are new to that body, as are 14 of the 46 on the Executive Committee. One development, whose implications are not yet clear, is the rise in the influence of those active in labor affairs. Nearly a quarter of the new Central Committee is composed of people with *Comisiones* backgrounds (the proportion of those of working-class origins on the CC is over 50 percent, and seven CC.OO. leaders now sit on the Executive Committee). This influx of labor activists into the highest ranks of the PCE is in no small measure due to the fact that in most parts of the country (Cataluña was an exception) those active in the labor movement distinguished themselves as the most dependable supporters Carrillo had outside the *apparat*. Many of them, we can be sure, are less than enthusiastic about some "Eurocommunist" tenets, but they sided with Carrillo primarily because they felt that doing so was the best way to insure that the debate within the party did not get out of hand.

In sum, Carrillo came out of the Ninth Congress firmly, if not necessarily comfortably, in control of his party's affairs; however, his victory there, and particularly the success he had in getting approval of the thesis abandoning Leninism, had not been easy. To achieve it, he and others in the Spanish Communist leadership had to endure a debate and criticism which was in many ways unique in the experience of communist parties.

While the Congress did not turn out to be as open as some had hoped it would be, neither was it as controlled as others might have wished. Indeed, the myth of party unanimity lies shattered in the wake of the Congress. Moreover, debate over the issue of Leninism has set in motion a process of democratization which the party apparatus will have a difficult time containing. The debates leading up to the Congress were the first salvos in what promises to be a long, drawn-out battle over the heart and mind, the identity and policies of the PCE. It is still too early to tell what the final outcome will be. However, we can be sure that if the renovators succeed in reversing the flow of decision-making within the PCE, communism in Spain will have been transformed.

Prospects

In the months since June 1977, the Spanish Communists have found themselves in the rather uncomfortable position of having to explain away the magnitude of the Socialist victory and to reassure Communist militants and sympathizers that the situation is not irreversible. Were the PCE a redoubt of radical sectarianism, any optimism on the part of Communist leaders and followers in this regard would be ill-founded. As it is, however, the PCE has undergone a dramatic transformation over the course of the last two decades, a transformation which, although in many ways responsible for the crisis of identity through which the party is now passing, may nevertheless help the Communists overcome some of their disadvantage. Still, a shift in the correlation of forces on the left will depend not only on how shrewdly the Communists conduct themselves in the next few years but also on the number and magnitude of PSOE mistakes.

For the present, Communist leaders can be buoyed by the PCE performance in senatorial by-elections held in May 1978 in Asturias and Alicante. While PSOE candidates won both seats, the vote for the Socialists declined by 92,000 and 70,000 votes respectively in comparison with the party's 1977 showing in the two provinces; the PCE, in contrast, increased its votes by 26,000 and 7,000. In real terms, the Communist improvement was on the order of a modest 2 percent in Alicante and a heftier 5 percent in Asturias, but the general results may have betrayed a disenchantment with the UCD and PSOE among voters.[49] Although the situation re-

48. Eurocommunistologists might argue about the underlying significance of the ordering of the words Marxism, revolution, and democracy in the final version. The original proposal was for the program to say that the PCE is a "Marxist, democratic, and revolutionary party." The final version, after lengthy debates in the commission, read slightly differently: "The PCE is a Marxist, revolutionary, and democratic party."

49. For a perceptive analysis, see *Triunfo*, May 27, 1978, pp. 20-21. For other discussion, see *La Calle* (Madrid), May 23-29, 1978, pp. 4-50.

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A party militant brandishes a homemade hammer and sickle at a public rally on Plaza de Toros de Carabanchel in Madrid on April 23, 1978, at the conclusion of the Ninth PCE Congress.

—Etienne Montes-Gamma/Liaison.

mains fluid, the Communists could exploit such sentiment in the next general elections.

No date has yet been set for these general elections. Speculation about anticipated elections has been rife in Spain for many months now. There will be a referendum on the new Constitution (approved in the Cortes with only minor hassling among the major parties) some time this fall, and one scenario has municipal elections next spring and general elections shortly thereafter. The present Cortes' term runs until 1981, however, and it will be up to Suárez to decide if he wants to move the date up.

It is conceivable that in municipal elections the Left will emerge with a higher national percentage than the Center. Much will depend, of course, on what sort of electoral law is approved by the Cortes; but in any case, the parties of the Left will be particularly well placed to challenge the UCD in the cities. Not only is the Center still an embryonic political party, but neighborhood and housewife associations—there are more than 100 of the former in Madrid alone—have long been strongholds of the Left and highly politicized. With the turnout in these elections likely to fall below the 78 percent mark registered for the 1977 parliamentary ones, a fairly disciplined vote will have a much greater impact. Indeed, a preliminary assessment would lead one to expect municipal takeovers by the Left in some of the largest Spanish cities.

The economy will also affect the outcome of new elections. The Spanish economy has yet to recover from the nadir reached earlier this year. Particularly disturbing is unemployment. Official figures place unemployment at 800,000, but the total rises to nearly 1.3 million people if we include those willing to work who cannot find jobs.[50] The situation is most delicate in Andalucía, where the figure hovers around the 15 percent mark. Apparently the *Pacto de la Moncloa* has helped hold down inflation in 1978, but the 19-20 percent rate expected for this year is still considerably higher than the 8 percent average for the other OECD countries.[51]

There has been some speculation that with the unification of the various socialist currents taking place under the PSOE banner—the one with the PSP in early May 1978 is the best known, but similar processes have been under way in Catuluña, Aragon, Valencia, and to some degree Andalucía—and recent statements by Felipe González to the effect that at the forthcoming 28th PSOE Congress in 1979 he would propose that the term Marxist be dropped from the party program, the PSOE may be able to broaden its electoral appeal sufficiently to gain a majority (or close to it) of the seats in a new Cortes. This will not be easily accomplished. Not only has there been some resentment within the PSOE as a result of González' declarations, particularly among a portion of the cadres, but it also appears that in the senatorial by-election in Asturias at least a part of the PSP electorate voted Communist. The PSOE has been weakened, moreover, by the inability of the UGT to win the syndical elections.

A recent poll published by the independent daily *El País* shows the PSOE leading in a hypothetical election with 33.6 percent of the vote (as compared with 29.3 percent in June 1977), followed by the UCD with 28.5 percent and the PCE with 9.7 percent. Some 13.6 percent of the voters were undecided, according to the survey. More generally,

50. *El Socialista* (Madrid), May 7, 1978.
51. See *Cambio 16*, June 4, 1978, p. 87.

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the poll showed a trend toward the Left in the country, with 40 percent of the electorate identifying itself as Left or Center-Left, 21.7 percent Center, and 10.9 percent Right.[52]

In the event of new elections, however, it is unlikely that either the PSOE or the UCD will record sharp gains or losses in comparison with their showings of June 1977. We should not, in any case, underestimate the political ability of Suárez, who has up to now demonstrated himself to be a consummate politician. As far as the Communists are concerned, a rise of 3 or 4 percentage points nationally is to be expected. In case either the PSOE UCD achieves a relative Cortes majority, the most probable outcome would be formation of a coalition government between the victorious party and Catalan and/or Basque minority groups. PSOE participation in a UCD government headed by Suárez is problematic, but Socialist leaders would like the inclusion of left-wing sectors of the UCD in any government their party headed. Such a government might also have Communist participation at the middle levels of various ministries in exchange for a commitment of parliamentary support. Much less likely governments would be UCD or PSOE one-party minority cabinets.

Any government will have a difficult time of it, though. Not only is the economy faltering and industrial discipline slackening, but peripheral nationalist groups, particularly in the Basque country, are unlikely any time soon to tone down their demands for even greater autonomy and in some cases outright independence. The military will also merit special attention in the months immediately ahead, particularly since it is likely to be the target of attacks by extremists interested in destabilizing the country.

Some observers saw the *Pacto de la Moncloa* as the first step on the road to a Spanish version of the Italian "historic compromise." Such an interpretation may be proved correct over the long run, but so far the confluence of interests among the various partners seems to be more tactical than strategic. The UCD, for one, has viewed the PCE more as an instrument with which to increase its bargaining leverage on the PSOE than as a long-term ally. As far as the Socialists are concerned, they have little interest in such a broad coalition, and if their party consolidates its hegemony on the Left, it will be in a strong position to frustrate efforts in that direction. For their part, some Communist leaders and particularly Santiago Carrillo may well be convinced of the viability and necessity of a "historic compromise" in Spain; nonetheless, the situation there differs substantially from that in Italy, and we must be careful about drawing too quick an analogy.

To avoid being locked into a marginal role, the PCE will pursue a dual-pronged policy of, on the one hand, supporting Suárez (this will help consolidate democratic institutions and underscore the moderation of the PCE) and, on the other, keeping the door open to the Socialists. At some point, the Communists will have to make a choice between alliance partners, but there is no reason why the PCE should not be able to employ both levers simultaneously for some time to come.

Certainly, it is too early yet to tell what the prospects for a shift in the "correlation of forces" within the Left are in the short to medium term, although the PCE does have an important ace in the hole with its strength in the labor movement. Whatever the outcome of the next general elections, though, competition between the PSOE and PCE will probably continue to be a fixture of the Spanish political scene. At the same time, we should not lose sight of the fact that, even now and however reluctantly, each side perceives the other to be a natural ally on the road to socialism. The Socialists would like to reach power alone, but if they fail in this effort—and the next two or three years will be decisive in this respect—it in all likelihood will only be a matter of time before the two parties work out some sort of common platform or program. The principal obstacles which have impeded such a development up to now—the fact that an entente, by conjuring up visions of a "popular front," would encourage the extreme Right, and the Socialist desire to reach power without the Communists and, otherwise, to delineate with some precision the areas and limits of Communist influence—are largely conjunctural in nature and will probably diminish over time.

Any assessment of Communist prospects for the longer term must emphasize the unlikelihood that the PCE will acquire a role in the Spanish Left comparable, for example, to that of the Italian Communist Party in its local Left. Nevertheless, precisely because of Communist efforts to reach parity with the PSOE, we can probably expect a deepening of the evolutionary process (which, it should be stressed, is not necessarily equivalent to "social democratization") already under way in Spanish communism. We should be wary of minimizing the obstacles involved, but we must not forget that the peculiar constellation of the Spanish Left in 1978 does favor such an evolution.

52. El País, June 15, 1978.

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Moscow and the "Eurocommunists"

By Richard Lowenthal

For a number of years now, the Soviet leaders have been increasingly confronted with a common type of "revisionist" trend in a number of communist parties in the industrially advanced democracies, including the major communist parties of Italy, France, Spain, and Japan. That trend, popularly known as "Eurocommunism," has started at different times and has developed unevenly in depth and strength from country to country, leaving some of the minor Western communist sects almost completely unaffected. However, in those more vital parties in which it has manifested itself, it appears to derive from broadly common roots and to have brought forth certain characteristic features.

The first of the common roots is the prolonged survival of these parties in a nonrevolutionary situation that has produced a growing integration of the bulk of the working classes into their advanced societies, and the attendant difficulty of maintaining the parties' mass appeal in a situation of relative isolation, devoid of influence on current policy decisions. The second is the decline of the international authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a consequence of, first, the destalinization crisis and, then, the Chinese schism, and the corresponding increase in the scope for autonomous decisions by major parties outside the Soviet bloc. The third is the new chances for these parties to overcome their isolation in the context of East-West detente on the one hand and the economic difficulties of recession and inflation on the other, provided the Western communists adjust their doctrine and strategy accordingly.

Among the common features are a rejection of the relevance of the models of the Russian October Revolution and—more important—of Soviet "socialist construction" for advanced countries with democratic traditions; a rejection of strategic subordination to an international center; and a rejection of such basic tenets of Leninist doctrine as the need to "smash" the democratic state and replace it with a "dictatorship of the proletariat" (i.e., a single-party regime), in favor of a commitment to pluralist democracy. The Soviet party, in short, finds itself faced with a tendency toward the "withering away" of Leninism among just those communist parties which have strong roots among the industrial working classes of advanced countries.

Not surprisingly, a number of Western commentators, in analyzing the "Eurocommunist" tendencies and the resulting conflicts with Soviet orthodoxy, have predicted the impending emergence of a major new communist "schism"—on the order of Stalin's break with Yugoslavia and the great Sino-Soviet conflict. However, Moscow, while publicly rejecting a number of specific criticisms that the "Eurocommunists" have directed against Soviet policies as well as some of the more far-reaching doctrinal statements of the "Eurocommunists," has so far refrained from measures of formal "excommunication." It has even made tactical concessions concerning the degree of international cooperation required. In turn, the "heretical" parties—apart from the Japanese, whose full and formal independence dates from the mid-1960's—have shown a marked eagerness to maintain a relationship of basic "solidarity" with the ruling communist parties, so long as this is compatible with the former's strategic and ideological autonomy.

Thus, relations between Moscow and the "Eurocommunist" parties are complex, and any predic-

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Mr. Lowenthal is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the Free University of Berlin (West Berlin). A leading commentator on communism and world affairs, he has been a frequent contributor to this journal. His most recent book is Model or Ally? The Communist Powers and the Developing Countries, *1977. This article is based on a paper delivered at the Seminar on the USSR and the Sources of Soviet Policy held at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, DC, in April-May 1978.*

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French Communist Party chief Georges Marchais enters the Élysées Palace in Paris on March 30, 1978, for a conference with the President of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

—Rush/Katherine Young.

tions should not be based simply on analogies with earlier intercommunist conflicts. It may be safer to start from an analysis of the nature of Soviet interests in the industrially advanced democracies and in their communist parties.

Soviet Interests

The USSR would seem to have three main kinds of interest in the industrially advanced democracies. These are (1) a potential, though normally latent interest in revolutionary seizures of power by pro-Soviet communist parties in these countries; (2) a present and major interest in influencing the foreign and defense policies of these countries so as to weaken the cohesion and vitality of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the American-Japanese alliance; (3) a permanent interest in the contribution that the nonruling communist parties in the advanced industrial countries can, and to some extent still do, make to the *domestic legitimation of communist party rule within the* Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

With regard to the first of these interests, one should note that owing to the long period of stability and prosperity of the industrially advanced democracies that began at the end of the 1940's, Soviet interest in a revolutionary overthrow of the systems of government in these countries appeared to have become so irrelevant for practical policy that many doubted its continued existence. In fact, however, the Soviet leaders themselves had, as early as 1956, adjusted their ideas of a possible revolutionary strategy for such countries by introducing—in Nikita Khrushchev's public report to the 20th CPSU Congress—the concept of the "peaceful road" to power. Under favorable conditions, it was argued, communists might come to power not by the creation of soviets and an armed insurrection on the model of Lenin's October Revolution or by prolonged partisan warfare on the model of Tito's and Mao's revolutions, but by the effective use of existing parliamentary institutions in combination with Soviet pressure from without—on the model of the takeovers in the East European "people's democ-

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racies." Such a road would still be "revolutionary" in the sense that it would lead to total control by the communists and to a radical transformation of society. At the same time, it would be "peaceful" in the sense that it avoided a civil war. In this new form, Soviet interest in a revolutionary transformation of the advanced industrial countries remained latent in Moscow's thinking until 1974-75, when it surfaced again under the dual impact of the revolutionary overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship by a military junta and of the worldwide economic recession.

The Portuguese Communists' attempt to seize power at first looked promising owing to their early influence on the junta and their control of a number of key positions in Portugal's propaganda and police apparatuses. Moreover, while Portugal is not, of course, an advanced industrial country, it does lie in Western Europe, and Soviet ideological writers soon proceeded to hold Portugal's Communists up, in authoritative Soviet journals, as an example to other West European communists. As we shall see, those Soviet leaders who held revolutionary hopes for Western Europe only abandoned them toward the end of 1975, after the prospects of the Portuguese Communists to assume power had clearly dimmed—and after expressions of such hopes had aroused growing opposition among most West European communist parties.

Far more permanently topical, because it is independent of real or presumed chances of a communist seizure of power, is the basic Soviet interest in influencing the foreign and defense policies of advanced nations allied to the United States—so as to induce these nations to make unilateral concessions to the USSR, to reduce their armaments unilaterally or to oppose American armaments, and generally to lessen their political, military, and economic cooperation with other noncommunist nations by playing on pacifist, neutralist, or nationalist emotions. The communist parties may advance such objectives by peace campaigns, campaigns against nuclear arms, anti-American campaigns, or, in Europe, campaigns against the Federal Republic of Germany. They can also play on economic conflicts among the partners of the Western alliance. However, their best chance to affect foreign and defense policies would presumably come if they could enter a government coalition—even without any prospect of transforming their membership in a coalition government into a true seizure of power—or if they could form, inside or even outside the government, an effective "veto group" with other pacifist, neutralist, or nationalist forces.

Finally, the Soviet leaders have shown an abiding concern with the legitimating function that nonruling communist parties, particularly those with an impressive hold over the working class of their countries, can perform in the domestic politics of the Soviet Union and other members of the Soviet bloc. The nonruling parties, according to Soviet thinking, can provide ever new evidence that the workers of the world look to the USSR and its allies as the model and stronghold of the socialist cause everywhere, and that the world's workers are willing to defend these countries not only against any military threat by the "imperialists," but also against the "ideological attacks of the bourgeoisie," as any criticism of the Soviet system is branded. This contribution of the nonruling communist parties is vital, because it is directly tied to the legitimating fiction that the ruling communist parties represent the working class.

Let us examine each of these three issue areas in more detail, turning first to questions of revolutionary strategy.

Conflict over Revolutionary Strategy

As noted above, in 1974-75 a number of Soviet specialists in revolutionary strategy and military theory began, under the impact of the Portuguese revolution and the international recession, to discuss the prospect of revolutionary developments in Western Europe. One of the first signs was an article on the theory of war appearing in a military journal, which announced that a "proletarian civil war of liberation against the bourgeoisie" was as worthy of support by all progressive states and forces as were "national wars of liberation."[1] A more authoritative appeal soon came from Soviet ideologue K. I. Zarodov, Chief Editor of the international communist journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, published in Prague. In the April 1975 issue of his journal, Zarodov called on the working class of the capitalist countries to exploit more actively the chances offered by the economic crisis by taking "offensive actions in the struggle for power." In early July, Soviet Politburo member M. A. Suslov, in a speech on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern (the 1935 "popular front" congress), compared the existing

1. T. Kondratkov in *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil* (Moscow), No. 11, 1974. For a later statement in the same vein, see V. Izmailov in ibid., No. 6, 1975.

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Alvaro Cunhal, Secretary-General of the Portuguese Communist Party and then Minister without Portfolio in the Provisional Government of Portugal, is met by Boris Ponomarëv, a secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, at Moscow's Sheremet"yevo Airport on November 1, 1974.

—London Daily Express/Pictorial Parade.

recession to the world economic crisis of 1929-32 and predicted "further extension of the world revolutionary process" because of the resulting paralysis of the West.[2] On August 6, Zarodov wrote a *Pravda* editorial on "Lenin's Strategy and Tactics in Revolutionary Struggle," using Lenin's 1905 slogan of the "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" as a justification for the speedy establishment of communist minority rule in a revolution, as was then being attempted by the Portuguese Communists and was evidently being recommended to other parties.

During the same period, Soviet leaders had called for a conference of all European communist parties and had begun to work for a joint document to be unanimously accepted by its participants. It soon appeared, however, that no unanimity could be achieved on Soviet ideas for a revolutionary strategy. Far from taking the Portuguese Communists as a model, the Italian Communists (engaged in a campaign to establish a "historic compromise," or coalition, with the governing Christian Democrats) and the Spanish Communists (then struggling to achieve democratic legality) openly criticized the policy of their Portuguese comrades.[3] For their part, the French Communists, involved in campaigning together with the Socialists on behalf the two parties' Common Program, defended the conduct of the Portuguese party at the cost of considerable friction with their electoral allies,[4] but the French party was not prepared to commit itself to a similar strategy. On the contrary, by November 1975, the French Communists joined the Italians and Spaniards in opposing the idea of a common international "strategy document," which they had previously supported. Shortly thereafter, moreover, the French Communists joined the Italian and Spanish parties in pledging the full maintenance of democratic rights and liberties (including the right of opposition) under a communist government and rejecting the principle of single-party rule.[5]

Faced with a solid front of the major Western communist parties on this issue (a stance that coincided substantively with that of the wholly independent Japan Communist Party and that received support from the Yugoslav and Romanian Communists insofar as the principle of autonomy of strategy was concerned), the Soviets by December 1975 began to back away from insistence on a common strategy document rather than risk aborting the planned conference of European communist parties. When that conference met at last in June 1976 in East Berlin, Moscow had to tolerate the publication of the speeches of the "Eurocommunist" leaders Enrico Berlinguer, Georges Marchais, and Santiago Carrillo; the explicit endorsement in the final conference document of the independence and equality of all communist parties; and even the replacement of the Soviet formula of "proletatian internationalism" by that of voluntary international solidarity.[6]

No doubt these concessions were made easier for the Soviets by the fact that by the end of 1975, the revolutionary strategy of the Portuguese Com-

2. See *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 11, 1975.

3. See, for example, Luca Pavolini in *l'Unità* (Rome), July 29, 1975.

4. See the press conference by Georges Marchais in *L'Humanité* (Paris), Aug. 9, 1976, and the statement of the French Communist Party's Political Bureau in ibid., Aug. 12, 1975.

5. The French shift became public in a joint statement of the French and Italian CP's (see *l'Unità*, Nov. 18, 1975). A joint statement of the Italian and Spanish parties had already appeared in ibid., July 12, 1975.

6. For the text of the final conference document, see *Pravda* (Moscow), July 1, 1976. The critical speeches of the "Eurocommunist" leaders were published in *Pravda* in censored extracts only, but had to be published in full in *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin) under the procedural rules agreed on before the conference.

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Enrico Berlinguer, left, Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party, is welcomed to Paris on June 3, 1976, by French Communist leader Georges Marchais. Berlinguer addressed a PCF rally and also compared notes with Marchais on the meeting of European communist parties which was to be held later in the month in East Berlin.

—Richard Melloul/SYGMA.

munists had clearly failed, and the hope of an early revolutionary development in Western Europe had faded. Nevertheless, Soviet ideological spokesmen remained unconvinced in principle: their subsequent theoretical statements not only have held firm to the formula of "proletarian internationalism" (as in Boris Ponomarëv's report on the conference),[7] but also have insisted on the need for a revolutionary "rupture" and the "smashing of the bourgeois state machine" as a condition of achieving socialism, even by the "peaceful road."[8]

Foreign Policy Cooperation

The attitudes of the leading nonruling CP's of Western Europe on questions of foreign and defense policy have been more urgently and permanently important and, on the whole, more satisfying to the Soviet Union than their attitudes concerning revolutionary strategy. The tradition of "peace campaigns" and "anti-imperialist campaigns" was well established with those parties long before the "Eurocommunist" concepts were fully developed, and it has been retained to this day in substantial degree. For instance, all the "Eurocommunist" parties have taken an active part in the recent Soviet-orchestrated campaign against the neutron bomb, and all of them have consistently supported Soviet policies in the Middle East and—but for minor misgivings over the sudden Soviet switch from Somalia to Ethiopia—also in Africa.

However, there has been a gradually increasing

7. Published in *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1976.
8. B. N. Ponomarëv, "The CPSU and the Development of the Leninist Theory of the International Revolutionary Process," *Information-Bulletin* (Vienna), No. 10, 1977.

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number of exceptions to this foreign policy cooperation that all the "Eurocommunist" parties have maintained in line with the concept of a basic solidarity with the Soviet Union against the "imperialists." The first of these involved the European Common Market. As early as 1962, Italian Communists began to accept the Common Market as "progressive," even in its present capitalist form, and called only for the subjection of its institutions to effective democratic control.[9] Accordingly, the Italian Communists have insisted on having the Communist-controlled trade union center, the *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* (CGIL), maintain a permanent office in Brussels, and also on being themselves represented in the existing, indirectly elected, European parliament. The French Communists, who shared the Soviet view of the Common Market as a reactionary invention, reluctantly trailed behind, as they came (like the Soviets) to accept the European Community as a fact of life. More recently, the Spanish Communists have supported Spain's application for membership in the Community.[10] Both the Italian and Spanish parties support the Community's decision to hold the first direct elections to the European parliament in June 1979.[11]

A second and more serious group of differences arose over the August 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and its justification by the "Brezhnev doctrine." This action was disapproved, in more or less cautious terms, by the Italian, French and Spanish communist parties individually. In fact, Italian and French Communist leaders had warned the Soviets against it beforehand,[12] while the Spaniards, whose leaders then lived in Czechoslovakia and had experienced the popular enthusiasm for the Prague Spring, seized upon the occasion to manifest an independent outlook for the first time.[13] Later, the French Communists accepted "for the good of the cause" the "normalization" of the Czechoslovak regime under Gustav Husak, but the Italians and Spaniards did not. Both the latter parties continue to print articles and letters from former proponents of the Prague Spring.[14] In the Italian case, continued disapproval of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia also implies a warning against a possible future intervention against neighboring Yugoslavia, with which the Italian Communists have developed strong ties of ideological dialogue and political friendship.

The shock of the Warsaw Pact action against Czechoslovakia on the one hand and the emerging chances of government participation in Italy and France on the other also produced changes in the attitudes of Italian and French Communists toward NATO, though in differing degrees. The Italian Communists have declared that they will not ask that Italy leave NATO so long as the Warsaw Pact exists, for while they favor the dissolution of both military blocs, they do not wish to disturb the European military balance. They publicly advocate a Europe on friendly terms with both the Soviet Union and the United States, and their leader, Berlinguer, has in a 1976 preelection statement even admitted that they regard the building of their type of socialism as easier in the area of NATO than in that of the Warsaw Pact.[15] The French Communists would oppose any French return into the integrated organization of NATO, but have stated that they will not ask that France withdraw from the alliance as long as the partition of Europe into military blocs exists. On the other hand, they have asked that French defense policy be oriented against all possible enemies (*tous azimuths*), meaning against the US and West Germany at least as much as against the Soviet bloc.[16] The Spanish Communists, while differing with Moscow about the merits of Spain's joining the European Community, agree with the Soviets in opposing Spain's entry into NATO, but they have stated that they will not ask for the removal of American bases from Spain while Soviet troops remain in Czechoslovakia.[17]

It will be seen that the foreign policy differences with Moscow are partial but serious in the cases of the Italian and Spanish parties but comparatively marginal in that of the French party, though the French Communists back up their similar conclu-

9. See the speech by Luigi Longo to the PCI Central Committee, published in *l'Unità*, Apr. 27, 1962.

10. See the interview with Manuel Azcárate in the volume *Eurokommunismus* edited by Heinz Timmermann, Frankfurt, S. Fischer, 1978.

11. For the PCI's welcome of direct European elections, see Giorgio Amendola in *Rinascita* (Rome), No. 6, Feb. 11, 1977. For the French party's initial opposition, see *L'Humanité*, July 15, 1976.

12. The French Communist leader Waldeck Rochet and Italian party leaders Carlo Galluzzi and Giancarlo Pajetta visited Moscow on July 15-16, 1968, for talks with "the Soviet leaders" (in fact, mainly Suslov) regarding the Czechoslovak situation. See *L'Humanité* and *l'Unità* of July 18, 1968. The fact that they had warned against military intervention came out in their parties' criticism of Soviet actions.

13. See the statement of the Spanish party's Executive in *Mundo Obrero* (Paris), September 1968.

14. See, for example, Alexander Dubcek's letter in *l'Unità*, Mar. 13, 1974; the letter from Zdenek Mlynar to the European communist parties in ibid., Apr. 11, 1976; and the statement by Frantisek Kriegel in *Mundo Obrero* (Madrid), No. 2, Jan. 12, 1978.

15. Interview with *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), June 15, 1976.

16. See Jean Kanapa's report to the PCF's Central Committee. *L'Humanité*, May 12, 1977.

17. See Santiago Carrillo's interview in *Time* (New York, NY), July 28, 1975.

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A mass demonstration in Paris by French Communists and other French leftists on April 25, 1972, calling for peace in Vietnam.

—Wide World.

sions on the questions of European or NATO integration by nationalist rather than "internationalist" arguments. Some friction has arisen between the French and Soviet Communists, however, over Soviet diplomacy toward France, which in the view of the French Communists has appeared to favor the government of the French Right over the opposition of the Left.[18] In effect, the French Communists have accused the Soviets of insufficient "solidarity." Another formal disagreement is that the French Communists have lately accepted the need to maintain the French nuclear force, which the Soviets are on record as opposing,[19] but it seems likely that the Soviets not only have long recognized the accomplished fact of that force, but are not seriously concerned about its existence—least of all in connection with the Communist advocacy of a French defense "*tous azimuths*," under which it would not be exclusively targeted at the USSR and its allies.

Despite the differences enumerated here, which—except for the Czechoslovak controversy—have not generally been played up in Soviet publications, the Soviet press in recent years has loyally backed the efforts of the Italian Communists to join the government majority. It has also supported both the campaign of the PCF for a *Union de Gauche* and the repeated turns of the French Communists against their Socialist partners in that union, which eventually wrecked its electoral chances. (Presumably, both the reticence evident in Soviet diplomacy toward the *Union de Gauche* and the apparent Soviet eagerness to support the Communist attacks against the Socialists were based on fears that a Left government under Socialist domination might be more "European" than a government of the Right, and on the calculation that a joint "veto group" of Communists and Gaullists might be preferable to such a government.)

18. See, for instance, the comment on Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU, with its friendly references to relations with the French government. *L'Humanité*, Feb. 26, 1976.

19. See the Kanapa report cited in fn. 16.

Western CP's and Soviet Legitimacy

Far more basic to Soviet relations with the major nonruling communist parties than intermittent Moscow hopes for new revolutions or for foreign policy support, however, has been the CPSU's reliance on the homage of these parties to the USSR as the country of the first "socialist revolution," as the first example of "socialist construction," and as the leading power of the "socialist camp." Yet,

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ever since the crisis of destalinization, the legitimating homage flowing to Moscow has become less than wholehearted in one after another of the nonruling communist parties in the industrially advanced democracies.

The Italian party led the way in this process of partial demythologization of the Soviet Union, with Palmiro Togliatti's 1956 interview raising the heretical question of the systemic defects that must have existed to make Stalin's crimes possible.[20] Although it was formally withdrawn after the immediate Soviet counterattack, the question could no longer be suppressed. By 1968, the reforms of the Prague Spring, themselves partly inspired by Italian Communist ideas, were taken as proof that the Soviet system could not be a model for socialism in advanced countries with democratic traditions. The horror of the Soviet suppression of the Czechoslovak experiment helped to spread that conviction to the French and Spanish parties. The need for finding noncommunist allies for future government coalitions increased the pressure on the "Eurocommunist" parties to make explicit their alternative model of socialism, and with it the features distinguishing it from what Moscow soon came to call—with clearly defensive intent—the "real socialism" of the USSR and the Soviet bloc.

The crucial step in undermining the ideological authority of the Soviet model was not the belated rejection of the slogan of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by the French Communists in 1976. In accordance with Gramsci, the Italians had always preferred to speak of "proletarian hegemony." Moreover, even the East European type of "people's democracy" had originally been recommended as an "alternative" to the dictatorship of the proletariat and had only been recognized as its synonym after the communists had consolidated their control. The crucial step, rather, was the acknowledgment that civil liberties achieved in "bourgeois democracies" must form an indispensable part of

20. See his famous interview with *Nuovi Argomenti* (Milan), No. 20, June 16, 1956, recently reprinted as a party pamphlet.

Chaque voix
pour les communistes
ra pencher la balance
u côté du changement
ANNIE MANDOIS
DEFI PUBLIC
a Robert HERSANT
Avec ministres communistes c'est en France que se décident la politique de la France

French Communist election posters in February 1978 bear a message not only to the French voters but also to Moscow and other foreign capitals. The poster at the left states: "Each Vote for the Communists Will Tip the Scales Toward Change." The poster going up at the right states: (in type) "With Communist Ministers, ***It is in France*** *That the Policy of France Will Be Decided," and (in script above), "Not in Washington, Not in Brussels, Not in Bonn, Not in Moscow."*

—Patrick Chauvel/SYGMA.

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Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo responds to the June 1977 Soviet attack on his "Eurocommunist" views at a Madrid press conference on June 27, 1977. To Carrillo's right (wearing eyeglasses) is Simon Sanchez Montero; to Carrillo's left, labor leader Marcelino Camacho.

—Victor Steinberg-Gamma/Liaison.

socialism in the West, that they were incompatible with a single-party system of the Soviet type, and that they included the right of opposition to a wholly or partly communist government and even its possible ouster in free elections. A corollary was that while the Soviet system had risen from the first, epoch-making socialist revolution and was therefore to be classified as socialist, it was to be viewed as a special type of socialism created on a backward historical and cultural basis rather than as a universal model. Although Lenin himself had said during the early years of communist power that after the communist victory in advanced Germany, which he then saw as impending, Russia would become "a backward country in a Soviet sense," the propounding of such ideas more than half a century later sounded to his Soviet heirs like blasphemy—a direct threat to the ideological legitimacy of Soviet rule. The threat was dramatically symbolized in April 1978 when the Spanish Communists at their Ninth Party Congress formally decided to cease referring to their party as "Marxist-Leninist,"[21] a step the Japanese Communists had taken earlier and the Italians are reported to be considering.[22]

Carrying this development toward its logical conclusion, some of the ideologues of "Eurocommunism" have expressed doubt as to whether the Soviet Union can be called "socialist" at all. Either human rights and civil liberties are a necessary part of socialism, or they are not. Can one knowingly defend a "socialism *without* a human face"? Santiago Carrillo articulated such doubts in his book *"Eurocommunism" and the State*.[23] Even more recently, Jean Elleinstein, the French Communist historian of the Soviet Union, arrived at the same conclusion,[24] although his party, which previously supported his criticism of Soviet failings, has not followed his lead to embrace a thesis that is bound to weaken its position in its competition with the Socialists.

21. On this, see the article by Eusebio Mujal-Leon, "Eurocommunism 1978: The PCE in Spanish Politics," in this issue of *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC).

22. See the interview with Lucio Lombardo Radice in *La Stampa* (Turin), Sept. 16, 1977.

23. "*Eurocomunismo*" y *Estado*, Barcelona, Editorial Critica, 1977.

24. See Elleinstein's article in *Le Monde* (Paris), Apr. 13, 1978.

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It is clear that if such criticism, even of the less consistent kind, is raised by the official spokesmen and organs of large communist parties that are still in formal "communion" with the ruling parties of the Soviet Union and its allied states, that criticism is bound to find an echo in those same countries and in some cases even in their ruling parties. This applies all the more if the critique is directed against specific actions in the countries of "real socialism," such as their inhuman methods of suppressing dissenting intellectuals and artists. The Prague Spring had to be snuffed out because it posed a danger of bloc-wide infection with the virus of democracy and human rights. Adoption of its principles by nonruling communist parties constitutes a lesser danger to the legitimating ideology of the ruling ones only as long as the present carriers of the virus are not able to practice in power what they preach.

The Soviet Response

On all the issues on which important nonruling communist parties have adopted policies in limited or serious conflict with Soviet interests, the Soviet response has been cautious to the point of ambiguity. Two reasons evidently underlie this cautiousness. First, despite the partial conflicts, Moscow has viewed the formal ties with these parties as still actually and potentially supportive of Soviet foreign policy interests in a number of ways. Second, it has felt that a total break with major communist parties could possibly prove even more harmful to the internal legitimacy of the Soviet-bloc regimes than proclamation of even serious heresies by those nonruling parties while still in communion with the ruling ones.

Thus, the advocacy of broad nonrevolutionary policies by the major "Eurocommunist" parties, while originally undertaken in opposition to Soviet advice, has since 1976 been accepted and supported by the Soviet press as a realistic adjustment to the given situation. At the same time, authoritative Soviet spokesmen have recorded reservations from the standpoint of principle and long-range strategy. They have argued that communist entry into nonrevolutionary coalitions could only prove useful up to the point when the resistance of monopoly capital would force the communists to go beyond the original coalition program, to use violence in fighting the violence of the reactionaries, and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Approval of present tactics of the West European parties is sometimes juxtaposed in the same document to reminders that such tactics will prove insufficient from a strategic point of view.[25] But explicit criticism of those parties is usually avoided in that context, and the hope is expressed that they will prove their truly revolutionary character once the crucial stage is reached. (This latter attitude has a curious parallel in the doubts frequently expressed in the West concerning the "sincerity" of the "Eurocommunists.")

In the field of foreign policy, the continuing broad solidarity in the struggle for peace and against "imperialism" is stressed in all Soviet media, and differences regarding European integration and even the formal attitude toward membership of the West European countries in NATO are played down. Similarly, no notice has been taken of the French Communist complaints over insufficient Soviet solidarity. The one difference on foreign policy that is treated as a question of principle concerns the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. There,

25. See, for example, the article cited in fn. 8.



Jan Fojtik, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and one of the vocal East European critics of the "Eurocommunists."

—Pictorial Parade.

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"Eurocommunist" criticism clearly touches on the question of the legitimacy of Soviet and Soviet-bloc regimes. Accordingly, it is on occasion branded as "support for bourgeois reaction" (a charge also voiced through the mouths of pro-Soviet Czechoslovak spokesmen).[26]

Generally, the Soviets, for all their obvious interest in avoiding a break with the major "Eurocommunist" parties, cannot afford, for equally obvious reasons, to ignore direct attacks on the legitimacy of their regime. In rejecting both the theoretical and the factual criticism, however, they tend to attribute it whenever possible not to the parties concerned, but to specific individuals, whom they then attack harshly. In the course of the past year, such attacks have been directed against the two most prominent leaders of the Spanish party, Carrillo and Manuel Azcárate, and against French Communist historian Elleinstein.[27] Only after the Ninth Congress of the Spanish CP had gone on record disavowing "Marxism-Leninism" did *Pravda* publish a harsh criticism of that party itself, and even then it was in the form of an extract from an article by a Czechoslovak Communist leader, J. Fojtik, originally published in the Czech *Tribuna*.[28]

Of course, if a Communist party should go too far in its criticism of the Soviet system, the ultimate weapon of "excommunication"—breaking relations, denouncing the leaders as traitors to the cause, and encouraging the splitting-off of a pro-Moscow faction—is held in reserve. So far, this weapon has only been used against some smaller parties. Moscow did not wholly welcome the splintering of the Finnish Party by the "Stalinist" wing, but it used the development to press for a reunion on terms which would give the Soviets greater influence.[29] The Greek party split at a time when it was still underground, and now the pro-Soviet faction has achieved greater electoral strength than the independent former underground organization enjoys.[30] Sweden's outspokenly "Eurocommunist" party has recently been greatly weakened by a formal breakaway of its pro-Moscow wing.[31] However, the efforts of the pro-Moscow group of Enrique Líster to split the Spanish party when it was still underground during the Franco era proved a complete failure.[32] Nevertheless, a renewed attempt in reaction to the decisions of Carrillo's recent party congress cannot be excluded.

Prospects

The foregoing analysis suggests that Soviet leaders, with the possible exception of some specialists in the ideological field, are not seriously worried about the marked lack of revolutionary zeal shown by most communist parties in industrially advanced Western countries. Deeper concerns for Moscow are on the one hand to preserve the usefulness of the major nonruling parties to Soviet foreign policy, and on the other to limit the damage that their "revisionist" theories and the concrete criticism of the Soviet-bloc systems, as well as their actions, may do to the internal legitimacy of the Soviet regime and its allies. For this dual purpose, they have developed an interparty diplomacy which differs considerably from their traditional doctrinaire authoritarianism. They have shown themselves prepared not only to grant the nonruling parties an almost complete autonomy with regard to strategy and tactics, but also to react to deviations from the Soviet interpretation of communist doctrine and to public critiques of Soviet and Soviet-bloc actions with comparative moderation, and to confine attempts to exert pressure in cases they consider extreme chiefly to nonpublic channels. For such

26. The Soviet weekly *Novoye vremya*, which appears in several Western languages, has specialized in this task. See, for example, the general article about the hopes that "anticommunists" place in "Eurocommunism," in issue No. 38, 1977, of this Moscow journal.

27. For Moscow's attacks on Carrillo, see ibid., Nos. 26 and 28, 1977; on Azcárate, Nos. 3 and 6, 1978; and on Elleinstein, No. 5, 1977, and No. 22, 1978.

28. *Pravda*, Apr. 23, 1978.

29. For a full account of the Finnish split and the role of the Soviets in shaping the terms of reunion, see Ulrich Wagner, *Finnlands Kommunisten* (Finland's Communists), Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1971.

30. The Greek party split came about in early 1968, when the leaders of the underground organization in the country were expelled by the exile leadership for supporting a broad antifascist united-front policy. The former reacted by setting up their own party, which subsequently took an independent line also on the Czechoslovak events. But in the election of November 1977, the second held after the overthrow of the military dictatorship, the official pro-Moscow Greek Communist Party (KKE) polled 9.36 percent of the total vote against only 2.72 percent for an alliance of independent left-wing groups, including the KKE-Interior.

31. On the Swedish split, see *Norskenflamman* (Lulea), organ of the pro-Moscow secessionists, Mar. 1, 1977; the official CP's *Ny Dag* (Stockholm), Mar. 2, 1977; and the general Stockholm press of the same days.

32. The breakaway of a number of Central Committee members of the then exiled Spanish party leadership followed the critique of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia by the majority. The secessionists constituted themselves as the "true" party under the leadership of Enrique Líster. See the "red" (the dissidents') edition of *Mundo Obrero* (also published in Paris), July 1971. For the majority view, see *Mundo Obrero*, No. 19, Nov. 1971. Soviet support for the Líster group was abandoned after a Moscow meeting of Soviet leaders with those of the Spanish CP majority, notably Carrillo, Azcárate, and Dolores Ibárruri. Communiqué in *Pravda*, Oct. 16, 1974.

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pressure, particularly against individuals below the top leadership levels of the nonruling parties whom they come to regard as definitely anti-Soviet, they can still rely on the desire of most if not all members of those leaderships to avoid a break.

That interest of most leaders of nonruling parties in "not going too far" has both ideological and material roots. Ideologically, the symbolic commitment to the October Revolution is still important for a large part of the cadres and the rank and file of these parties. Its abandonment, however logical this might be in the search for an alternative model of socialism, would make the parties vulnerable on one hand to pro-Soviet splits and on the other to social democratic charges that they have become superfluous, because the commitment to the Bolshevik Revolution constitutes an important part of their historic political identities. Materially, while the strong nonruling parties are no longer vitally dependent on Soviet financial support, they still appear to benefit substantially from their links with a network of companies in their countries that are engaged in trade with the Soviet Union and its allies.

The situation would be different if one of the "Eurocommunist" parties came to wield power, or, more likely, to play a substantial role in the government of its country. It could then base its appeal increasingly on its progress along its own road of socialist transformation while depending less and less on a foreign model. At the same time, it would be able to dispose of increased material resources of its own.

Moreover, foreign policy differences among communists in different governments are not only more likely but also more difficult to bridge by interparty diplomacy, precisely because these governments then come to rely for the legitimation of their respective positions on competing versions of the same ideological doctrine. It is surely no accident that the great schisms in international communism in the past have resulted from conflicts between Moscow and *ruling* communist parties—the Yugoslav and the Chinese. Indeed, it may be suggested that the only truly irreconcilable conflict involving a (premature) "Eurocommunist" party was that between the Czechoslovak Communist reformers of 1968 and the other communist parties of the Warsaw Pact—a conflict that could be quickly settled by brute force because it occurred on the "wrong" side of Europe, but that has nonetheless left lasting scars among the "Eurocommunists."

As long as the "Eurocommunists" play no substantial role in the governments of their countries, initiation of a break or a split by Moscow is just conceivable in the case of the Spanish party but highly unlikely with regard to the French or Italian parties. A major schism arising from the revisionist developments in Western Europe thus is only likely on the hypothesis that their exponents achieve substantial government influence.

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Books

The PCI: A History of Compromise

By Lawrence Gray

HOWARD R. PENNIMAN, Ed. *Italy at the Polls.* Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977.

HARALD HAMRIN, *Between Bolshevism and Revisionism: The Italian Communist Party, 1944-1947.* Stockholm, Scandinavian University Books, 1975.

MARIO SANTUCCIO and SABINO ACQUAVIVA. *Social Structure in Italy.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1976.

LUCIANO BARCA et al. *I comunisti e l'economia italiana, 1944-1974* (The Communists and the Italian Economy, 1944-1974). Bari, De Donato, 1975.

MICHAEL LEDEEN. *Italy in Crisis.* Beverly Hills, CA, and London, SAGE Publications, 1977.

Sociologie du communisme en Italie (The Sociology of Communism in Italy). Paris, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1974.

SINCE THE 1976 Italian general elections, we have experienced an extraordinary outpouring of literature on, about, and by the Italian Communist Party (PCI). As with all such efflorescences, much of the writing has little importance and will be of short-lived utility. This is all the more so because the field of "PCI-ology" is being taken over by academics and journalists, especially non-Italians, who worry their points into books and articles of an esoteric nature. Nonetheless, the outpouring attests to more than the "academization" of the field of PCI studies. It testifies as well to the growing fascination (and fear) that this powerful Western communist party—on the verge of and partially already in power—arouses in many foreign observers. The six books under review are highly informative about recent trends in scholarship concerning the steady growth of PCI strength in the context of the crisis of the Italian political system in the postwar period.

THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST Party is widely recognized as the most successful of the Western communist parties. As Howard R. Penniman observes in his preface to the compendium *Italy at the Polls,* the PCI's virtually uninterrupted advance was demonstrated again in the 1976 Italian elections, even if the Christian Democrats managed to recapture many of the votes they had lost to the far Right in the 1975 regional contests. Thus, over a period of 30 years, the Italian Communist Party increased its share of the vote from 18.9 percent to 34.4 percent, while the Christian Democrats slid from a 1948 high of 48.5 percent to 38.7 percent in June 1976.[1]

The PCI's successes have not been restricted to the domestic scene. The party is also generally acknowledged to have been one of the pathbreakers in the evolution of the international communist movement since 1956. From the outset of the metamorphosis in interparty relations which was set in motion by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in June 1956, the PCI has consistently opposed any form of centralized control over the communist movement and has advocated autonomy in the search for national paths to socialism.[2] The coining of the term "polycentrism" by the PCI's late Secretary-General Palmiro Togliatti in June 1956

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1. One should note that the Penniman volume is more than a survey of how the Italian parties fared during the 1976 elections. Its 10 thoughtfully chosen essays carefully examine the strategies of the various Italian parties and assess the prospects for change in the fragmented Italian political system.

2. See Palmiro Togliatti, "On the Political Orientation of Our Party," *Rinascita* (Rome), November 1959, pp. 757-62.

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reflected this stance. Even the PCI's post-1956 call for "structural reforms" of Italian society through parliamentary action was viewed by its proponents as a means not only of attracting allies among Italy's political moderates but of advancing in concrete, immediate terms the cause of socialism. This acceptance of a seemingly open-ended democratic "transitional phase" during which Italian society would gradually evolve in a socialist direction often placed the PCI dangerously close to the brink of revisionist heresy in Soviet eyes.

Thus, in both domestic strategy and interparty relations the PCI moved rapidly toward the "independent" end of the international communist political spectrum. Over the past few years, of course, such a posture has ceased to be unique. Well before the advent of the popular term "Eurocommunism"(a term not invented by the adherents of the phenomenon), the tiny British Communist Party, the Spanish party, and the far larger but more orthodox French party had all modified their policies in a similar direction. Nevertheless, the PCI was the first major West European communist party to pursue this path, and its innovating efforts were doubtless at least partially responsible for prodding the more conservative parties to adopt similar lines.

This raises a central question: What has motivated the leadership of the PCI (Togliatti and, later, Enrico Berlinguer) to assume this vanguard role? Were there factors in the PCI's earlier history that encouraged the party to behave as it did once the crisis over Soviet hegemony emerged in early 1956?

THE ANSWERS to these questions, have, as Harald Hamrin suggests in his *Between Bolshevism and Revisionism: The Italian Communist Party, 1944-1947,* been hard to come by, in part because of the methodological approach long prevalent in postwar communist studies, whereby the common denominators were stressed and the "national peculiarities" of parties or states were neglected. Hamrin takes issue with this approach, which led Western students of communism to be—like the Stalinist policy-makers—concerned more with model-building than with reality. In their search for evidence of similarity, observers tended to adopt a general and poorly defined "model" which often obscured the individuality of men and parties. Like the Stalinists they regarded actual variations from the model as aberrations. Individuals and parties were seen as communist when they conformed to the model, and as noncommunist insofar as they differed from it. However, the "general model" was, in fact, not general at all but merely a representation—actual or idealized—of the Soviet Union. This method often yielded highly misleading findings. When any ideological and political creativity by a communist party differed from Soviet practices or wishes, it was generally interpreted as a defection from the communist cause.

While perhaps understandable in the political atmosphere of the cold war, this prevailing view of communism as a "monolith" was particularly distorting when applied to studies of the PCI, for it drew attention away from the rich Italian intellectual and political setting within which this party operated. By ignoring important national distinctions, it led to the neglect of significant facets of the Italian movement's history and, most important, all but precluded any expectation of change in PCI practice.

Hamrin's basic intention is to correct this distortion by suggesting that an organic relationship exists between the polycentric path followed by the PCI after 1956 and the party's earlier behavior. He begins by focusing on the peculiarities of the PCI's development in the Stalinist years, in particular on its clashes with Moscow and on the predilection among the Italian party's leaders for some concept of a democratic "transitional phase" between capitalism and socialism. In tracing this history, to be sure, Hamrin rejects the approach whereby the conduct of the PCI is seen to be nearly autonomous, with its ties to the Soviet Union limited to a few common positions in international affairs. At the same time, he refuses to view PCI domestic strategy as a mere reflection of Soviet foreign policy. Instead, he sees a national party strategy that was strong and independent, even if frequently deflected or influenced by Soviet directives and by the USSR's international behavior, preoccupations, and general situation. In this portion of the book, Hamrin examines the elements of change and continuity in PCI history against the "Bolshevik" and "revisionist" (or social democratic) images of what a party should be. He argues that the PCI elaborated an "original synthesis" of these "ideal" types. (A minor weakness in this otherwise outstanding piece of scholarship is Hamrin's failure to explore to the fullest the influence of party-father Antonio Gramsci on the PCI during its formative years.)

The bulk of the volume consists of an analysis of the crucial 1944-47 period when the PCI became a legal party of major political significance. Hamrin looks at PCI behavior during this

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period in terms of the three dimensions—policy, ideology, and organization—that any Marxist party must integrate into a coherent unity, as Pietro Nenni once observed, if it wants to successfully face both the present and the future. The author traces the main lines of the PCI's early postwar posture forward into the post-Stalinist years and also notes their roots in earlier periods of party history. In short, Hamrin sees a basic continuity in the party's evolution, one which the PCI itself claims.

THE POSTWAR development of the PCI obviously did not take place in a vacuum, but rather occurred against a backdrop of major social and economic change. The 1976 volume *Social Structure in Italy* is both a superb introduction to and a highly systematic account of Italy's major socioeconomic problems and the country's postwar development.

The working premise of this study is that the contemporary configuration of political and economic power in Italy cannot be properly understood without carefully analyzing the historical dynamics of the development of Italian society. The authors, Mario Santuccio and Sabino Acquaviva, demonstrate that the roots of the contemporary Italian social and political crisis lie not in the failures of fascism, democracy, Catholicism, or Marxism, but in the endemic underdevelopment of Italian society in the second half of the 19th century. This long period of underdevelopment was followed by an extremely uneven regional evolution that led to

. . .tremendous cleavages between ultra-modern and utterly antiquated phenomena, the juxtaposition of flexibility and rigidity, of optimistic enthusiasm and traditionalism, of extreme wealth and abysmal poverty, of high and low levels of earnings, and of a maladjusted, ill-functioning, uneasy combination of agricultural, industrial, and postindustrial society.

According to the authors, this state of affairs has been aggravated by the crisis in the Church and by the existence of a North-South development division within the country.

Antonio Labriola wrote in 1896 that the state of affairs in Italy "creates a universal sense of unease; that is, it creates a general awareness of the incongruity of the whole, and of every part."[3] The work of Santuccio and Acquaviva convincingly demonstrates that the old incongruity of which Labriola spoke has by no means disappeared, but has merely been reproduced at a higher level. The authors' analysis of political power in Italy, their detailed examination of the state bureaucracy, and their comments on the very transformation of the power structure are characterized by a generally admirable combination of subtlety and indignation.[4] As they observe, public administration remains inadequate and unwieldy, justice is slow, universities are medieval, the taxation system is vexatious for the poor and powerless against tax evaders, and corruption is widespread.

Some may object that this is the inevitable price and inconvenience of progress. It certainly cannot be denied that in the postwar period, Italy finally has managed to break the chains of backwardness in which she had been held for centuries and has joined the small number of industrially advanced countries. But what leaves many Italians perplexed and skeptical when they consider their "progress" is that there have been no parallel social advances. Santuccio and Acquaviva skillfully point to the paradoxes of a society where the death penalty has been abolished yet many "crimes of honor" are still committed; where intellectual progressiveness and alienation coexist with clericalism and superstition. These incongruities generate universal unease, to borrow Labriola's phrasing. The same Italians who benefit from prosperity do not believe in it but confine themselves to enjoying it as noisily and unthinkingly as they can, while it lasts.

THE QUESTIONS raised by Santuccio and Acquaviva are of the greatest importance, a fact which has not escaped Italy's Communists. This is evidenced in the anthology *I comunisti e l'economia italiana, 1944-1974*. The volume presents a collection of articles and documents which delineate the major positions taken by the PCI on the Italian economy from 1944 through 1974. The most useful part of the book is the introductory chapter in which Luciano Barca, one of the party's major economists, provides a valuable overview of the relevant documents presenting the PCI's perspective on economic questions.

If the contents of the Barca volume are disappointing as a critical prescription for Italy's economic ills, it is because the PCI has yet to offer an extremely

3. Quoted in Giuliano Procacci, *Histoire d'Italie* (History of Italy), Paris, Fayard, 1968, p. 292.

4. At times, however, this indignation does, unfortunately, result in the use of unnecessarily charged imagery, as on page 173: "The social parasites sucking blood, penetrating deeper and deeper into the system. . . ."

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precise "economic manifesto" for Italy. Even the PCI's "mid-term program" published in 1976—two years after the Barca volume—is at best only an outline of party economic strategy for the coming years.[5]

Nevertheless, as Barca observes in his introduction, the political strategy of the PCI should always be seen against the background of Italian economic development of recent years. Of course, it is exceedingly difficult for even the most objective observer to arrive at a balanced view of the Italian economy. It always seems to be better than the pessimists predict, yet never quite as good as the optimists claim. While the country has recently managed to reduce its foreign debt and gradually trim a whopping annual inflation rate of over 25 percent, industrial production is in a slump, and unemployment is increasing. In 1974, the end year of Barca's analysis, the country experienced strict austerity, and in the following year, it underwent its worst recession since 1948. Yet, in 1975 Italy was the largest market in Europe for champagne, Scotch whiskey, and Rolls Royce automobiles. Italy does not go by the "rules," but somehow it manages to go.

AT THE SAME TIME, some have asked how long this can continue. Will the smoldering problems of Italian society finally erupt into crisis? Even an observant tourist will note that Italy is plagued with a number of extremely serious problems: an incredibly inadequate school system, chaos in the universities, pathologically disturbed labor-management relations, a labyrinthine civil service, health services locked in a semicoma, and a tired and traditional ruling political elite performing as if in semiretirement. The unprecedented economic expansion of the late 1950's and early 1960's led many Italians to expect more from their society. It made them acutely aware of, and increasingly impatient with, the backward condition of their country's social services and civic structures. Despite popular aspirations, the Center-Left governments—comprising Christian Democrats, Socialists, and minor lay parties—which ruled the country for 15 years until 1976 were largely distinguished by their disunity and constant factional strife and showed themselves to be unable to cope with the consequences of disorderly and uneven growth that increasingly exposed the country to runaway inflation and/or economic recession. Moveover, as socio-economic problems have worsened, Italy has slowly acquired some of the trappings of modern society, from a divorce law to powerful labor unions.

Thus it is possible that Italy is moving closer to the type of crisis suggested in the title of Michael Ledeen's recent tract. The author brings formidable polemical talents to bear on the evolution of what he sees as a political and economic crisis. Ledeen identifies as the main culprits the trade unions and the Communists, often working in cahoots to undermine the country's stability. Unfortunately, this booklet uses such broad categories and oscillates so between sweeping assertions and commonsense qualifications, that it is difficult to take seriously many of the statements therein. Yet, in his attempts to discredit the PCI, Ledeen does draw our attention to the dilemma faced by the party in trying to reconcile tactics and strategy.

It seems clear that the PCI tactic of attempting to win allies by formulating democratic objectives with broad popular appeal has gradualist implications for the long term, whether intended or not. There is, after all, no reason why achievement of democratic goals will itself evoke further demands for more radical steps in the direction of socialism. Precisely because of this, PCI spokesmen remain vague on the practical nexus between realization of the party's interim and ultimate goals.

Part of the problem here, no doubt, lies in the difficulty in defining what the Italian Communists mean by their use of the term "socialism." Here again, PCI leaders remain vague. But is it constructive for Ledeen to spike these recycled, albeit legitimate, questions with cold war ideological moonshine? Against Ledeen's doubts that the PCI is committed to the establishment of a pluralist regime in Italy there weighs heavily the considerable evidence of the gradualist and parliamentary practice of Italian communism since 1945. If it is indeed the case that, as Baudelaire observed, the world advances only through misunderstandings, Ledeen's work may yet have a salutary function.

THE POTENTIAL and the problems inherent in the PCI's post-war strategy are examined brilliantly by Sidney Tarrow's contribution to the last of the books reviewed here, *Sociologie du communisme en Italie*. His essay in French on the Communist Party and Italian society is one of the best ever to appear on the PCI, and it is unfortunate that the piece has never been published in English. In it, Tarrow ponders with a touch of skepticism the party's ability to administer a society as

5. See *Programa a medio termine*, Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1976.

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complex and distorted as Italy's. This, he observes, is not altogether the PCI's fault. The party's sophisticated domestic strategy has often been too modern, too complex, and too subtle to be understood by many party members and accepted by the rest of Italian society.

In the early postwar years, Tarrow explains, the PCI leaders faced the serious problem of actually getting down to fashioning a "new party," one which had already acquired a mass dimension because of the large influx of members during the antifascist resistance. The author discusses how the party strategy of establishing a "presence" in civil society was frequently misunderstood by many party members. For a not inconsiderable portion of the PCI's rank and file—including both older cadres from the resistance and younger members—it would have been much easier to believe in and propagate a simple identification of PCI goals with those of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which had highlighted a hegemonic role for the working class. For members of a working class that rhetorically defined socialism as the defeat of capitalism and of its ruling industrial class, it was difficult to adjust to a strategy of national solidarity uniting capitalists, members of middle-class strata, and workers.

There were other costs in this strategy of "national unity." First, by pursuing a broad coalition rather than moving firmly into the opposition in the mid-1940's, the PCI reduced the prospects for forging a more effective operational unity with the Socialists. Second, the party's postwar willingness to compromise on nearly all issues has only accentuated the widespread fears among noncommunist forces about the PCI's *doppiezza,* or duplicity, about its real objectives. This fear, rooted in the dualism of Italian political culture with its split between Marxist and non-Marxist outlooks, explains the PCI's own diffidence about any more aggressive policy, which might shatter the delicate equilibrium existing among antifascist political forces.

While this diffidence may have cost the PCI opportunities in the cold war context of the late 1940's, it has proved to be the strength of PCI strategy in subsequent years. Party leaders have been constantly, perhaps excessively, aware of the example of 1919-22, when extremism within the workers movement nearly destroyed the Italian Left; hence, they have been predisposed to caution rather than to audacity. Berlinguer, as Togliatti before him, continues to maintain that a socialist Italy is the PCI's goal, even while he proposes that the party free itself from the rigidities of more traditional communist views. The consequence has been the maturing of the party into a prudent and responsible political force, conscious of the danger of a conservative offensive and determined to avoid provoking it at all costs.

In the last analysis, the litmus test for the PCI may be how it relates to capitalism, not socialism. The PCI is confronting one of the great unanswered questions of the present period in history: Can a communist party hold to a strategy that, in power, will avoid the cruelties of the revolutions of our time and create a "socialism" of free men? The evolutionary path of the Italian Communist Party is only on the brink of coming to terms with this question.

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The Christian–Marxist Dialogue

By Maurice Cranston

DALE VREE. *On Synthesizing Marxism and Christianity.* New York, NY, John Wiley and Sons, 1976.

CARLO FELICE CASULA. *Cattolici-Comunisti e sinistra cristiana, 1938–45* (Catholic-Communists and the Christian Left, 1938–45). Bologna, Il Mulino, 1976.

M. THOREZ et al. *Communistes et Chrétiens* (Communists and Christians). Paris, Éditions Sociales, 1976.

DENNIS J. DUNN. *The Catholic Church and the Soviet Government, 1939–1949.* Boulder, CO, East European Quarterly, 1977.

HANSJAKOB STEHLE. *Die Ostpolitik des Vatikans 1917–1975* (The Eastern Policy of the Vatican 1917–1975). München, Piper Verlag, 1975.

PIERO GHEDDO. *Vietnam, Cristiani e comunisti* (Vietnam, Christians and Communists). Turin, Società Editrice Internazionale, 1975.

HERE WE HAVE six books which deal, in one way or another, with the idea of a "dialogue" between Christians and Marxists. Dale Vree's book analyzes the intellectual content of Marxist and Christian philosophies to consider how far any reconciliation of the two systems is logically possible. Carlo Felice Casula examines the relationship between communism and the Christian Left in Italy in the years 1938–45, a period dominated by World War II. *Communistes et Chrétiens* presents a number of documents concerning the relationship between Communists and Christians, the latter mostly Catholics, in France from the time of the Popular Front (1936) until 1976. Dennis J. Dunn provides a detailed study of diplomatic and informal contacts between the Vatican and the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1949, while Hansjakob Stehle looks at the changing policy of the Vatican toward the Soviet Union from the October Revolution up to the mid-1970's. In *Vietnam, Cristiani e comunisti,* Piero Gheddo traces the impact of the Indochinese war on Christian opinion in America and Western Europe, in particular the generation of a desire for peace and reconciliation by means of a "dialogue" between competing systems.

As several of these volumes attest, the idea of a "dialogue" between Christians and Marxists is not new; it is something which dates from World War II, from the wartime collaboration between Communists and Christians in underground resistance movements. The idea was given more systematic formulation in the early 1950's by the late Umberto Campagnolo, an Italian philosopher of Hegelian leanings, who organized in Venice, at the *Société Européenne de Culture,* meetings between intellectuals from both sides of the Iron Curtain in the hope of diminishing the kind of mutual misunderstanding which breeds war. It was in Italy, too, that the idea of dialogue was first introduced into party politics as a formula for reconciling Catholic believers and Communist voters. Since then, the dialogue has become a much more ambitious project, producing a considerable literature and prompting a new style of political rhetoric, that of the "outstretched hand."

For many reasons, Italy was the natural place in which this idea of dialogue should develop most swiftly. There is, for example, a strong tradition in Italian philosophy—exemplified in the works of Benedetto Croce—which insists on a logical disjunction between different realms of experience, with the realm of the practical and the political, for example, having standards of appraisal distinct from those in the realm of the spiritual or metaphysical. From this perspective, the Italian working man who decides to vote with the Communists and think with the Catholics does not deserve condemnation, for the Communist Party will look after his wages and the Church after his soul. Such an outlook enabled the Italian Communist Party to build up its massive strength as the champion of the supposed class interests of the workers.

As a result of this practical (not to say pragmatic) attitude, the Ital-

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ian Communist Party manifested a certain slackness on matters of ideology that differed greatly from the ideological rigidity of the French Communist Party. In France, a rationalist and anticlerical national tradition, combined with more insistent demands from Moscow, encouraged the party to require its adherents to accept fully party dogma. To both the French Communist leadership and its Soviet mentors, in short, the Catholic Church in France appeared to have too feeble a hold over the French working-class mind to be taken seriously. But in Italy the fact that almost every worker was a Catholic meant that something had to be done to overcome the traditional hostility of the Church toward communism. The "outstretched hand" may be seen as a symbol of that desire to transform old enemies into new friends.

In more recent years, the "outstretched hand" policy has been introduced into other countries besides Italy, even into France. This policy tends to be associated with what is fashionably known as "Eurocommunism," and "Eurocommunism" must, in the present reviewer's opinion, always be seen as a response to one overriding imperative: the desire of the Soviet Union to have tranquility in Europe while communism secures its grip on Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However much the Communists may favor resort to violence outside Europe, they are, within Europe, its sternest opponents. Indeed, no one in Europe proclaims the value of law and order more eloquently than the "Marchese" Enrico Berlinguer, and his wish for such law and order is undoubtedly sincere. Thus, one very important function of the "outstretched hand" is to soothe bourgeois fears of communism. From the Communists' point of view, the content of the Marxist-Christian dialogue does not matter. All that concerns them is that the dialogue should take place, for it thereby makes an important contribution to détente.

At the same time, it must be remembered that the Communist line can change. Moscow has not always wanted tranquility in Western Europe, and the day may come when it no longer does so. Everything is a matter of timing. For example, Santiago Carrillo, the Secretary-General of the Spanish Communist Party, is today a fervent champion of "Eurocommunism" and of the dialogue with Christians. But in 1964, when another Spanish Communist, Jorge Semprun (who then used the pseudonym of Federico Sanchez), put forward the same ideas, that "premature" theorist of "Eurocommunism" suffered expulsion from the party. This punitive action against him was manifestly endorsed by Carrillo. In fact, Semprun believes that Carrillo actually organized it—a disturbing charge from Carrillo's standpoint now, 14 years later, when he is trying to prove that the Spanish Communist Party is even more open, independent and democratic than the Italian one.[1] Such voltes-face, however, have marked the history of Communist party policies in Europe.

IF ITALY can claim to be the birthplace both of "Eurocommunism" and the idea of a dialogue between Christians and Marxists, it was a Frenchman who pushed the idea of dialogue toward its second phase: Christians and Marxists should not simply talk together but "pool their ideas" and work toward a convergence of belief. It was Cardinal Jean Danielou, who undoubtedly influenced Pope John XXIII to draft the encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (which officially encouraged Catholics to be more tolerant toward communism) and then busily sought to promote understanding not only between Catholics and Communists, but between Catholics and Marxists of the ultra-Left. Protestant intellectuals proved equally eager to engage in this more audacious enterprise. Jürgen Moltmann, perhaps the most eminent living German Lutheran theologian, has gone even farther

1. See Jorge Semprun, *Autobiographie de Federico Sanchez* (Autobiography of Federico Sanchez), Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1978.

Reviewers in this Issue

LAWRENCE GRAY—Lecturer at the European Studies Center of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna, Italy); contributor of articles on the politics of the Italian Communist Party and author of a forthcoming volume on Eurocommunism.

MAURICE CRANSTON—Professor of Political Science, London School of Economics and Politics; currently seconded to the European University Institute (Florence, Italy); author and editor of numerous works on political thought, including *The New Left*, 1971, and *Mask of Politics*, 1973.

PAUL NOACK—Professor of Political Science, University of Munich (West Germany); author of numerous studies on politics and international affairs, including *Internationale Politik* (International Politics), 1970, and *Die Manipulierte Revolution* (The Manipulated Revolution), 1978.

LEWIS S. FEUER—Professor of Sociology and Humanities, The University of Virginia (Charlottesville, VA); author of numerous studies, including *Einstein and the Generations of Science*, 1974, and *Ideology and the Ideologist*, 1975.

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toward the Marxists than Cardinal Danielou went, while in the United States, Harvey Cox has excited millions with his promise of reconciling Marx with Jesus.[2]

In sum, the Marxist-Christian dialogue has developed a new dimension. It is no longer a matter of accepting that people can vote with the Communists and think with the Catholics; it is inviting them to think Christian and Marxist at one and the same time. This intellectual exercise, as Vree demonstrates in what is surely the best book yet available on the dialogue, is unfortunately a profoundly irrational one. The main tenets of Christianity and those of Marxism contradict one another. There is no question of distinct realms of activity here. Two philosophies, two competing systems of belief, each designed to explain the nature of reality, conflict with one another, and both cannot be true.

Vree's book is unusual in that it is written from a purely academic point of view. While he is a Christian, he addresses himself to the problems posed by the Christian-Marxist dialogue from the standpoint of a scholar, a practitioner of legal and linguistic analysis. Without pretending that there is any "essence" of Christianity or of Marxism, he argues, very reasonably, that there are certain propositions about which the overwhelming majority of Christians have always been agreed, and that there is a corresponding set of propositions which constitutes the accepted core of Marxist doctrine. In short, there is something which can properly be called Christianity, and there is something which can properly be called Marxism. Hence, the words "Christianity" and "Marxism" cannot be allowed to denote whatever any particular person may feel like calling Christianity or Marxism. Vree's point is that even the most minimal statement of what one can rightfully call Christianity still poses obstacles to a coherent fusion of Marxism and Christianity. A marriage of the two is logically impossible. In defense of this judgment, Vree notes that the Christian view of history as the coming of God's kingdom in God's time is inconsistent with the Marxist prediction of the salvation of man in man's own time by man's own efforts. He also shows how the Christian doctrine of original sin is contradicted by the Marxist assertion that men's problems, being basically economic, can be solved without divine aid, and he points out that similarities exist between the Marxist project for a classless society and the Christian vision of universal community only if that Christian vision is interpreted in the style of those heretics who fancied that the unseen world could be brought into being empirically in the here and now.

ONE STRIKING feature of the Christian-Marxist dialogue is that the revision of belief on the part of the Christians has been far greater than that on the part of the Marxists. Moltmann, for example, seems willing to strip his Christianity of every shred of doctrine that might hinder a fusion of his faith with Marxism, even to the point of replacing the affirmation that God exists with the affirmation that God will exist, or "God's being is coming." Harvey Cox, with all the New England Puritan charisma of Harvard around him and a Southern Baptist past behind him, goes even further and proclaims that God is secular: "God is preeminently and ultimately natural." If Christianity is "restated" in these astonishing terms, its marriage with Marxism undoubtedly becomes more conceivable. The only objection is the one put forward by Vree, namely, that Christianity divested of central Christian beliefs ceases to be Christianity. Whatever philosophy or theory Moltmann and Cox are proffering for union with Marxism does not have the necessary credentials to qualify as Christianity; the fusion is between Moltmannism or Coxism on the one hand and Marxism on the other.

While Marxism, too, has undergone some revision in recent years, this revision has been of a limited kind. The intellectual impetus for the revision has been the rediscovery of the young Marx, who was a Hegelian idealist with a yearning for liberty, as opposed to the mature Marx, who was an unsentimental scientific socialist with a prospectus of class war; the political impetus has been the repudiation by the world Communist movement of its Stalinist past and the demand for more independence by national Communist parties. Despite these emancipatory forces, however, no Marxist has surrendered anything like as much of his Marxism as Moltmann, Cox, and like-minded Christians have surrendered of their Christianity. Roger Garaudy went furthest in stretching out his hand toward the Christians, but the French Communist Party ignominiously expelled him. (Significantly, his name does not appear in the texts in *Communistes et Chrétiens,* published by Éditions Sociales, the party-controlled publishing house.) Moreover, Garaudy, who first moved Marxist dogmatism toward a liberal-democratic kind of Catholicism, has since shown more sympathy for the utopian New Left, perhaps because churchmen such as Danielou, Moltmann, and Cox have also gone in that direction.

2. For Moltmann's thinking, see, among others, *Theology of Hope,* New York, NY, Harper and Row, 1968, and *Religion, Revolution, and the Future,* New York, NY, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969. With regard to Cox, see particularly *The Secular City,* New York, NY, Macmillan, 1975.

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There have been some other odd developments in European thought which perhaps may be seen as consequences of the dialogue. The most important has to do with Jean-Paul Sartre. In the early 1960's, Sartre was an active participant in the dialogues organized by Campagnolo in Venice between existentialists and Communists. At that time, Sartre supported the politics of the Communists but considered their philosophy to be worthless; later he proclaimed himself a convert to Marxist philosophy, although he turned bitterly against the Communist Party. In his *Critique de la Raison Dialectique* of 1960 and later writings, however, Sartre claims to make a "dialectical fusion" of existentialism and Marxism. The actual propositions he sets forth are still those of the old Sartrian individualistic, misanthropic existentialism, fortified by some fragments of Stalinism—the very bits of Stalinism, indeed, from which the Communists have been trying to disassociate themselves. But maybe Sartre should be seen mainly as an exponent of the dialogue within one individual—"the conversation of the mind with itself"—rather than of dialogue between different philosophers.

It is too soon to say whether the wider dialogue between the exponents of competing ideologies will prove fruitful. On the positive side, the Christian-Marxist exchanges have furthered an atmosphere of toleration, for the man who engages in dialogue must at least have the patience and the politeness to listen. On the negative side, the dialogue has generated a good deal of loose and illogical utterance as well as excessive optimism about the magnitude of the obstacles to be overcome.

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CSCE from Helsinki to Belgrade

By Paul Noack

DETTMAR CRAMER. *Bürgerrechte '77* (Civil Rights '77). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1977.

GERHARD WETTIG. *Europäische Sicherheit: Das europäische Staatensysten in der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik,* 1966-1972 (European Security: The European State System in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1966-1972). Dusseldorf, Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1972.

GERHARD WETTIG. *Frieden und Sicherheit in Europa: Probleme der KSZE und der MBFR* (Peace and Security in Europe: Problems of CSCE and MBFR). Stuttgart-Degerloch, Seewald Verlag, 1975.

BORIS MEISSNER and ALEXANDER USCHAKOW. *Probleme der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa* (Problems of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). Berlin (West), Berlin Verlag, 1975.

BORIS MEISSNER, Ed. *Elemente des Wandels in der östlichen Welt* (Elements of Change in the Eastern World). Köln, Markus Verlag, 1976.

Sowjetunion 1975/76: Innenpolitik, Wirtschaft, Aussenpolitik—Analyse und Bilanz (The Soviet Union 1975/76: Domestic Policy, Economy, Foreign Policy—Analysis and Evaluation). Munich and Vienna, Carl Hanser Verlag, 1976.

US CONGRESS, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. *Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977. 4 Vols.

THERE CAN BE little doubt that right through to the end of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) convened in Helsinki in July 1975, scarcely anyone foresaw how dramatic a shift of interest in the topics discussed at the conference would take place once the 35 participating national delegations left the Finnish capital. Yet the change was almost immediate, and the watershed was already passed by the end of the year. Up until 1975, through years of preparatory negotiations and during the conference itself, questions of political and military security received greater attention than did issues such as technological and economic cooperation or bloc maintenance, which were often discussed on the basis of disguised or explicit notions of convergence. After 1975, however, these topics were reduced to secondary status, at least in public discussions, and were given lower priority than the implementation of the human rights clauses of "Basket III" of the Helsinki Final Act.

The offensive launched by the Western states on the question of human rights was not the only reason that the "more profound exchange of views" scheduled for the Belgrade sequel to the Helsinki Conference failed to materialize. But it was certainly not the least significant reason. Despite the length of the Belgrade meeting—from October 1977 to March 1978—it resulted in a final document almost completely devoid of content. The West, which no longer presented as united a front as at Helsinki, was unable to get the USSR or its allies to engage in substantive discussions on human rights issues. Consequently, the only positive results in this subject area which could be pointed to in the final document concerned procedural matters. On these the document concluded that "the exchange of opinions in itself represented a valuable contribution" to the attainment of the goals of CSCE.

Emanuele Gazzo, Director of the "Europe" International Agency for Press Information in Brussels, commented on the substantive poverty of the final document in the human rights field:

The truth is that the emptiness of the Belgrade document is in reality full of meaning. It is an omi-

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nous emptiness. And the silence of Belgrade is more eloquent than long tirades.[1]

Gazzo's overall judgment of the outcome of the meeting, "Better empty than polluted,"[2] reflects a recognition of the unbridgeable gulf which exists between Western and Eastern concepts of human rights. Dr. Per Fischer, Chairman of the Standing Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany at Belgrade, indicated a similar evaluation when he wrote of the final document of the Belgrade meeting:

It has the advantage of plain honesty. Even this was not easy to arrive at, because the Soviet delegation raised strong objections to negative statements of this kind.[3]

These views of the results of the Belgrade meeting contrast markedly with the high expectations that US President Jimmy Carter's human rights initiative had generated, for a short time at least, prior to the meeting—namely, that some basic change in the human rights attitude of the Soviet Union might occur. They reflect the changes which have taken place since 1972—when preparations for the Helsinki meeting began to pick up momentum—not only in assessments of how the *results* of the conference ought to be evaluated, but also in assessments of what constituted the primary *topics* for discussion. Within this context, it is the purpose of the present essay to examine the current state of West German opinion regarding CSCE on the basis of views recently expressed in the literature by West German specialists.

IT IS NOTEWORTHY that even as the Carter Administration was pressing forward with its human rights campaign—for example, via President Carter's correspondence with Soviet dissident leader and Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov in early 1977—Dettmar Cramer, Bonn Bureau Chief of RIAS (Radio in Allied Sector, Berlin) and a leading commentator on East-West relations, was expressing some doubt as well as hope about the results that could be expected from the upcoming Belgrade meeting. His analysis in *Bürgerrechte '77,* which appeared in the interim between the Helsinki and Belgrade meetings, contains a mix of optimism and skepticism which even today, after Belgrade, characterizes a good deal of German work in the field. Cramer wrote of the shift in topical focus of CSCE:

To make a critical point, it might be said that if Brezhnev had known three or four years ago what he knows today about Helsinki and its consequences for Eastern Europe, he would hardly have pushed so hard to convene and conclude the Conference on Security and Cooperation.

At the same time, he indicated that the conference had already had major effects in the East when he interpreted the Soviet refusal to discuss the problem of human rights as a result not merely of differences between the (Western) individualistic concept and the (Eastern) collective concept of human rights, but also of the "destabilization" triggered by CSCE throughout Eastern Europe. He called for a moderation of Western pressure, for restraint, less out of any sense of modesty than out of good judgment.[4] In addition, noting German departures from the American position, he pointed out that geopolitical considerations dictated differences between the stances of the Federal Republic and the United States on CSCE issues:

A great power such as the United States, which is not, like the Federal Republic, on the dividing line between East and West, can and in fact must speak out in clearer terms than the Federal Government could ever permit itself to use.

Dettmar Cramer, whose work is the most recent under consideration here, assigned to CSCE much more positive potential for the *long term* than had the skeptical view which prevailed in the Federal Republic prior to 1975. He abandoned the notion that CSCE would offer scant benefits to the West while providing the USSR new political and propaganda inroads in the West—a view which had extended far beyond the ranks of Christian Social/Christian Democratic opposition supporters—and concluded that change on the human rights as well as political fronts would likely work to the advantage of the West. His reasoning reflected the fact that after 1975 many Germans came to see the USSR, formerly the prime exponent of the Helsinki conference, as the chief obstacle to further progress toward a "status quo plus" in Europe. (The visit of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Federal Republic in the spring of 1978 did nothing to alter this

1. Emanuele Gazzo, "Belgrade 1978—An Empty Basket?" *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), No. 7, 1978, p. 196.
2. Ibid., p. 194.
3. Per Fischer, "The Outcome of Belgrade," ibid., No. 8, 1978, p. 227.
4. For a similar evaluation and recommendation by an American, see George F. Kennan in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), Feb. 26, 1977.

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evaluation or to alter expectations for *short-term* progress, which had fallen to very low levels in the Belgrade aftermath.)

To capture the skepticism which had characterized the earlier period, one need only cite the comprehensive judgment of Hans Peter Schwarz of the University of Hamburg, published in 1970:

The two principal elements in the concept of an All-European Conference—European regionalism and the idea of multilateralism overstepping bloc boundaries—are anything but new . . . . They lead to the conclusion that neither assurance of peace nor cooperation would be well served by this concept. True, it is suitable, as has been demonstrated, for the manipulation of a range of relations in power politics, but it is suitable only to a modest degree for the improvement of relations between countries of opposing interests and heterogeneous social and political structures.[5]

Indeed, with hindsight one might even conclude that Schwarz's early skepticism was justified. Nothing of significance remained of either "European regionalism" or "multilateralism overstepping bloc boundaries" once the CSCE process progressed beyond the preparatory stage.

Gerhard Wettig, today one of the leading West German specialists on détente-related issues, was also skeptical regarding European cooperation and security in the first of his volumes reviewed here, *Europäische Sicherheit: Das europäische Staatensystem in der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik, 1966-1972*. As the dates in the title suggest, the book provides the background against which the events of the 1973-75 period—*that of actual CSCE negotiations*—must be viewed. Wettig divided the late 1960's and the early 1970's into three phases of Soviet policy: (1) a "policy of movement" phase, during which the USSR attempted on the one hand to initiate an intra-German dialogue and on the other hand to bring about all-European cooperation and security (excluding the United States); (2) a "critical" phase, during which Soviet policy reached a deadlock in relations with both Paris and Bonn; and (3) a "reconstruction" phase, during which the USSR formulated new positions taking into account the requirements that the West set for progress in détente (and resulting, in 1972, in the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin and the strategic arms limitation and other accords of the Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit). In his second book, *Frieden und Sicherheit in Europa*, Wettig collapsed these three phases into two: (1) détente policy with an ongoing sense of confrontation (1966-68/69); and (2) authentic détente policy at the governmental level (1969-75). But since that writing he has again added a third phase, one of a "policy of hindrance," which he sees as in effect since 1976.

Wettig's basic assessment was that in 1972 the Soviet Union occupied a very favorable initial negotiating position. The US was still mired in the Vietnam morass. And in Europe, Wettig felt, it would be difficult, once pending all-European agreements on the renunciation of force were signed, to convince the West European public that the maintenance of NATO remained necessary. In this regard, he was ahead of his time, raising concern about attitudes toward the alliance which became current in the FRG only in 1977, in reaction to continually expanding Soviet armament efforts.[6] (*Concern over this issue* abated with the cooling off of the détente process in the first half of 1978.) At the same time, as early as 1972 Wettig raised serious doubts about any "weakening of hostility to communication" on the part of the USSR, which enthusiastic supporters of détente touted as one of the main benefits that would result from CSCE. In short, Wettig saw détente policy as in many ways a question of strategy rather than of substance for the Soviet Union. He summed up this view in the following fashion:

While Soviet goals in Europe have not fundamentally changed, a considerable change in Soviet policy can nevertheless be detected.

The volume *Probleme über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa*, edited by Boris Meissner and Alexander Uschakow, contains papers delivered at a conference of experts in international law held in 1973. The papers supplement and complete, from the perspective of international law, much of Wettig's chain of reasoning. For example, in his article on the principles of peaceful coexistence as elements of an all-European security system, Meissner himself stated:

. . . "peaceful coexistence" according to the Soviet concept

5. For this and other expressions of skepticism, see Hans Peter Schwarz and Helga Haftendorn, *Europäische Sicherheitskonferenz* (European Security Conference), Opladen, Leske Verlag, 1970.

6. It is important to note here, however, that the carelessness which developed regarding the state of preparedness of NATO could be ascribed much more to internal factors in the European member states of the alliance than to any effects of CSCE or other international developments, as Wettig had predicted.

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is the strategy by means of which the goal of world revolution can best be attained.

And Dietrich Frenzke, in his piece on the prohibition of intervention and the use of force in the Soviet theory of international law, expressed this view:

According to the foreign policy interests of the Soviet state . . . the prohibitions regarding intervention and the use of force, as well as the closely related concept of aggression, were abandoned, accepted, or interpreted and limited in one way or another. The single guiding principle in each and every case was its own national interest.

Finally, in the economic as opposed to the political field, Peter Knirsch concluded:

Industrial cooperation between East and West has certainly not yet attained the degree of importance in the current economic situation of either side that was often assigned to it in recent years in journalistic reports. Thus, cooperation in this field can be regarded as of some importance only as a hope for the future.

The leitmotif common to all of these papers was that moderation of the hopes placed in the results of CSCE by the Social Democratic/Free Democratic leadership of the FRG was necessary. Simultaneously, however, the papers also pointed out that it was possible to proceed with CSCE negotiations and that the political risks involved, once recognized by experts in the field of government policy, could be judged—correctly, as it turned out—to be less serious than had been claimed in parliamentary debates from 1970 to 1975 by members of the Christian Democratic/Christian Social opposition.[7]

BY THE TIME he wrote his 1975 analysis, Gerhard Wettig was able to demonstrate Soviet lack of consistency in CSCE-related matters such as the renunciation of force, and thus illustrate the validity of much of the skepticism expressed up to then. But he also paid less attention than he had earlier to the political-military issues emphasized by Moscow and, consistent with the course negotiations had taken, laid new stress on the competing set of issues promoted by the West, i.e., issues dealing with relationships between the *societies* rather than the governments of East and West. These were the issues which had forced the Soviet side to reevaluate its position in the CSCE negotiations and which would, in the end, move the USSR from the offensive to the defensive in the CSCE process. On the question of the free exchange of people, information, and ideas, Wettig formulated four options on how to proceed: (1) codification of the status quo; (2) reciprocation of the Eastern "shielding" (*Abschirmung*) policy; (3) application of political leverage for the purpose of increasing exchanges; and (4) restriction of exchange beneficiaries to the power elite. He placed main emphasis for the formulation of policy on the need to optimize Western potential for purposeful and effective intercourse:

Maintaining a balance between the potentialities for action and openness to the greatest possible extent ought to characterize East-West relations at the societal level. At the same time, the West should focus its attention on making sure that détente does not unintentionally reinforce the firmness and power position of the Soviet apparatus of coercion, either internally or externally, and thereby prepare the ground for the overwhelming superiority of the regime vis-à-vis the dissidents in their own country or vis-à-vis the nations of the West.

With the benefit of hindsight, one can certainly say that the USSR has taken a position on the exchange of people, information, and ideas diametrically opposed to that outlined as optimum for the West. Viewed on the level of society as a whole, the recent Soviet policy of expatriating dissidents in fact seems to be an attempt to append the "two camp" theory of the international arena. Those that voice opinions which can in the broadest terms be called "Western" are being deported to the Western geographical area, and a further "unmixing" of opposing forces is thus being brought about. The extent to which the Kremlin could control mass dissident movements by means of expatriation is difficult to say. Unlike Czechoslovakia, where the real possibility of organized mass opposition has been created by the Charter '77 movement, the USSR has not yet had to face up to the problem of dealing with thousands rather than some dozens of dissidents. What is clear, as Astrid von Borke points out in her article in *Elemente des Wandels in der östlichen Welt,* is that "in fact, the question of human rights has now as never before become a matter of concern for the Soviet leadership." The Helsinki Final Act is at least partially responsible for this state of affairs.

7. Even after the Helsinki Final Act was signed, Franz Josef Strauss, leader of the Christian Social Union, continued to refer to the conference as a "gigantic Munich."

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WHAT HAS HAPPENED since the Helsinki meeting adjourned? One way to find out is to compare the writings discussed up to this point, conceived before or during the Helsinki conference, with summary volumes outlining the successes and failures of Western détente policy as they are reflected in the results of the CSCE process. For this purpose, the volumes *Elemente des Wandels in der östlichen Welt* and *Sowjetunion 1975/76* are instructive. Divergent views are to be found in both volumes, although these reflect differences of degree rather than differences of principle in the evaluation of the results of CSCE. In the first of the two compendia, for example, Boris Meissner treats CSCE as a *quantité négligeable* and backs up this view by pointing to two key Soviet adjustments of course that took place at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1976. These were the placing of a stronger emphasis on the pursuit of world revolution and a shift in the center of gravity of Soviet foreign policy toward its military-technological (rather than diplomatic) components—that is, an intensification rather than a lessening of the tendency toward aggression on the part of the USSR. On the other hand, Gerhard Wettig speaks of a "relative success in negotiation" for the Western side at Helsinki and adds that contrary to what some had expected, "the commitment to the West politically of the member countries of NATO and the European Community remained unshaken." In his judgment, events have confirmed that "the resolve of the West not to allow its own integrity to be questioned" has had the result that "the USSR may now adopt a defensive posture in its policy toward the West, although it does not have to do so."

While clearly reaching different conclusions than Meissner about the CSCE experiment, even Wettig admits that increased contact and communication and closer ties between East and West represent such a serious threat for Moscow that it has proved impossible to reduce ideological competition. At this level, no trace of détente can be detected, and in fact the competition has intensified. Here, even the most minimal expectations of the West have been disappointed.

If Astrid von Borke in her paper in this volume is correct, then this is hardly surprising. For she points out that the ideologists are one of the factions in the Soviet elite most opposed to détente. According to her analysis, makers of foreign policy and leaders in the economic field tend to be supporters of détente; the military and the ideologists tend to be opposed to it; and the security apparatus tends to be somewhere in the middle.

NOW THAT three years have passed since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the Belgrade meeting to review CSCE progress has come and gone, the key word for evaluating the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe seems to be "disillusionment," for East as well as West. This is the message of the contributions in *Sowjetunion 1975/76,* as it was in *Elemente des Wandels in der östlichen Welt,* and as it has continued to be, by and large, in the West German literature on détente. According to the most recent Eastern view, the Warsaw Pact countries have already basically lived up to the terms of the CSCE Final Act, while implementation on the part of the West has left a great deal to be desired. The West, on the other hand, insists that commitments on human rights in the document should be interpreted in a manner in keeping with Western traditions, i.e., as commitments to the rights of the individual, as opposed to those of the state and of society. By these standards, it is the East that is defaulting on its commitments. Such studies as *Basket III: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords,* published by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of the US Congress, are illustrative of the depth of feeling on this issue in the West. The study is comprised of four volumes—almost one thousand pages—and provides a wide-ranging documentation of Soviet and East European human rights violations of the most varied types.

Belgrade added further to Western disillusionment. The meeting demonstrated that the success or failure of CSCE would depend not so much on *how* the Final Act was interpreted as on *whether* interpretation could be discussed at all at East-West conferences. Although Western delegates did not shy away from such discussion at Belgrade, the final communiqué of the meeting (in a sense, what really matters) showed not a trace of it.

If one looks at the results of unbiased analysis (which ought not to be understood as norm-free analysis), one can conclude that the fears which were prevalent in the West in the early 1970's, of disintegration in the face of a Soviet propaganda offensive regarding security and cooperation in Europe, have disappeared and have been replaced by a modicum of self-confidence on the Western side. Between 1973 and 1975, the West was able to reach accord on commonly acceptable positions on all vital and decisive

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questions. For the first time, in fact, the European Community adopted joint foreign policy stances. At the same time, both East and West quickly realized that the CSCE process might best be regarded as an instrument for long-term crisis management, which might in the short and long haul leave relations between the great powers largely unchanged. In Wettig's words, "The fundamental problems would remain unsolved."

It seems, then, that the CSCE process has grown in importance basically because it has shown how limited in fact the common interests between East and West are, not because it set up any illusory framework for peace. Of course, in politics even clarity in a negative sense has positive value.

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University Marxism

By Lewis S. Feuer

PERRY ANDERSON. *Considerations on Western Marxism.* Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1976.

MARK POSTER. *Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1975.

MICHAEL LÖWY. *Pour une sociologie des intellectuels révolutionnaires: l'évolution politique de Lukács, 1909-1929* (Toward a Sociology of Revolutionary Intellectuals: The Political Evolution of Lukács, 1909-1929). Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1976.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT fact about contemporary Western Marxism—that which followed World War II—is that it is essentially the ideology of the intellectual class, not of the working class. Karl Marx and his followers in the Second International—Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein, Victor Adler, and Jean Jaurès—addressed themselves consciously to the workers, calling upon them to emancipate themselves. However, neo-Marxism, whose forerunners were the Hungarian Communist Georg Lukács and the Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci and whose chief spokesmen today are the existentialists Jean-Paul Sartre and Herbert Marcuse, looks primarily to the intellectuals, especially the students, as the agents of revolution.

This change in the social compass of political thinking has been accompanied by a psychological shift in the basic emotional tone of Marxist ideology, what might be described as a change from an ideology of shame to one of guilt. When Marx began writing for the workers, his aim, he said, was to induce in them a shame for submitting unmanfully to exploitation. "Shame is itself already a revolution," wrote Marx. "If a whole nation were really ashamed, the lion crouching for a spring would refrain."[1] But when a Marxist today addresses his fellow intellectuals, it is rather their sense of guilt which he seeks to ignite, for the intellectuals, far from being the socially exploited, are usually the children of the middle class and the wealthy. The experience of shame was based on an awareness that one was intimidated from acting in one's self-interest; the experience of guilt, on the other hand, leads the intellectual to renounce acting on behalf of his own self-interest.

Classical Marxism and neo-Marxism are also divergent in intellectual approach. The former was essentially a set of theories conceived in economic terms such as surplus value and the declining rate of capitalist profit, and asserting the primacy of economics as the determinant of politics and history. The latter, by contrast, is an ethical-moralistic protest against capitalist society articulated in the spiritualistic terminology of man's "alienation"; its philosophy is voluntarist, not determinist.

Finally, the institutional base of Marxism has shifted. While classical Marxism looked to workingmen's societies, especially the trade unions, for support, neo-Marxism finds its bastions in the universities. Marxism has become what may best be characterized as "University Marxism."

PERRY ANDERSON's essay *Considerations on Western Marxism* vividly documents this fourfold trend in the evolution of Western Marxism. Anderson, himself editor of *New Left Review,* records a shift in European Marxism from economics to philosophy, which not only reverses the direction of Marx's own intellectual history but also, he maintains, has turned Western Marxism into "a prolonged and intricate Discourse on Method" (p. 53). The comparison with Descartes, we must note, is unfortunate and pretentious. The great Descartes's *Discourse on Method* was short and straightforward; he wrote in French, not the scholastic Latin of his time, so that the citizen-scientists outside the academies could understand and test his

1. Cited in Otto Rühle, *Karl Marx: His Life and Work,* tr. Eden and Cedar Paul, New York, NY, Garden City Publishing Co., 1929, p. 52.

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writings; and he was a rationalist, with a faith in the natural light of reason and mathematics. "The new dominance of philosophers," as Anderson calls it (p. 59), is, by contrast, irrationalist in spirit. *Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason* and Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* wind their way through tortuous, obscure pages in which "dialectical logic" is counterposed as a superior organon to scientific logic, and in which, particularly in Marcuse, the mathematical logic and operational method of the advanced physical sciences are accused of being the expressions of an imperialist society.[2] This is all a long way from Karl Marx's own conception of science, for Marx believed that the more a science advanced, the more mathematical it became.[3]

At any rate, as Anderson indicates, the locus for Marxist theorizing has shifted to "academic departments" (p. 50). While the first Marxists in the German Social Democratic Party of the 1880's and 1890's were self-taught workingmen or "free-floating" intellectuals, publicists without institutional connection, most leading West European Marxist theoreticians in the modern period, particularly since World War II, have occupied professorial posts. In this latter category Anderson includes Lukács, Henri Lefebvre, Lucien Goldmann, Karl Korsch, Marcuse, Galvano Della Volpe, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Lucio Colletti, and Louis Althusser, among others.

The social base for "University Marxism" is not, however, located among practitioners of the advancing natural sciences such as particle physics or molecular biology. From the Depression years to the present, the experience of natural scientists with Marxism has been unhappy. Regrettably, their story, especially that of the British Marxist scientists, is omitted from Anderson's inventory of Western Marxism. Actually, the Marxist writings of such scientists as J.B.S. Haldane and Hyman Levy had a genuine freshness and originality usually lacking in their continental counterparts. At the same time, the most eminent Marxist scientists, such as the American Nobel Laureate in Genetics, Hermann J. Muller, in the long run found it impossible to reconcile their scientific consciences to the falsehoods promulgated by the Soviet leaders in such fields as genetics, relativity theory, and atomic physics. The appeal of "University Marxism" is, thus, not to the scientists but primarily to the literary and ideological intellectuals, strata that to a certain extent find themselves "displaced" in industrial society. As Anderson notes, the spokesmen for neo-Marxism, from Lukács to Sartre, have as a group been hostile to the natural sciences and drawn to idealistic metaphysics.

Similarly, the natural constituency of "University Marxism" is composed of student intellectuals, especially those in the "humanities," and aimless, disoriented "nonstudent" intellectuals. The latter, possessing no marketable skill or technical capacity yet imbued with a sense of metaphysical merit, regard themselves as worthy of a place if not as Platonic philosopher-kings then at least as post-Platonic philosopher-princelings, and they engage in a restless search for a doctrine to give purpose to their purposeless lives. These "failed intellectuals" prefer the activism of political demonstrations to the activity of scientific demonstration.

As children usually of prosperous middle-class parents, the student and nonstudent intellectuals have found in neo-Marxism an ideology to express their "alienation"—their repudiation of the "middle-class culture" of accumulation to which they owe their comfort, their feelings of guilt at inherited social status and at not having had to struggle for a living. By rebelling against their fathers' society, they seek to expiate their guilt, to assert their manhood, and even to pursue the elitist mission of guiding society to a new age, which will inaugurate their rule.

Anderson sees Western Marxism as "a product of defeat," of the failure of the industrial working class to fulfill its historic mission and to realize its revolutionary potential (p. 42). But the Western workers may well have demonstrated far more good sense than the intellectuals by rejecting revolutionary Marxism and pursuing their own interests through free trade unions within a capitalist setting. The workingmen have only supported Marxist parties in the depressed aftermath of national military humiliation. Moreover, they have suspected, as American labor leader Samuel Gompers long argued, that socialist intellectuals were eager for socialism because they

2. *Critique de la Raison Dialectique,* New York, NY, French and European Publications, 1960; and *One-Dimensional Man,* Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1964.

3. "According to his [Marx's] way of thinking, a science was not properly developed until it had reached a form in which it could make use of mathematics." Paul Lafargue, "Personal Recollections of Karl Marx," in D. Ryazanoff, Ed., *Karl Marx: Man, Thinker, and Revolutionist,* New York, NY, International Publishers, 1927, p. 186.

Marx's last sociological investigation—into the social condition of French workers—aimed to supplant the "dialectical" controversies of sects with factual statistical surveys. See Karl Marx, "A Workers' Inquiry," *The New International* (New York, NY), Vol. 4, 1938, pp. 379-81.

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wanted to establish themselves as a dictatorial elite.

The causes for the failure of Western Marxism would seem to go deeper than the alleged lack of revolutionary will on the part of the workingmen. As Anderson concedes, during the 20 years following World War II "the intellectual record of Western Marxism in original economic or political theory. . .was virtually blank" (p. 46). Not only did Marx's categories fail to lead to an understanding of the most critical period in modern history, they also served to obscure the true nature of Soviet socialism. Indeed, contemporary Western Marxists are haunted by what might be termed a "socialist pessimism," something akin to the Roman stoicism that accepted the law of social decadence. Even Anderson is constrained to observe that his fellow neo-Marxists, "no matter how otherwise heteroclite,. . . share one fundamental emblem: a common and latent pessimism" (p. 88). Socialist pessimism is founded, we might suggest, on the realization that the social order to whose advent the Marxist is committed may bring with it a blind alley of human frustration deeper than anything "bourgeois" society knew. This pessimism is the latent ethos of a Marxism that, in the post-Soviet era, has lost its naiveté, its confident prognosis of a wondrous flowering of character within the planned economy. It conceals the anxiety of Marxists that their ideology is guiding the world into unfreedom, that posterity will not bless their names, that their messianic character, as Henry A. Murray indicated, may be perceived as the outward form of a Satanic complex.[4]

Contemporary Marxist theory, Anderson aptly states, "is not. . .to be equated with revolutionary sociology" (p. 110). In fact, unlike classical Marxists, who were grounded in sociological science, neo-Marxists from Lukács to Adorno and Marcuse have invoked the messages of the artist as communicating a truth not accessible to ordinary experience. The artist is viewed as the pathfinding cultural critic, clarifying for men the impoverished "alienation" characterizing their lives in capitalist civilization; from this view, "poverty" becomes a cultural category rather than an economic one.

The claim of neo-Marxists such as Marcuse that art communicates a higher political truth probably subserves an underlying social aim. The "aesthetocrats" are usually children of the upper classes raised in a happy familiarity with the arts. When they say then that Art confers a higher intuition upon its disciples, they concomitantly affirm that only persons with sensibility and cultivation should rule. Thus, neo-Marxism became an ideology for European aesthetes, especially those like Marcuse, who had a traditional German disdain for the American democratic ways and arts. The Frankfurt School of Marxists, or "critical theorists" as they called themselves protectively, thus regarded "cultural criticism" as their special contribution. Plato wanted to exclude the poets from his republic; the German neo-Marxists felt that only poets, or their devotees should rule the proletarians. Ironically, it is the socialist countries that today have turned out to be more Platonist in this respect: the poets Yevgeniy Yesenin and Vladimir Mayakovskiy in despair committed suicide, and Osip Mandel'shtam perished in a labor camp.

FRENCH EXISTENTIAL Marxism is the most fully developed version of Europe's postwar "University Marxism," both in style and doctrine. Virtually the entire French intellectual class has become Marxist,[5] and their perspective permeates French Marxism. The French Marxists write in the language of their university philosophy classes. Their every page suggests that the author is arguing with his colleagues in the lycée, collège, or école normale, seeking to prove to his critics that he can be just as pompous, turgid, Hegelian, and unintelligible as they.

For France's neo-Marxists, the culminating event was the uprising or "upheaval" of May 1968. As Mark Poster observes in his study of postwar French Marxism, this event was viewed as a "dialectical" leap into history, a chance for intellectuals to engage in "praxis," to become the "subjects" rather than the "objects" of history. For the neo-Marxists, May 1968 marked the birth of a new radicalism, a new opposition to advanced capitalism. As such, it had its theoretical consequences. For one, as Poster indicates, the word "proletariat" had to be redefined. To classical Marxists, the word signified the industrial workers; to the neo-Marxists, the "proletariat" is that social group that will make the revolution, that group "that corresponded to their analysis and their theory" (p. 369). From this, it followed

4. Henry A. Murray, Jr., "The Personality and Career of Satan," *The Journal of Social Issues* (Ann Arbor, Mi), Vol. 18, 1962, pp. 36-54.

5. Paul Johnson reports that a French member of parliament recently estimated that more than 90 percent of French college and university teachers were leftist. See Paul Johnson, "Irrespective of the Facts," *Times Literary Supplement* (London), Oct. 14, 1977, p. 1194.

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that the student population is part of the new working class. Although they usually live well on their parental allowances and the labor-power of the workers, students are classified as "proletarians" because they want to experience their "freedom" in a revolutionary act. Why the students, children of the middle and upper classes, turn against the capitalist system is a question for which Marxists have no answer, for to find the answer they would have to avail themselves of such psychological ideas as that of generational conflict, which they dread for the light it might cast on their own motivations.

Indeed, one can find strong motives of guilt and masochism running throughout existential Marxism. Sartre felt drawn toward communism, writes Poster, from "feelings of guilt against his own class" (p. 165). Moreover, for all his existentialist emphasis on man's freedom, Sartre (in Hegelian fashion) regarded individual freedom as attaining its contemporary fulfillment in self-surrender to the Communist Party. Ironically, Sartre, who commended the party to French workers as an organization that would offer them unity in the face of "atomization" in bourgeois society, himself sedulously avoided joining.[6] His words, never tested in commitment, lacked "authenticity."

Existentialism, which began by indicting Marxism for omitting or suppressing the human subject, ended up being virtually swallowed by Marxism and mainly served to embellish the historical materialist concepts with subjectivist vocabulary. The Communist Party was metaphysically elevated as the one real Historical Subject which, to realize its aim, was justified in repressing individual subjectivities. In this regard, Sartre's social reportage consists less of perceptions than of Fichtean positings. Thus he could state after a brief trip to the Soviet Union that "the freedom to criticize is total in Russia."[7] Had he bothered to study the experience of the hundreds of American Communists and their children who submitted their beliefs to the test of existence by going to live under Soviet communism in the 1930's, he would have found very few who remained communists. It is communist society, not capitalist society, that needs walls to keep its citizens from leaving. There is, in fact, startlingly little sense of "existence," little sense of choices actually made, in the whole literature of existential Marxism.

In keeping with their maimed sense of reality, the existentialist Marxists are enamored of the word "praxis." It has for them a kind of sacred, esoteric overtone, like some mysterious mana-producing incantation that its possessors can invoke. However, it means different things at different times. It can signify any action that is designed to overcome "alienation." Alternately, it may denote any action in which the Communist Party is engaged, for as Sartre says, the party is "the only subject of Praxis," the "free subject creating revolutionary action from nothing" (Poster, p. 172). More generally, "praxis" is any action in which men are involved in "making history," challenging the existing social structure (or "practico-inert," as it is termed) and calling its future into question. Last, "praxis" denotes more particularly actions such as demonstrations, occupation of buildings, riots, guerrilla tactics, and terrorist deeds, in which the action itself, apart from its professed aim, constitutes a violation of so-called bourgeois norms of legality and expresses overtly a contempt for the democratic constitutional system. Sartre himself journeyed to the Stammheim Prison in Stuttgart to express his warm appreciation to the incarcerated terrorists of the Baader-Meinhof gang.[8]

A certain ego-grandiosity, or ego-inflation, has also come to be a trait of existential Marxism, expressing itself in the aura which surrounds the word "historical." Existentialist "freedom" takes us far from that of the ordinary citizen making his choices in vocation, family, church; it is not even the freedom of a scientist such as Albert Einstein or Michael Faraday working in humble modesty on some problem which absorbs him. Rather the existentialist "freedom" is peculiar to the revolutionary intellectual, who pictures himself as a new Moses, creating a new order for liberated slaves, or as a leftist version of T.E. Lawrence, leading his tattered *guerrilleros* to sever the bourgeois communication lines. For Sartre, such an individual "makes himself historical in order to undertake the eternal" (Poster, p. 189). By contrast, Marx ridiculed guerrilla-style revolutionists as play-actors and homosexuals, while August Bebel, the leader of the German Social Democratic Party, wrote a whole pamphlet entitled *Assassinations and Socialism* to denounce the terrorists as sick people who

6. Ignazio Silone, speaking from the position of one who *had* been a Communist, learned that communist society had its own "atomization," for it consisted of "comrades" but no friends. See his *The Seed Beneath the Snow*, tr. Frances Frenaye, New York, NY, Harper & Brothers, 1942, p. 235.

7. Poster, p. 173.

8. See *The New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1977.

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brought discredit to the labor movement.[9]

The sociological content of Sartre's concept of freedom is much the same as that set forth in William James's brilliant essay "Great Men and Their Environment" and in Sidney Hook's *The Hero in History*.[10] However, the obsessive preoccupation with "making history" easily translates into a rationale for anarcho-terrorist and dictatorial behavior. The "history-maker" invariably regards his own "freedom" as privileged over that of others; he rejects liberal democracy, which requires that one's freedom be exercised within a framework in which the freedom of others is not cancelled, and instead claims that he personifies the will of the "masses." A society with a multitude of such "history-makers," claiming the prerogatives of illegality and terrorism, lives in permanent chaos and eventually comes to welcome an authoritarian power to restore order. Thus, for all its bright hopes, existential voluntarism is shortly transmuted into a somber ideology for the subordination of the people at large. For every "free" man, there is a brigade of slaves.

Emerging as a curious symbiosis between professors of philosophy and student activists, existential Marxism suffers from a profound "ideological fallacy." This lies in its tenet that social issues must be fought out as metaphysical ones. This fallacy imparts to these Marxists' political discussions a certain aroma of profundity: one talks theology, or cosmology, or epistemology, and suddenly, presto!, as from a conjuror's hat, out comes a political program. Thus, the philosopher of literature, Jacques Derrida, asked to define structuralism (those concepts of Levi-Strauss that have of late been combined with existential Marxism), answered cryptically that it signified "the end of property."[11] Exactly how the existence of universal forms of thought entailed the end, beginning, or continuance of sociolegal arrangements remains a Higher Ideological Mystery.

FOR MORE THAN a half century, Georg Lukács has been the symbol of the European literary-philosophical intellectual who has not only espoused Marxism, but has accepted the privileges and disabilities of communist party membership. During Lukács' last years in Budapest, many a young Western intellectual made his pilgrimage to talk with the Master, and duly to publish his interview with him. Michael Löwy, an ardent left neo-Marxist and author of the third volume reviewed here, calls Lukács "the greatest Marxist philosopher of the twentieth century." That might be so, but it would also go to prove how impoverished in thought the Marxist philosophers have been. What is distinctive about Löwy's book is that it examines Lukács' life and work as a case study in the sociology of revolutionary intellectuals (on the purely theoretical side, the work is not as informative as Victor Zitta's *Georg Lukács' Marxism* [12]).

What was the mental evolution that transformed Lukács, the son of a prosperous banker, into a Communist in 1918, and the Vice-Commissar of Culture in the short-lived Hungarian Communist Republic of 1919? According to Löwy, the roots of the anticapitalist spirit of intellectuals lie deep in their lower-middle-class origins, which predispose them to an ethical-cultural romantic opposition to capitalism: This account, I should think, is belied overwhelmingly by the "petty bourgeois" who are usually more "bourgeois" in their loyalties than the capitalist organizers, and is in any case irrelevant to Lukács, who wrote of his own background:

I come from a capitalist Lipotvaros [a fashionable district] family.... From my childhood I was profoundly discontent with the Lipotvaros way of life. Since my father... was regularly in contact with the representatives of the city patriciate..., my rejection tended to extend to them too. Thus at a very early age violently oppositional feelings ruled in me against the whole of official Hungary.[13]

Whatever its source, Lukács' radical critical propensity was reinforced in the university circles of which he was successively a member before and during World War I—the Galileo Circle and the Scientific Social Society at the University of Budapest, and then the cenacle around the revered sociologist, Max Weber, at Heidelberg, where an undercurrent of romantic anticapitalist protest prevailed among such men as Robert Michels, Georg Simmel, and Ernst Bloch. While still in the

9. Indeed, the very appeal of deterministic historical materialism to the German Social Democrats was that it made large-scale economic and social movements, not posturing heroes, the independent variables in history. See Guenther Roth, *The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany*, Totowa, NJ, Bedminster Press, 1963, pp. 166 ff.

10. William James, *The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, New York, NY, Longmans, Green & Co., 1897, pp. 216-54; and Hook, *The Hero in History*, New York, NY, The John Day Company, 1943.

11. Poster, p. 338.

12. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

13. Translated in William O. McCagg, Jr., *Jewish Nobles and Geniuses in Modern Hungary*, Boulder, CO, East European Quarterly, 1972, p. 106.

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Galileo Circle, Lukács was deeply affected by the poetry of Endre Ady, with its revolutionary syndicalist outlook. This circle of young cultural critics founded the Free School of the Sciences of the Mind (where philosophic idealism animated critiques of capitalist society), though Lukács still continued, until 1914, to doubt whether socialism had the kind of religious power that had emanated from primitive Christianity. He brooded upon suicide, criticized kindness as weakness, and studied Fyodor Dostoyevsky. He felt drawn to the mystical atheism of the Russian terrorists, with their strange search for salvation in murder and suicide; atheism seemed to him to lead necessarily to socialism. Lukács had first read Marx in 1908 while working on an essay on the modern drama, but only gradually during the war did he find himself acknowledging in a Kantian-Marxist idiom that the working class is "the Messianic class of world history."[14]

Then in 1918 Lukács was stirred by the Bolsheviks as the inheritors of Dostoyevsky's student murderer, Raskolnikov. Bloodshedders and criminals were laying down the new moral law. The communists, in their very crimes, were taking the sins of the world upon themselves. Masters of the dialectic set forth the principle that good emerges out of evil. The Kantian moralist merged with the Leninist immoralist. According to a disciple, Lukács said: "The ethical communist has the supreme duty of acting immorally: this is the greatest sacrifice the Revolution demands of him."[15] Renouncing ethics seemed to be his act of passage to manhood. In December 1918, between two Sundays, Lukács was converted to the Hungarian Communist Party; in February 1919, he became a member of its Central Committee.

Lukács was the one outstanding figure from the university circles of pre-World War I Central Europe to become a communist activist. A kind of halo emanating from his sacrificial dedication therefore enveloped him, suggesting a philosophic depth which he really lacked. The novelist Thomas Mann, who knew Lukács well, used him as a model for the character of Leo Naphta in *The Magic Mountain*.[16] Naphta is a strange blend, a Jesuit and a communist, a Jew become Catholic—comingling his yearning for a medieval order with slogans of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a masochist monk and a would-be sadistic dictator. As Löwy notes (p. 66), Lukács himself regarded Naphta as representing Catholic fascist tendencies. Indeed, when Mann's novel first appeared, Naphta's character seemed bizarre, a caricature so exaggerated as to have no base in social reality. Yet Mann had in actuality grasped aspects of the revolutionary intellectual which lay concealed behind the rhetoric and the propaganda.

The next half-century of Lukács' life fluctuated around just such a self-immolating norm of political evil sanctified by the party. In abnegation of his scholarly conscience, he sacrificed his perception of truth to Party Truth. For example, in 1923 Lukács wrote his famous *History and Class Conciousness* in which he developed the central idea of the reification of the human spirit under the bourgeois system. Because the work placed such an emphasis on the will of the human subject in revolutionary activity, Soviet spokesmen accused Lukács of a "Left deviation." Dutifully, Lukács acknowledged his "idealistic deviation." Repudiating his "revolutionary juvenile ideals," he adopted a more Hegelian "realism" and wrote an abject essay of self-criticism in 1929. Many years later he was to admit that this was a hypocritical essay, justified on "realistic" grounds.[17]

Indeed, it was sadly true of Lukács that his politically most significant decades were spent in what might be called "holy hypocrisy." A bland sense of double standards pervaded his writings. Although morally indignant with the reification of man under bourgeois society, he repressed the question as to whether such "reification"—with all its manifold forms of hypocrisy—did not flourish far more under a socialist system. While rejecting Nikita Khrushchev's explanation of the crimes of the Stalinist era as deformations arising from Stalin's individual aberration, Lukács lacked the intellectual courage to trace the phenomenon back to its fundamental social sources, presumably because that would have sounded the hollowness of his own messianic stance.

Lukács is now much admired by neo-Marxists as the precursor in the rediscovery of the "young Marx." This "rediscovery" is another example of what we might call the phenomenon of "selective identification" that runs through the history of Marxist ideology. The not-so-New Left prefers the youthful Karl Marx when he was writing his philo-

14. Löwy, p. 154.
15. Ibid., p. 160.
16. Ibid., pp. 69 ff. Also see Zitta, op. cit., p. 59; and Ignace Feuerlicht, *Thomas Mann*, New York, NY, Twayne Publishers, 1968, p. 39.
17. Löwy, pp. 230, 235, 237.

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sophic manuscripts about "alienation" in 1844. An older generation prefers the Marx of 1867, at age 49, when he published *Capital*, with its law of inevitable social development. A very new group prefers the Marx of still later manuscripts when he was suggesting the special role of scientists in the development of industry. Young adherents of the New Religious Consciousness prefer Marx in his teens when he was writing religious essays of New Testament devotion.

Why is it that revolutionary intellectuals, who may be consciously rejecting all the basic propositions of historical materialism, still feel the need to call themselves Marxists and to somehow identify with Marx? Evidently, there exists an inner instability at the center of the revolutionary personality. Neither so convinced of his beliefs nor so confident in his direction as he pretends to be, the revolutionist sustains a guilt and loneliness arising from his rejection of his family, his friends, his first values. He who rejects his traditions entirely must all the more firmly rivet himself to some surrogate orthodoxy. The rebel against "bourgeois" conscience and duty must substitute even more unquestioningly "proletarian" ones to give him certainty and assurance. Marginal, partial rebels can be skeptics; total rebels are always dogmatists. Thus, Marxism becomes defined not as an invariant set of propositions, but rather as a revolutionary emotion· identifying selectively with Marx at different times in his life during the course of which he held to varying, contrary propositions. Revolutionaries would still need to emplace Marx as their super-ego if they threw aside almost every one of his tracts and treatises.

Allied to this need for a Marx ego-ideal is the mystique which envelops the party for the revolutionary intellectual and of which ordinary political parties in democratic societies know nothing. Lukács dwelled, for instance, on the significance of the party as the self-consciousness of a class; to be outside the party meant for him to be excluded from the processes of history-making. This party mysticism is a metaphysical need of the revolutionist, for his political party must fulfill all the functions of the family, friends, and religion which he has renounced. It must be more than their moral equivalent; the new Marx-Father must possess the authority to banish the old and mitigate guilt. New comrades must supplant brothers and intimates. With the party's authority, the revolutionist deeply represses into his unconscious all old warm, emotional associations. The party always feels threatened by any spontaneous incursion of personal emotion or poetry, which it views as a potential threat to discipline. The party is akin in its psychological functioning to the institutions of the Church Universal and the Grand Army. Leo Naphta is indeed the exemplar of the Party Activist.

Curiously, the bloodshed, tyranny, and propagandist antics of the Hungarian Communist regime of 1919 had an unforeseen consequence. They estranged a new generation of young Hungarian Jewish schoolboys from Marxism and confirmed them in the choice of science rather than ideology. This post-Communist generation, blessed with scientific genius and enjoying a scientific education that was undistorted by Leninist ideology, gave the world John von Neumann, Edward Teller, Leo Szilard, Eugene Wigner, and the older Theodor Von Karmann. To their colleagues at Los Alamos in later years, they seemed almost possessed of extraterrestrial intelligence, so that they were called "the Martians."[18] Lukács' political metaphysics provides a sorry contrast to their achievements in objective knowledge.

TO MICHAEL LÖWY, our present time resembles the period before 1918 when Lukács made his communist commitment. The cenacles of intellectuals, especially the young ("*surtout les jeunes*"), have become radicalized, but they do not quite know how to channelize their anticapitalist feelings. They are attracted by the revolutions in the Third World, which, allegedly repudiating the culture of gadgetry, are fashioning new values of altruism and solidarity. They regard the reported American atrocities in Vietnam as "organic expressions of capitalist civilization at its apogee" (p. 269). Of course, somehow overlooked by this ideological vision is the vastly huger scale of atrocities in Communist societies from Cambodia to the Soviet Union, which are, moreover, "organically" rooted in these societies and not incidental or accidental to them as was the My Lai episode of massacre to the American.

As a neo-Marxist, Michael Löwy tries to explain the radicalization of the intellectual class on economic grounds. Intellectual work, he argues, has become proletarianized, and therefore the intellectuals, especially the young ones, have become anticapitalist. However, the very "global character" of the revolt of the intellectuals that Löwy notes sug-

18. See Stanley A. Blumberg and Gwinn Owens, *Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward Teller*, New York, NY, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976, p. 265.

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gests that this is far more a generational-educational phenomenon than one founded on technological or economic developments. The student unrest in the United States began in the 1960's, when the economic prospects for students were excellent, and has subsided precisely during a period when academic competition and requirements have become more severe. Although Löwy opposes any generational interpretation of the phenomenon of student radicalization, he does concede that there is involved a revolt, under modern conditions, against "the repressive authority of the paterfamilias, the schoolmaster, priest," and against the codes of sexual morality and the "work ethic," that the "explosion" in the numbers of university students has abetted. What Löwy fails to recognize is that "university culture" has always tended to engender an emotional-intellectual vector at odds with the surrounding social system.

University Marxism, highly important as a sociological phenomenon, is much less significant as a theoretical advance. The European Marxists are almost wholly ignorant of the far more creative thought of the earlier contemporary American Marxists. For instance, during the 1930's American Marxists were making a far richer contribution to Marxist theory than their European counterparts. While Sartre was being exhilarated by the notion that you could build a philosophical construction out of a bubbling cocktail,[19] Sidney Hook, Max Eastman, and Edmund Wilson were probing the bases of literary and philosophical Marxism. Bertram D. Wolfe, moreover, had tried to develop a theory of "American exceptionalism" that preceded the analogous concept of "Eurocommunism" by more than 40 years.[20]

Of even greater importance, the American Marxists went on—as post-Marxists—to write such books as Wolfe's *Three Who Made a Revolution,*[21] exploring the Soviet revolutionary character and social reality with an integrity that no European neo-Marxist can match. Europe's "University Marxists" prefer to protect their will to illusion. Thus it is not surprising that they ignore the American efforts—efforts that the Europeans have recapitulated in vaguer, more ponderous, more pretentious, and more pedantic form.

19. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Prime of Life,* tr. Peter Green, Cleveland, OH, The World Publishing Co., 1962, p. 112.

20. Bertram D. Wolfe, *What is the Communist Opposition?,* 2nd ed., New York, NY, Workers Age Publishing Association, 1933, pp. 15 ff.

21. New York, NY, Dial Press, 1948.

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